MARVIN LYNN DUNLAP/DONALD RAY GRIFFIS, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A youthful offender sentence imposed under Chapter 958, Florida Statutes, is not limited by the maximum term of imprisonment applicable to adult offenders for the same crime.
Appellant Dunlap, classified as a youthful offender, was sentenced to four years imprisonment and two years of community control for second-degree gra…
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WENTWORTH, Judge.
Appellants seek review of judgments of conviction and sentences for the offense of second degree grand theft. Among other issues, appellant Dunlap asserts error as to the length of his sentence as a youthful offender. We affirm the orders appealed.
Upon being classified as a youthful offender Dunlap was sentenced pursuant to § 958.05, Florida Statutes, to a term of four years’ imprisonment followed by two years in a community control program. Dunlap contends that such sentence is statutorily impermissible to the extent that it exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment generally applicable when an adult is convicted of second degree grand theft. In support of this position Dunlap cites J.W.H. v. State, 402 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), and G.W.M. v. State, 391 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Those cases involved delinquency adjudications under Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, which expressly provides that the juvenile’s commitment “shall not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment which an adult may serve for the same offense.” See § 39.11(3). The present case does not involve that statute.
Dunlap was sentenced as a youthful offender pursuant to Chapter 958, Florida Statutes, which expressly provides that such disposition is “in lieu of other criminal penalties authorized by law .... ” See § 958.05. While § 958.05(2) indicates that the offender shall serve the entire sentence “unless sooner released as provided by law,” we construe this language as referring to the possibility of early release, such as by parole, consistent with the sentence imposed. Insofar as Chapter 958 circumscribes the penalties for qualifying offenders, thereby precluding the application of other sanctions, see, Whitlock v. State, 404 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), general sentencing provisions external to Chapter 958 do not constrain the term of Dunlap’s confinement as a youthful offender. The order appealed is affirmed.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J., and ZEH-MER, J., concur.
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State v. Livingston Milbry, 476 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 1985)…McDonald, justice. We have for review Milbry v. State, 469 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), which directly and expressly conflicts with Dunlap v. State, 433 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The issue here is whether a defendant may be sentenced as a youthful offender in excess of the statutory maximum sentence an adult offender could receive for the same crime. W…
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Livingston Milbry v. State, 469 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…er Act [ch. 958, Fla.Stat. (1983) ] may not be invoked to impose a sentence which exceeds the statutory maximum set for the offense for which an accused stands convicted. Saunders v. State, 405 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); contra Dunlap v. State, 433 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The Act was obviously designed to impose more lenient sanctions on a youthful offender who meets the statutory requirements, not to aggravate the sanctions which would ordinarily apply. The adjudication of guilt under review i…
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Andrews v. State, 448 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…to the Department of Corrections for a maximum period of five years, since attempted manslaughter is a third degree felony, which may be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years. The First District Court of Appeal, in Dunlap v. State, 433 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), rejected a substantially identical contention, upon a holding that sentencing for any felony, including a third degree felony, must be accomplished in accordance with Section 958.05, Florida Statutes, which provides that a court…
Authorities Cited
- Whitlock v. State, 404 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- G. W. M. v. State, 391 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- S. Miami Pools & Travelers Ins. Co. v. Graves, 402 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- J. W. H. v. State, 402 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)