G. W. M., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1980-12-24
No. 79-2603
DOWNEY, HERSEY and HURLEY, JJ., concur.
391 So. 2d 738 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1980) Caution
Cited by 14 cases

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Synopsis

A thirteen-year-old juvenile was committed to the Florida Department of Children and Family Services for delinquent acts. The court affirms the adjudication of delinquency but remands for correction of the commitment term, which exceeded statutory limits for juvenile commitments.


Holding

A juvenile commitment must be for an indeterminate period but cannot exceed the maximum term of imprisonment an adult may serve for the offense, with the commitment ending when the child either reaches age nineteen or is discharged by the department, whichever occurs first. The commitment term imposed here exceeded these statutory boundaries and must be corrected.


Headnotes

[1] A court must reconcile contradictory statutory provisions to harmonize and reconcile them.

[2] A juvenile's commitment to the department for a delinquent act may be for an indeterminate period until discharge or age nineteen, but shall not exceed the maximum term o…

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Key Quotes

“the term of said commitment shall be until said child is discharged by the department or until he reaches the age of 19”

Establishes the maximum duration of juvenile commitment under section 39.11(1)(c)

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Facts & Procedural History

G.W.M., age thirteen years and two months, was adjudicated delinquent for two crimes and committed on December 4, 1979 until his nineteenth birthday, …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm the conviction and remand for correction of the sentence.

Appellant was committed on December 4, 1979 at which time he was thirteen years and two months old. The commitment was to the date of his nineteenth birthday or a term of approximately five years and ten months. An adult could have received a maximum sentence for the two crimes involved here of five years and sixty days. Section 39.11(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1979) provides that when a child has been adjudicated to have committed a delinquent act, the court may:

(c) Commit the child to the department. Said commitment shall be for the purpose of exercising active control, including, but not limited to, custody, care, training, treatment, and furlough into the community. Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 743.07, the term of said commitment shall be until said child is discharged by the department or until he reaches the age of 19.

Section 39.11(3), Florida Statutes (1979) specifies:

(3) Any commitment of a delinquent child to the department shall be for an indeterminate period of time, but the time shall not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment which an adult may serve for the same offense. Any child so committed may be discharged from institutional confinement or a program upon the direction of the department. Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 743.07, no child shall be held under a commitment from a court pursuant to this section after becoming 19 years of age.

Where statutory provisions appear contradictory, it is the duty of the judiciary to adopt, if possible, a construction which harmonizes and reconciles those provisions. Woodgate Development Corp. v. Hamilton Investment Trust, 351 So. 2d 14 (Fla.1977).

In this case, the provisions may be construed to require a commitment of an indeterminate period of time until the child is discharged by the department or reaches the age of nineteen, but not to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment which an adult may serve for the offense. Thus, a child’s commitment has parameters of the maximum sentence or his becoming 19, whichever occurs first. Otherwise, the term of commitment is until the child is discharged by the department.

The sentence of commitment exceeds these boundaries and must be corrected.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part, with directions, and remanded.

DOWNEY, HERSEY and HURLEY, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • F.R. v. State, 473 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
    …ed by an HRS counselor. The period of community control should have been no greater than the maximum term of incarceration which an adult could serve for the offense or when defendant reaches age nineteen, whichever is sooner. See G.W.M. v. State, 391 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Also, the responsibility for determining the amount of restitution should not have been so delegated. See J.J.S. v. State, 465 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). We therefore reverse and remand for resentencing. RYDER, C.J., and…
  • In the Interest of J. P., 405 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
    …nse. Section 39.11(3), Florida Statutes (1979). Another amendment provides that any term of probation shall not extend beyond the juvenile’s 19th birthday. Section 39.-ll(l)(a). We have interpreted the effects of these provisions in G.W.M. v. State, 391 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). . Justice Fortas, in writing the opinion which assured numerous procedural due process rights to juveniles, noted: “If Gerald had been over 18, he would not have been subject to Juvenile Court proceedings. For the particular of…
  • Marvin Lynn Dunlap/Donald Ray Griffis v. State, 433 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
    …extent that it exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment generally applicable when an adult is convicted of second degree grand theft. In support of this position Dunlap cites J.W.H. v. State, 402 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), and G.W.M. v. State, 391 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Those cases involved delinquency adjudications under Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, which expressly provides that the juvenile’s commitment “shall not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment which an adult may serve for the same…

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