JAMES MORGAN TINDALL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James Tindall was convicted of grand theft by jury, but the Florida appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial because the trial court improperly allowed police officer testimony about Tindall's silence after arrest, which violated his Fifth Amendment Miranda rights.
Yes. Any testimony concerning a defendant's silence when detained by police is constitutionally prohibited and constitutes reversible error regardless of prejudicial effect. The trial court erred in overruling Tindall's objection and denying his motion for mistrial.
[1] Testimony concerning a defendant's silence when detained by the police is constitutionally prohibited.
[2] Commentary on a defendant's silence during police interrogation constitutes reversible error regardless of its prejudicial effect.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Any testimony concerning appellant's silence when detained by the police is constitutionally prohibited, and constitutes reversible error without regard to its prejudicial effect.”
Establishes the absolute prohibition on comments about post-arrest silence under Miranda
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA police officer testified that he interviewed Tindall shortly after arrest and read him his Miranda rights. When asked if Tindall made any statements…
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ORFINGER, Judge.
Appellant, convicted by a jury of grand theft, contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to certain testimony and denying his motion for mistrial. We agree and reverse.
A police officer testified for the State that he interviewed appellant shortly after his arrest, and he was asked:
Q: Did you read him his rights?
A: Yes, sir. Q: Did he talk to you at all?
A: Oh yes, yes.
Q: Did he make any statements to you?
A: No, sir. Nothing as far as admissions.
Appellant objected and moved for mistrial on the grounds that this was an impermissible comment on his right to remain silent.
Any testimony concerning appellant’s silence when detained by the police is constitutionally prohibited, and constitutes reversible error without regard to its prejudicial effect. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L. R.3d 974 (1966). The objection was proper and the motion for mistrial should have been granted. Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331 (Fla.1978); Washington v. State, 388 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Harris v. State, 381 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
The State contends that the context of this testimony indicates that appellant did make certain statements, although not concerning admissions, so the officer’s testimony is not improper. The fact that appellant might have talked to the officer about some irrelevant matter such as the weather1 does not bootstrap the impermissible testimony to the level of propriety. In the context of the testimony here, the comment could serve no purpose other than to highlight the defendant’s silence about the crime for which he was charged.
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., and SHARP, JJ., concur. . The State made no attempt to introduce evidence of the conversation, so the record does not reflect what was said. We must therefore conclude that it was an irrelevant conversation since the burden of proof is on the State. We must also assume that the prosecutor knows in advance what the answer to this question will be; when it is thus answered in the negative and nothing else follows, it seems unlikely that it was asked for any purpose other than to highlight appellant’s silence.
. Similar comments are characterized as improper in: Clark v. State, 336 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Pinkney v. State, 351 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Eck v. State, 354 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Knight v. State, 374 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 386 So. 2d 642 (1980).
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Citator
Cited By
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Bowen v. State, 404 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…we are remanding for a new trial, we caution the state to observe the principle elucidated in Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331 (Fla.1978), that there be no reference during trial to the defendant’s right to remain silent. See, e. g., Tindall v. State, 395 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Knight v. State, 374 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Davis v. State, 356 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Accordingly, we reverse appellant’s conviction and remand this cause for a new trial. BOARDMAN and OTT, JJ., concur.…
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Extra Augustine v. State, 523 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)…uld not respond to the question. Regardless of the appellant’s ability to speak or understand English, however, any testimony concerning a suspect’s silence when detained by law enforcement officers is constitutionally prohibited. Tindall v. State, 395 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). By the time the appellant was allegedly shown the matchbox and asked whether it was his, he was “in custody” because he had become the focus of the deputies’ investigation, he was not free to leave, and after the deputies had vi…
Authorities Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)
- Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1978)
- Clark v. State, 336 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Gans v. Tarlton, 374 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Stanford Legray Knight v. State, 374 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Harris v. State, 381 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Washington v. State, 388 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- ECK v. State, 354 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Pinkney v. State, 351 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)