ROSS EDMUND LACHANCE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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LaChance appeals his conviction for second-degree murder and thirty-year sentence with a three-year mandatory minimum. The appellate court affirmed the conviction based on sufficient circumstantial evidence, but vacated and remanded the sentencing portion because the trial court failed to make required findings of fact before retaining jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence.
The court affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the guilty verdict. However, the court vacated the retention order and remanded because the trial court failed to make findings of fact and justification with individual particularity on the record as required by statute before retaining jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence.
[1] Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a verdict of second degree murder if the State rebuts any reasonable hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant.
[2] A trial court must state with individual particularity the justification for retaining jurisdiction over a portion of a defendant's sentence, and this justification must…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 947.-16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), allows a trial judge to retain jurisdiction over one-third of a defendant's sentence after a conviction of second degree murder. However, that statute requires the trial judge to state with individual particularity justification for such retention on the record before such a retention can be made.”
Establishes the statutory requirement for trial judge findings when retaining jurisdiction over sentencing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLaChance was convicted by jury of second-degree murder and sentenced to thirty years in prison with a three-year mandatory minimum. The trial court re…
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RYDER, Judge.
Appellant appeals from the trial court’s order entered after a jury trial adjudicating him guilty of second degree murder and sentencing him to thirty years in prison, subject to the three-year mandatory minimum sentence, with the court retaining jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence.
Appellant challenges whether the circumstantial evidence in the case was sufficient to support the verdict and whether the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence because the court failed to make findings of fact as required by the statute.
We reject appellant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict of second degree murder. Although appellant presented some evidence supporting an allegedly reasonable hypothesis of innocence, the hypothesis was rebutted in almost every instance by other evidence produced by the State and therefore we affirm appellant’s conviction.
We believe appellant’s second contention to be meritorious. Section 947.-16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)1, allows a trial judge to retain jurisdiction over one-third of a defendant’s sentence after a conviction of second degree murder. However, that statute requires the trial judge to state with individual particularity justification for such retention on the record before such a retention can be made. See also Hicks v. State, 388 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Tompkins v. State, 386 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
In the case at hand, although the state attorney stated on the record at sentencing several reasons why the trial judge might have retained jurisdiction, the trial judge made no findings of fact and justification on the record before retaining such jurisdiction. Because of this, the trial judge was not legally empowered to retain jurisdiction over one-third of appellant’s sentence.
Accordingly, the judgment and sentence of appellant are affirmed. However, the order of retention over the first one-third of appellant’s sentence is vacated and the cause is REMANDED with directions that the trial judge make findings of fact and justification, with individual particularity, as is required by section 947.16(3Xa), Florida Statutes (1979), retaining jurisdiction over one-third of appellant’s sentence.
SCHEB, C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur. . 947.16(3)(a). In retaining jurisdiction for the purposes of this act, the trial court judge shall state the justification with individual particularity, and said justification shall be made a part of the court record.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Sanders v. State, 400 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…pursuant to section 947.-16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). However, this statute requires the trial judge to state with individual particularity justification for such retention on the record before such a retention can be made. See LaChance v. State, 396 So. 2d 1234 (Fla.2d DCA 1981); Hicks v. State, 388 So. 2d 357 (Fla.2d DCA 1980). Here the trial judge failed to note any justification for his retention of jurisdiction on the sentencing order. The transcript of the sentencing hearing also provides us with no h…
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Kendrick Lovonous Stafford v. State, 440 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)…l charge of robbery with a weapon. However, it retained jurisdiction pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981), without stating the basis with “individual particularity.”1 See Mobley v. State, 409 So. 2d 1031 (Fla.1982); LaChance v. State, 396 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Subsequently, in writing, the trial court stated with particularity its reasons for retaining jurisdiction.2 Appellant had no opportunity [*56] to respond to the written order. See Thornton v. State, 442 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 4…
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Bradwell v. State, 468 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…is mother. We find no merit in the error urged, as to the circumstantial evidence, Huff v. State, 437 So. 2d 1087 (Fla.1983); Washington v. State, 432 So. 2d 44 (Fla.1983), as to the failure to reduce the charge to manslaughter, LaChance v. State, 396 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Smith v. State, 314 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), and as to the alleged abuse of discretion in permitting the minor to testify, Rutledge v. State, 374 So. 2d 975 (Fla.1979); Williams v. State, 400 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Doyall Tompkins v. State, 386 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Hicks v. State, 388 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)