STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
RUDOLPH STEPHEN VUKOJEVICH, APPELLEE
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The State appealed a criminal court's discharge of a first-degree murder defendant based on violation of the 180-day speedy trial rule. The appellate court reversed, holding that a change of venue granted mid-trial constituted a mistrial, restarting the 90-day timeline, and that the defendant's subsequent motion for continuance waived the speedy trial requirement.
The court reversed the discharge order, holding that: (1) voir dire commenced on January 2, 1980, bringing the defendant to trial within 180 days; (2) the grant of change of venue mid-trial was equivalent to a mistrial, giving the State 90 days to retry; (3) the defendant's motion for continuance eliminated the 90-day requirement and made speedy trial subject to judicial discretion; and (4) the defendant was not entitled to discharge.
[1] A trial commences for speedy trial rule purposes when the jury panel is sworn for voir dire examination.
[2] A motion for change of venue granted after voir dire has begun may be deemed equivalent to a mistrial, triggering a new speedy trial period.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 requires that the State bring an accused to trial within 180 days of taking him into custody on a felony charge. The rule specifically provides that a person is deemed to have been brought to trial when trial commences by the swearing of a jury panel for voir dire examination.”
Establishes the core statutory requirement and defines when trial is deemed to have commenced for purposes of the speedy trial rule.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceVukojevich was arrested on July 19, 1979, and indicted for first-degree murder on July 30, 1979. Voir dire began on January 2, 1980 (within 180 days).…
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RYDER, Judge.
The State appeals from the discharge of Rudolph Stephen Vukojevich pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191. We reverse.
The Charlotte County Sheriff’s Department arrested appellee on July 19, 1979. The State filed an indictment charging first degree murder on July 30, 1979. Appellee moved for a change of venue on October 17, 1979, and the court denied the motion subject to trying to select a Charlotte County jury. The court, after several delays charged to the State, set trial for January 2, 1980.
After voir dire had been initiated on January 2, and after several prospective jurors had been discharged for cause, the State withdrew its objection to venue change and the appellee renewed his motion for change of venue. The court granted the motion and reset the case for trial on January 21, 1980 but in Collier County. On January 11, appellee moved for discharge noting that 180 days had passed since his arrest. Ap-pellee also filed a motion for continuance on January 18. At hearing on January 21, the court denied the motion for discharge, finding that exceptional circumstances required a change of venue. Citing the need for further discovery, appellee then pursued his motion for continuance and agreed that the delay would be charged to him. The court set trial for June 10 in Hendry County. The record reflects that extensive discovery and motion practices followed.
During voir dire on June 10, appellee again moved for discharge. The court granted discharge, asserting that the State had had two weeks within which to try appellee after the change of venue, and was prevented from doing so only by a crowded trial docket. The court alternately observed that appellee should have been brought to trial within 90 days from the grant of his motion for continuance on January 21.
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 requires that the State bring an accused to trial within 180 days of taking him into custody on a felony charge. The rule specifically provides that a person is deemed to have been brought to trial when trial commences by the swearing of a jury panel for voir dire examination. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(3). Since the voir dire examination of prospective jurors began on January 2, 1980 below, appellee was brought to trial within 180 days for the purpose of the rule. Moore v. State, 368 So. 2d 1291 (Fla.1979); Stuart v. State, 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla.1979); State ex rel Capibianco v. Green, 377 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
We hold that the granting of appellee’s motion for change of venue at that time to be equivalent to a mistrial, which gave the State 90 days within which to retry appellee. The court properly set trial for January 21, and properly denied the motion for discharge filed on January 16. Appellee then moved for continuance and this had the effect of eliminating the 90-day requirement. When the continuance was granted, the time limits set forth in the rule became inapplicable, and speedy trial requirements become determined in the light of individual circumstances as a matter of judicial discretion. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla.1980), quoting State ex rel Butler v. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla.1971).
We hold that the trial beginning on June 10 was thus permitted by the rule, and appellee was not entitled to discharge. We note that appellee could still have demanded speedy trial within 60 days under the provision of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(2), but failed to do so.
The order of discharge is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
SCHEB, C. J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Lobik v. State, 506 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…n for discharge and was sentenced on February 4, 1986. This timely appeal followed. The general rule is that “a defense continuance usually constitutes a waiver of the defendant’s right to trial within the speedy trial period.” State v. Vukojevich, 392 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Also generally, a state continuance does not extend speedy trial time absent a finding of exceptional circumstances under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(f). State v. Burris, 424 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The deter…
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State v. Musselwhite, 402 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…e time the court entered its order on May 30, 1980, the jury panel for Mussel-white’s trial had been sworn for voir dire examination and, thusly, the State had satisfied all speedy trial requirements. Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.191(a)(3). State v. Vukojevich, 392 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). The trial court erred in denying the State’s motion to permit trial time after receipt of the mandate and that order is REVERSED. The order granting appellee’s motion to suppress is also REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for fur…
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George v. Honorable Thomas T. Trettis, 500 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…held as of October 30, when George filed this petition. Although it is true, as the respondent contends, that a defense continuance usually constitutes a waiver of the defendant’s right to trial within the speedy trial period, State v. Vukojevich, 392 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), we cannot agree with the suggestion that this case involves one or more defense requests for continuance. The record supports the conclusion of the original judge that any problems with preparation of this case are largely of the…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State of Fla. ex rel. Isaac Don Butler & Gerald Nickles v. Honorable Ralph O. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1971)
- Honorable Robert A. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1980)
- Alphonso Stuart v. State, 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978)
- Moore v. State, 368 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. 1979)
- Entenmann's Bakery OF Fla., Inc. v. Loughlin, 368 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. 1979)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Joe Capibianco & Debbie Matthews v. Green, 377 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)