ASHLEY DOWNING GEORGE, PETITIONER,
v.
HONORABLE THOMAS T. TRETTIS, RESPONDENT
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Ashley George petitioned for a writ of prohibition to bar trial on felony charges, arguing the trial court violated Florida's speedy trial rule by failing to schedule trial within the required period after denying his motion for discharge. The court granted the writ, holding that discovery delays caused by the state, not defense requests, did not constitute a waiver of speedy trial rights and required discharge of the charges.
The court held that the trial court was obligated to grant the motion for discharge and schedule trial within ten days because the discovery delays were attributable to the state's failures, not defense continuances, and the court did not cite exceptional circumstances justifying denial of the motion as required by rule. George must be discharged.
[1] A defendant's right to a speedy trial may be violated when discovery is not promptly furnished by the state, and the court may continue a case at the state's expense beyo…
[2] A defense continuance typically waives the defendant's right to trial within the speedy trial period, but this does not apply when delays are attributable to the state's…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Discovery must be furnished within sufficient time to permit the defendant to make use of it without having to forfeit his right to a speedy trial, and when discovery is not promptly furnished, the court may continue a case at the state's expense beyond the speedy trial limits even if such continuance effectively results in the discharge of the defendant.”
Establishes that state-caused discovery delays justify continuances beyond speedy trial limits and can result in discharge
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGeorge was arrested January 30, 1986, and arraigned March 3, 1986. The state failed to promptly comply with discovery requests, leading to repeated de…
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PER CURIAM.
Ashley George has petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition barring respondent from proceeding with trial on felony charges in violation of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191.
George furnishes us with the following chronology, all adequately documented. He was arrested January 30, 1986, arraigned on March 3, 1986, and the case was set for “docket control purposes” on April 8. Prior to that date, on March 21, 1986, the docket was sounded and there was some discussion of pending defense motions including one to require the state to comply with discovery requests. That motion was granted.
On April 4, 1986, George’s attorney stated he “would like to go to trial” but complained that the state had not sufficiently satisfied its discovery obligations. The April 8 appearance apparently never took place. Instead, on May 2, 1986, defense counsel lodged another complaint against what he considered tardy compliance with the discovery rule. The court decided to “continue it” but added, “It’s the state's problem.” The “problem” apparently went unresolved through May 23. Here the state noted that trial was set in ten days and offered to furnish the desired information prior to that date. Calling this proposal “unreasonable”, defense counsel suggested a continuance chargeable to the state and maintained that he had no intention of waiving his client’s right to a speedy trial. At the same hearing, by mutual consent, the presiding judge withdrew from the case. The state asked that speedy trial be “tolled” until a new judge could be reassigned. George did not object. Respondent was assigned to the case June 2, 1986. For some reason the case continued to appear on the docket of the first judge.
On August 29, 1986, defense counsel stated he had just received “additional discovery,” which he accused the state of having withheld.
On September 26, 1986, counsel charged that the state had twice furnished an incorrect address for a witness, and he added that he had been continuously ready to try the case but for these alleged omissions. The motion for discharge was filed on or about October 3, 1986, heard October 8, and denied by an order filed October 21, 1986. Neither at the hearing nor in the motion did the respondent make specific findings as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(i)(4). Trial was not held as of October 30, when George filed this petition.
Although it is true, as the respondent contends, that a defense continuance usually constitutes a waiver of the defendant’s right to trial within the speedy trial period, State v. Vukojevich, 392 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), we cannot agree with the suggestion that this case involves one or more defense requests for continuance.
The record supports the conclusion of the original judge that any problems with preparation of this case are largely of the state’s making. Discovery must be furnished within sufficient time to permit the defendant to make use of it without having to forfeit his right to a speedy trial, and when discovery is not promptly furnished, the court may continue a case at the state’s expense beyond the speedy trial limits even if such continuance effectively results in the discharge of the defendant. State v. Williams, 497 So. 2d 730 (consolidated) (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). State v. Del Gaudio, 445 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
We find nothing in the documents furnished by the state to indicate that George was in any way to blame for his inability to complete discovery in timely fashion or that defense counsel misled the court about the alleged discovery problems. Any delay caused by the subsequent reassignment of the case to respondent was minimal at best, and the fact that George’s counsel did not object to “tolling” speedy trial until the reassignment cannot be construed as acquiescence to a trial date beyond the speedy trial period.
Moreover, neither the reassignment nor the controversy surrounding discovery was cited as “exceptional circumstances” justifying denial of the motion, as required by the rule.
Accordingly, the trial court was obligated to schedule trial within ten days of the hearing on the motion for discharge. Its failure to do so requires that George be discharged. Apolinari v. Ulmer, 483 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA), petition for review denied, 492 So. 2d 1335 (Fla.1985).
We grant the petition for writ of prohibition.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and LEHAN and FRANK, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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McKINNEY v. Honorable Theron A. Yawn, Jr., 625 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…ke use of it in preparation for trial, the court may properly continue the case on the defendant’s request, charge the continuance to the state, and thereafter grant the defendant a discharge based on a speedy trial violation. See George v. Trettis, 500 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); State v. Williams, 497 So .2d 730 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); State v. Del Gaudio, 445 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 453 So. 2d 45 (Fla.1984).1 See also Lasker v. Parker, 513 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987);2 State ex rel. Wright…
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The Honorable Jonathan T. Colby v. McNEILL, 595 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…9); Granade v. Ader, 530 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 541 So. 2d 1172 (Fla.1988); Brown v. State, 527 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 534 So. 2d 398 (Fla.1988); Lobik v. State, 506 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); George v. Trettis, 500 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); State v. Williams, 497 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Perez v. State, 474 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), rev. denied, 484 So. 2d 10 (Fla.1986); State v. Hutley, 474 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), rev. denied, 486 So. 2d 596 (Fla.…
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Albert Banks v. State, 691 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…he court was concerned with prejudice to the defendant by last minute delays caused by a violation of discovery rules as the speedy trial time was about to expire. Here, there is no such issue. For that reason, we also do not deem George v. Trettis, 500 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) and Lobik v. State, 506 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) to be in conflict with this opinion. Appellant cites no authority applying the Del Gaudio principle under these circumstances, nor has Appellant furnished any authority indica…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. del Gaudio, 445 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- State v. Vukojevich, 392 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Apolinari v. The Honorable Ray E. Ulmer, Jr., 483 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- McPHAUL v. State, 497 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Smith v. State, 497 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)