JAMES JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
CLING ELECTRIC, INC., OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY, AND THE DIVISION OF WORKERS COMPENSATION, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this workers' compensation case, the court held that when an appellate court affirms certain benefits in a workers' compensation claim while reversing others, the affirmed benefits become immediately due upon finality of the appellate order, even if other issues remain pending. Because the employer failed to pay the affirmed benefits within 20 days, the court reversed the denial of penalties and awarded the claimant a 20% penalty.
When certain benefits in a workers' compensation case are affirmed on appeal, payment of those affirmed benefits becomes due upon finality of the appellate order, regardless of whether other benefits are reversed and remanded. If the employer fails to pay the affirmed benefits within 20 days after they become due, the claimant is entitled to a 20% penalty under Florida Statutes Section 440.20(8).
[1] When certain workers' compensation benefits are affirmed on appeal, even if other benefits are reversed and remanded, payment of the affirmed benefits becomes due upon th…
[2] Failure to pay affirmed workers' compensation benefits within 20 days of the appellate court's order becoming final entitles the claimant to a 20% penalty.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when one issue in a workers' compensation case is still pending in the appeal process, the other benefits which a claimant is justified in receiving should not be delayed until that issue is determined on appeal”
Establishes the foundational principle that affirmed benefits should not be held up pending resolution of other disputed issues
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe deputy commissioner ordered the employer/carrier to pay temporary total disability benefits, 5% permanent partial disability benefits, interest, a…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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McCORD, Judge.
Appellant/claimant appeals from the deputy commissioner's refusal to assess penalties against appellee, employer/carrier, for appellee’s failure to timely pay benefits due on appellant’s claim after those benefits were affirmed on appeal by this Court. 376 So. 2d 481. We reverse.
The deputy commissioner’s original order was entered in this case on February 16, 1979, as a result of appellant’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The deputy commissioner ordered employer/carrier to pay the following benefits: certain temporary total disability benefits, 5% permanent partial disability benefits, payment of interest, payment of an attorney’s fee, and payment of a doctor’s bill and his expert witness fee. Appellees appealed that order, raising three points: the issue of temporary total disability benefits, whether or not there was a new accident, and employer/carrier’s responsibility regarding payment of the doctor’s medical bills. This Court reversed the temporary total disability award but affirmed on the other two points and remanded the cause to the deputy commissioner for further proceedings consistent with that opinion, dated November 9, 1979. That opinion became final on November 26, 1979.
On December 12, 1979, appellant’s attorney wrote a letter to the deputy commissioner indicating that his client was due a 20% penalty because of employer/carrier’s failure to pay the benefits which this Court had affirmed. Although a hearing was never held regarding that issue, on January 23, 1980, the deputy commissioner, in compliance with this Court’s opinion, entered an order providing that employer/carrier should pay all compensation awarded by its February 16,1979, order, with the exception of the award of temporary total disability benefits. The deputy commissioner’s order stated further that appellant’s claim for penalties was denied since the district court’s remand for further proceedings consistent with its opinion stayed the time for compliance with the February 16, 1979, order until the further proceedings were conducted by the deputy commissioner.
Appellant asserts that the award of the medical bill, permanent benefits and interest in the deputy commissioner’s February 1979 order was not disturbed by this Court and, therefore, when this Court’s order became final, payment was due on those benefits without further delay.
We agree. In Stauffer Chemical Company v. Jacobs, 9 FCR 64 (1975), the Industrial Relations Commission declared that when one issue in a workers’ compensation case is still pending in the appeal process, the other benefits which a claimant is justified in receiving should not be delayed until that issue is determined on appeal. The Commission stated that such a delay is not within the intent of the act. Similarly, in a case such as the one sub judice, when certain benefits are affirmed on appeal by this Court, even if other benefits are reversed and remanded, payment of the affirmed benefits becomes due upon finality of this Court’s order. If those benefits are not paid within 20 days after they become due, the claimant shall be entitled to a 20% penalty.
Section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes. Because employer/carrier did not pay the affirmed benefits within 20 days of finality of this court’s opinion in this case, appellant is entitled to the 20% penalty.
Reversed and remanded for entry of an order assessing the penalty against employer/carrier. SHIVERS and JOANOS, JJ., concur.
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Thibodeau v. Sarasota Mem'l Hosp. & All Risk Corp. of Fla., 449 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…the date the motion for rehearing was denied, i.e., December 14, 1982, irrespective of the date of the issuance of the mandate. We disagree with the deputy’s order on two counts. First, this court has recently held in Jones v. Cling Electric, Inc., 397 So. 2d 767, 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) that payment of compensation benefits affirmed on appeal become due upon finality of this court’s order and, that if those benefits are not paid within 20 days after they become due (20 days being the applicable time period…
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Etheridge v. McKENZIE Tank Lines, Inc., 557 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…o section 440.-20(8). Accordingly, appellants are entitled to be awarded a 20 percent penalty on the amount paid ($16,532.42) on September 28, 1988. See Binimelis v. M.E.F. Int’l Corp., 424 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Jones v. Cling Elec., Inc., 397 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Appellants are similarly entitled to interest on the unpaid penalty from August 29, 1988, when the compensation was due, until the penalty is paid. § 440.20(9), Fla.Stat. (1985). The remaining points raised by appellants are a…
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COX OIL & Sales, Inc. v. Boettcher, 410 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…f the statute assessing penalties for the late payment of compensation. Accord, Jessup v. Don’s Gulf Service, IRC Order 2-1472 (1965), cert. den., 180 So. 2d 463 (Fla.1965). The question was not raised and addressed in Jones v. Cling Electric, Inc., 397 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), which therefore is not contrary to our decision today. On remand the $15 arithmetic error may be corrected. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART. ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J., and LARRY G. SMITH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Cling Elec., Inc. v. Jones, 376 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)