STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
GUILLERMO GASTON GODOY, APPELLEE
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The court held that a defendant's waiver of speedy trial rights applies to a second information charging him as an accessory after the fact to the same robbery underlying the initial prosecution, even though the charges differ. The trial court's discharge order was reversed because the waiver extended to charges arising from the same criminal conduct.
A speedy trial waiver applies to a second information when the charges arise from the same criminal conduct or episode, regardless of whether the second information charges a different crime or degree of participation. The trial court erred in discharging the case based on the difference in the specific charges.
[1] A defendant's waiver of speedy trial rights applies to an amended information if the amended charge arises from the same criminal episode as the original charge.
[2] A speedy trial waiver remains effective even if the amended information charges a more serious crime, provided the charges stem from the same criminal conduct.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“At issue is whether a defendant's waiver of speedy trial rights in an initial prosecution for robbery applies to the prosecution of a second information charging the defendant as an accessory after the fact to the same robbery that formed the basis of the initial prosecution. We hold that the waiver does apply to the second information and reverse the trial court's order of discharge.”
Establishes the precise issue and the court's holding on the central question of whether a speedy trial waiver extends to different charges arising from the same criminal conduct.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant Godoy was initially prosecuted for robbery. He waived his speedy trial rights in that prosecution. The state then filed a second informa…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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ANSTEAD, Judge.
At issue is whether a defendant’s waiver of speedy trial rights in an initial prosecution for robbery applies to the prosecution of a second information charging the defendant as an accessory after the fact to the same robbery that formed the basis of the initial prosecution. We hold that the waiver does apply to the second information and reverse the trial court’s order of discharge.
The positions of the parties are virtually identical to those involved in State v. Corlew, 382 So. 2d 787 (Fla.2d DCA 1980). Because we agree completely with the views expressed by Judge Scheb in that opinion we quote with approval his analysis of the parties’ positions and the controlling authorities:
The state contends that Corlew’s waiver of his right to be tried within 180 days was effective as to the state’s amended information since the amended information was based on the same conduct or criminal episode as the original information. Homer v. State, 358 So. 2d 1176 (Fla.3d DCA 1978); State v. Luck, 336 So. 2d 464 (Fla.4th DCA 1976). Corlew, however, seeks to sustain the trial court’s ruling on the basis of State v. Boyd, 368 So. 2d 54 (Fla.2d DCA 1979). He asserts that Boyd stands for the proposition that a speedy trial waiver does not apply to an amended information charging a more serious crime than the original information. We disagree.
Although Boyd involved a second information which charged the same crime as the original information, the basis for this court’s decision was that the charge in both informations arose out of the same criminal conduct. Id. at 55. Moreover, in Boyd this court cited Homer which held that a waiver under an information charging a defendant with driving while intoxicated applied to a second information charging vehicular homicide. Since the second information in Homer charged a more serious crime than the original information and Boyd relies on Homer, Boyd does not support Corlew’s position.
Similarly here, the trial court granted the motion for discharge on the grounds that the second information did not charge the same exact crime as was charged in the first information. The second information, instead of charging the defendant with direct participation in the robbery, alleged that he was an accessory after the fact. We believe that charge was based upon the same criminal conduct or episode as alleged in the first information and that the waiver of speedy trial filed as to the first information applied to the second information. State v. Luck, 336 So. 2d 464 (Fla.4th DCA 1976); Clark v. State, 318 So. 2d 513 (Fla.4th DCA 1975).
Accordingly, the order of discharge is hereby reversed with directions for further proceedings consistent herewith.
DOWNEY and HERSEY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Clark v. State, 318 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- State v. Luck, 336 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Hernandez v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 358 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Homer v. State, 358 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- State v. Corlew, 382 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- State v. Boyd, 368 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)