AIDEE LOPEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
DEMARIA PORCHE-AUDI, ETC. ET AL., APPELLEES
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The Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed a directed verdict for a vehicle owner in a negligent entrustment case, holding that an owner who entrusts a vehicle to a serviceman for repair, knowing the serviceman will use it for personal transportation, remains vicariously liable for accidents occurring during such personal use.
The owner remains vicariously liable for negligent entrustment. The limited exception established in Bickley v. Castillo does not extend to shield an owner from liability when the owner permits personal use of the automobile incidental to having it repaired. The mere fact that the automobile was being transported partly for the owner's convenience is insufficient to remove the owner's responsibility for entrusting a dangerous instrumentality.
[1] An owner of a motor vehicle is generally vicariously liable for entrusting the vehicle to another for personal use.
[2] An owner's liability for entrusting a vehicle to a repairman is not excluded when the vehicle is used for a personal use incident to repairs.
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States the foundational legal principle governing vicarious liability for negligent entrustment of motor vehicles
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PER CURIAM.
The trial judge directed a verdict for DeMaria, the owner of a vehicle, relying on this court’s opinion in Bickley v. Castillo, 346 So. 2d 625 (Fla.3d DCA 1977), approved, Castillo v. Bickley, 363 So. 2d 792 (Fla.1978). We reverse.
Under the facts of this case, the vehicle in question was entrusted to a serviceman, not only to deliver it to the repairman’s facility but with the understanding that the repairman could take it home for the night and drive it to his place of business the next day. The accident in question occurred on the way between the repairman’s home and his place of work. Generally, the owner of a motor vehicle is vicariously liable for entrusting same to another for his personal use. Southern Cotton Oil Company v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920); Greene v. Miller, 102 Fla. 767, 136 So. 532 (1931); Jordan v. Kelson, 299 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). The limited exception carved out by this court from this general rule in Bickley v. Castillo, supra, as approved by the Supreme Court of Florida in its opinion in Castillo v. Bickley, supra, does not extend to excluding an owner from liability when he permits his automobile to be used for a personal use incident to having it repaired. We also do not find that the mere fact that the automobile was being transported, in part, for the convenience of the owner is sufficient to take the owner out of the general responsibility for the entrustment of a dangerous instrumentality-
Therefore, the final judgment based on the directed verdict be and the same is hereby reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
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Est. OF Reinaldo Villanueva v. Youngblood, 927 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…y); Grilli v. Le-Bo Props. Corp., 553 So. 2d 352, 353 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (following Michalek and refusing to apply the shop exception to accident that occurred when cleaning company employee was returning car to owner); Lopez v. DeMaria Porche-Audi, 395 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). In this case, Youngblood did not turn the Lexus over to an “automobile service agency” for repair or service. Rather, he consigned the Lexus to a used [*959] car dealer for sale. While Youngblood argues that Extreme Auto was pro…
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Selma Smilowitz v. Russell, 458 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…226 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), cert. denied, 386 So. 2d 638 (Fla.1980); Jordan v. Kelson, 299 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974), cert. denied, 308 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1975), or otherwise totally unrelated to its repair, see, e.g., Lopez v. DeMaria Porche-Audi, 395 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), courts have refused to apply the shop rule exception to owner liability. In the present case, it is clear that Russell exercised no control over the offending vehicle; that at the time of the injury to the appellant, the vehicle…
Authorities Cited
- Kraemer v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1990)
- S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441 (Fla. 1920)
- Castillo v. Bickley, 363 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1978)
- DelLouise Greene v. Jas. T. Miller and wife, 102 Fla. 767 (Fla. 1931)
- Jordan v. Kelson, 299 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
- Bickley v. Castillo, 346 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)