WILLIAM E. MCGUIRE, APPELLANT,
v.
SPINOZA, INC., AND HIGHLANDS INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
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McGuire, a workers' compensation claimant, appealed the deputy commissioner's order barring his claim for additional medical treatment as time-barred. The court reversed, holding that a second check issued by the carrier in October 1978 constituted a new payment of compensation that restarted the two-year statute of limitations period under Florida law.
The court held that the October 18, 1978 check was a payment of compensation that restarted the statute of limitations period. Because McGuire's claim was filed January 4, 1980, which is within two years of the October 18, 1978 payment, his claim was not barred by the statute of limitations.
[1] A workers' compensation claim is not barred by the statute of limitations if filed within two years of the date of the last payment of compensation.
[2] A check issued as payment of compensation tolls the statute of limitations, even if a prior uncashed check for the same amount was issued.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If McGuire's claim was filed within two years of the date of the last payment of compensation, it was not barred by the statute of limitations. Section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes. The check dated October 18, 1978, was a payment of compensation.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard and the court's determination that the October 1978 check constituted a payment that restarted the limitations period.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe original workers' compensation order was entered in January 1977, awarding McGuire permanent partial disability benefits. The carrier issued a che…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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MILLS, Chief Judge.
McGuire, claimant in a workers’ compensation action, appeals the deputy commissioner’s order which ruled his claim for additional medical treatment was barred by the statute of limitations. We reverse.
The original order of compensation was entered in January, 1977, and awarded permanent partial disability benefits. The claimant appealed to the Industrial Relations Commission, which affirmed the award in February, 1978. The carrier wrote McGuire a check on January 19,1977, in the amount of $5,120.00, representing full payment of compensation for permanent partial disability. However, the check was never cashed. Instead, McGuire filed an application for hearing in August, 1978, for “past-due benefits,” among other things. On October 18, 1978, the carrier wrote another $5,120.00 check to McGuire.
If McGuire’s claim was filed within two years of the date of the last payment of compensation, it was not barred by the statute of limitations. Section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes. The check dated October 18, 1978, was a payment of compensation. Therefore, the deputy erred in finding the statute had run on this claim which was filed January 4, 1980.
Citing Brown v. Giffen Industries, Inc., 281 So. 2d 897 (Fla.1973), the carrier argues that the October 18 check was merely a “replacement” payment for the check previously issued and therefore does not affect the limitations period. However, Brown involved a claimant who was attempting to revive an already-expired limitations period, contrary to the well-settled principle that benefits voluntarily provided will not re-activate the limitations clock. See Miller v. Brewer Co. of Florida, Inc., 122 So. 2d 565 (Fla.1960). The Brown court was also troubled that the claimant had waited more than three years from the issuance of the first check before filing a claim for the monies due. McGuire’s application for hearing on past-due benefits was filed within six months of the IRC’s affirmance and clearly within the two-year period.
Accordingly, the deputy’s order is reversed and we remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WENTWORTH, J., and BEVERLY, VIRGINIA Q., Associate Judge, concur.
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Johnson v. Division OF Forestry, 397 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…voluntary furnishing of further remedial treatment, e. g., Mangurians v. Johnson, IRC Order 2-3464 (June 28, 1978), cert. denied, 268 So. 2d 1370 (Fla.1979); Hunt v. Southland Plumbing, IRC Order 2-3352 (February 14, 1978); McGuire v. Spinoza, Inc., 394 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). We believe that in view of the Supreme Court’s decision in Watson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., supra, the Miller case, supra, is no longer authoritative for that proposition in workers’ compensation cases where remedial treatment or…
Authorities Cited
- Brown v. Giffen Indus., Inc., 281 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1973)
- Miller v. Brewer Co. OF Fla., Inc., 122 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1960)