KENDRICK LOVONOUS STAFFORD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Stafford was found in violation of probation and sentenced to thirty years for robbery with a weapon. The trial court retained jurisdiction over the sentence but failed to state its reasons with sufficient particularity at the sentencing hearing, only providing written justification afterward. The appellate court reversed the retention order and remanded for a new sentencing hearing where appellant could respond to the court's stated reasons.
The trial court's retention of jurisdiction was improper because it did not state its reasons with individual particularity at the sentencing hearing. The retention order is reversed and the case is remanded for a new sentencing hearing where the trial court must state its reasons for retaining jurisdiction on the record and give appellant an opportunity to respond before the sentence is imposed.
[1] A trial court must state the basis for retaining jurisdiction with individual particularity.
[2] A defendant must be given an opportunity to respond to a written order retaining jurisdiction.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court, having properly found appellant to be in violation of his probation, then sentenced him to thirty years' imprisonment for the original charge of robbery with a weapon. However, it retained jurisdiction pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981), without stating the basis with "individual particularity."”
Establishes the fundamental error: retention of jurisdiction without proper particularity at sentencing.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStafford was convicted of robbery on January 13, 1983, during which he carried a blank pistol with intent to scare the victim and threatened to shoot …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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GLICKSTEIN, Judge.
Having reviewed the transcripts of the violation of probation hearing and the change of plea, we find no error as to appellant’s first two points on appeal. However, the third point requires remand, which we do.
Briefly, the trial court, having properly found appellant to be in violation of his probation, then sentenced him to thirty years’ imprisonment for the original charge of robbery with a weapon. However, it retained jurisdiction pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981), without stating the basis with “individual particularity.”1 See Mobley v. State, 409 So. 2d 1031 (Fla.1982); LaChance v. State, 396 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Subsequently, in writing, the trial court stated with particularity its reasons for retaining jurisdiction.2 Appellant had no opportunity to respond to the written order. See Thornton v. State, 442 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). Accordingly, we reverse the order retaining jurisdiction, and remand with direction that appellant be given an opportunity to hear and respond at an appropriate sentencing to be conducted should the trial court seek to retain jurisdiction.
The following remarks are not directed to the retention of jurisdiction but to the fact that this gifted youngster, blessed with vast athletic ability, has now wasted all of the opportunity which those gifts have and would have provided — higher education being the most important. If there is any lesson to be learned from this tragic waste, it is that we are all trustees of our individual gifts; and that, somehow, we adults have to permanently instill in our children this awareness. Perhaps someday there will emerge a generation of parents who will not have to suffer being told by their grown children how they regret having lightly given up those avenues of self-expression that could have enriched their lives.
WALDEN, J., and GOLDMAN, MURRAY, Associate Judge, concur. . The court said:
Further the Court, pursuant to Section 947.-163A will retain jurisdiction over the defendant for the first one-third of that time. The Court specifically finding with respect to the original charge that it was of such a heinous nature and didn’t involve the use of a firearm and potential use of such force, the Court will retain jurisdiction.
. In accordance with Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes, this Order is justified by the following specific findings of fact:
1. The defendant was convicted of Robbery on January 13, 1983.
2. The defendant carried a blank pistol during the course of the Robbery, with the intent to scare the victim and during the course of the Robbery, the defendant threatened to shoot the victim. 3. The Defendant’s pattern of criminal conduct has convinced the Court that he is a danger to the community. The Defendant committed the violation of probation only four months after being placed on probation by the Court.
4. The Court believes that it is in the best interests of society that the Defendant remain incarcerated for at least one-third of the sentence imposed.
5.Such retention of jurisdiction is required in order to assure this Court that the Defendant serves an appropriate term of incarceration.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Murray v. State, 491 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1986)…(Fla.1982), we need not remand for findings of fact justifying the retention of jurisdiction, as the findings have become part of the record. More importantly, the defendant has had an opportunity to respond to the court’s action, Stafford v. State, 440 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), and the trial court’s statement of the brutal facts of this crime lays out quite clearly the basis for retention of jurisdiction. The basis is therefore far from “vague and subjective.” Robinson v. State, 458 So. 2d 1132, 1134 (…
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Robinson v. State, 458 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…cation for retention be stated “with individual particularity.” We have previously suggested on two occasions that one purpose of the statute is to give the defendant an opportunity to respond to the reasons stated for retention. Stafford v. State, 440 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) and Thornton v. State, (Fla. 4th DCA, Case No. 82-1208, opinion filed April 13, 1983) [8 F.L.W. 1043], rev’d on other grounds on reh'g, 442 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). It is apparent that a defendant can make no appropriate…
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Larkin v. State, 474 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)…stifying retention. This court has held that one of the purposes of subsection 3(a) of the rule is to give the defendant the opportunity to contest the reasons for retention. Robinson v. State, 458 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Stafford v. State, 440 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). This requirement is somewhat analogous to the requirement that a defendant be advised of certain contents of any presentence investigation report utilized by the trial court in sentencing. It [*1285] enables the defendant “to di…
Authorities Cited
- Autley Mobley v. State, 409 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1982)
- LaCHANCE v. State, 396 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- Wechsler v. Beall & Assocs. Roofing Corp., 442 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)