JAMES ECK, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James Eck was convicted of third-degree murder, but the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial because the State improperly elicited testimony about his silence after arrest despite Miranda warnings, in violation of established precedent.
The admission of testimony concerning the accused's silence after Miranda warnings constitutes fundamental reversible error requiring automatic reversal, regardless of whether an objection was made at trial. The State's argument that a waiver of the right to remain silent occurred because Eck answered other unrelated questions lacks merit.
[1] It is fundamental reversible error for the State to elicit testimony at trial concerning an accused's silence during questioning after Miranda warnings have been given.
[2] Reversal is required for the State's elicitation of testimony about an accused's post-Miranda silence, even if no objection was made at trial.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it is fundamental reversible error for the State to elicit testimony at trial concerning an accused's silence during questioning after Miranda warnings had been given. Reversal is required even if, as here, no objection was made to the testimony at trial.”
Establishes that Miranda violation requires automatic reversal regardless of trial objection
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Eck and the decedent had been drinking together at his home when they had a dispute, resulting in Eck shooting the decedent. When police arr…
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STETTIN, HERBERT, Associate Judge.
Appellant was convicted of third-degree murder. He seeks reversal claiming error in the admission of testimony at trial from a police officer concerning his silence after arrest and Miranda warnings. Factually, it appears the appellant had been drinking with the decedent at his home. They had a dispute and the appellant shot the decedent. When the police arrived they arrested the appellant, read him his Miranda rights and then proceeded to question him in the house within sight of the decedent’s body.
A police officer was questioned by the State at trial about the conversation with the appellant at the murder scene.
Q Did he (the appellant) ask any questions or make any comments or indication about the body that was lying in the kitchen?
A None whatsoever. At the point prior to fire rescue, prior to the ambulance arriving, Mr. Eck was moved into an area where we could better talk to him and that was again the dining room area, and at no time did he make any reference to the victim lying on the floor. And again:
A The second peculiarity would be, in my own mind, is when we brought him back into the area where the deceased was still lying. He made no mention, did not view, didn’t ask any questions as to what he was doing there or how he was doing there or anything.
And finally:
Q-Did he make any comment to you at all?
A About being injured?
Q Yes.
A No, not to me.
Q Did he make any comment to you about the incident?
A No. Bennett v. State, 316 So. 2d 41 (Fla.1975) established that it is fundamental reversible error for the State to elicit testimony at trial concerning an accused’s silence during questioning after Miranda warnings had been given. Reversal is required even if, as here, no objection was made to the testimony at trial. Carter v. State, 335 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
The State argues that appellant did answer other questions put to him by the police during this interrogation and that this constituted a waiver of his right to remain silent. A careful reading of this testimony shows that it concerned matters not directly connected with the incident. The argument that a waiver exists because of answers given to unrelated questions is illogical. It would vitiate the effect of Miranda and Bennett protections, something which the courts have steadfastly refused to do in recent years. See Sylvester v. State, 341 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Carter, supra; Martin v. State, 334 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Bostic v. State, 332 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Acee v. State, 330 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Jones v. State, 200 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967) and cases cited therein.
The judgment and sentence are vacated, and the cause is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ANSTEAD, J., and DREW, E. HARRIS (Retired), Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Williams v. State, 366 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…at the statement constituted fundamental, reversible error in the denial of a constitutional right pursuant to the law set forth in Jones v. State, 200 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). See also Bennett v. State, 316 So. 2d 41 (Fla.1975); Eck v. State, 354 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), and Spann v. State, 340 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The defendant admits that the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331 (Fla.1978), is governing in all cases in which trial was held aft…
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Tindall v. State, 395 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…t it was asked for any purpose other than to highlight appellant’s silence. . Similar comments are characterized as improper in: Clark v. State, 336 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Pinkney v. State, 351 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Eck v. State, 354 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Knight v. State, 374 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 386 So. 2d 642 (1980).…
Authorities Cited
- Bennett v. State, 316 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1975)
- Jones v. State, 200 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Martin v. State, 334 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Bostic v. State, 332 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Am. Emp'rs Ins. Co. & Snead Constr. Corp. v. J. H. Atkins & Assocs., Inc., 332 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Sylvester v. State, 341 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Carter v. State, 335 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Acee v. State, 330 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)