DWIGHT LEE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Dwight Lee challenged the constitutionality of Florida Statute § 918.14(3)(a)(1), which criminalizes placing a witness in fear by threat of force. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the statute as sufficiently definite and not unconstitutionally vague, affirming Lee's conviction.
The statute is not unconstitutionally vague. The language of § 918.14(3)(a)(1) is sufficiently definite to convey a definite warning as to the conduct proscribed, measured by common understanding and practice, and thus satisfies the constitutional requirement that criminal statutes apprise ordinary persons of common intelligence of what conduct is prohibited.
[1] A statute defining criminal offenses must use language definite enough to inform ordinary persons of common intelligence about the conduct that is prohibited.
[2] A statute is sufficiently definite if it conveys a clear warning as to the proscribed conduct, understandable by common understanding and practice.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Statutes which define criminal offenses must do so in language that is definite enough to apprise ordinary persons of common intelligence of what conduct is proscribed.”
Establishes the constitutional standard for evaluating vagueness challenges to criminal statutes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDwight Lee was charged with threatening the life of a prospective witness scheduled to testify against him in a pending criminal case on October 11, 1…
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[*685] BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before the Court on appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit, Sarasota County. In rendering judgment, the court passed upon the constitutional validity of a state law. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const. (1972).
Appellant Dwight Lee was charged with the offense of placing a witness in fear by threat of force in violation of section 918.-14(3)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (1979). Section 918.14(3) provides:
(3)(a) It is unlawful for any person:
1. To cause a witness to be placed in fear by force or threats of force;
2. To make an assault upon any witness or informant; or
3. To harm a witness by any unlawful act in retaliation against the said witness for anything lawfully done in the capacity of witness or informant.
(b) Any person violating the provisions of this subsection shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in S. 775.082, S. 775.083, or S. 75.084.
The information alleged that on October 11, 1979, appellant threatened the life of a prospective witness who was to testify against him in a pending criminal case. Appellant moved to dismiss the information on the ground that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. After the denial of the motion to dismiss, appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere, specifically reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. Based on this plea, the court adjudicated appellant guilty and imposed probation for two years.
On appeal, the appellant argues that section 918.14(3)(a)(l) is vague. We disagree and uphold the statute.
Statutes which define criminal offenses must do so in language that is definite enough to apprise ordinary persons of common intelligence of what conduct is proscribed. State v. Ashcraft, 378 So. 2d 284 (Fla.1979); State v. Mayhew, 288 So. 2d 243 (Fla.1973); Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670, 154 So. 690 (1934). Applying this standard to the language of section 918.14(3)(a)(l), we conclude that it is sufficiently definite “to convey a definite warning as to the conduct proscribed, measured by common understanding and practice.” Von Edwards v. State, 377 So. 2d 684, 685 (Fla.1979); Zachary v. State, 269 So. 2d 669 (Fla.1972).
The circuit court’s order upholding the statute was correct. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.
It is so ordered.
SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, OVER-TON, ENGLAND, ALDERMAN and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Gray, 435 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1983)…cused: (1) knew the threatened person was to be called as a witness in some judicial proceeding and (2) [*819] intended that the threat influence the witness to withhold testimony or testify falser !y- The district court noted that in Lee v. State, 397 So. 2d 684 (Fla.1981), this- Court held that section 918.14(3)(a)l was suffi-. ciently clear to provide a definite warning of the conduct proscribed, measured by' common understanding and practice. The district court accordingly acknowledged, that it was bound…1 / 2
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Gray v. State, 404 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…egislative branch of government and disregards the court’s duty to measure statutes against constitutional standards. Without discussing the elements of this offense or mentioning Murray, the Florida Supreme Court in the recent case of Lee v. State, 397 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1981), has held this statute constitutional on the basis that it is sufficiently definite to convey a definite warning as to the conduct proscribed, measured by common understanding and practice. We are, of course, bound by that decision. Art…
Authorities Cited
- Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670 (Fla. 1934)
- Zachary v. State, 269 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1972)
- State v. Ashcraft, 378 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1979)
- State v. Nell Emerson Mayhew, 288 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1973)
- Glenwood von Edwards v. State, 377 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1979)