STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
CARRIE ANGILEE PETTIS, APPELLEE
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The State appealed the trial court's dismissal of a battery-on-a-law-enforcement-officer charge against Carrie Pettis. The court held that the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss because the motion failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that the officer was not engaged in lawful duties, and all inferences must be resolved against the defendant when evaluating whether the State has established a prima facie case.
The trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss. When evaluating a Rule 3.190(c)(4) motion, all inferences must be resolved against the defendant, and if the undisputed facts permit a conclusion that the defendant could be found guilty, the motion must be denied. Here, the motion failed to allege facts to show that Officer Mallard was not engaged in the lawful performance of his duties.
[1] A Rule 3.190(c)(4), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, motion to dismiss tests whether the facts relied upon by the State establish a prima facie case of guilt as a mat…
[2] In considering a Rule 3.190(c)(4) motion, a trial court should not determine fact issues or weigh conflicting evidence or witness credibility.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The function of a "(c)(4)" motion to dismiss is to ascertain whether or not the facts which the State relies upon to constitute the crime charged, and on which it will offer evidence to prove it, do, as a matter of law, establish a prima facie case of guilt of the accused.”
Establishes the legal standard for evaluating a Rule 3.190(c)(4) motion to dismiss
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCarrie Pettis was charged with battery on a law enforcement officer (Deputy Mallard) under Florida law. The defendant's motion to dismiss stated she d…
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ORFINGER, Judge.
Appellant was charged with battery on a law enforcement officer pursuant to sections 784.03 and 784.07, Florida Statutes (1979), which charge was dismissed in response to a motion by appellant under Rule 3.190(c)(4), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State appeals1 and we reverse.
The motion to dismiss did not deny striking Deputy Mallard, but stated that defendant “did not believe she struck” the officer. The State traversed the motion and specifically the attempt by defendant to deny striking the officer. Defendant asserts that if the battery occurred, it was in the course of resisting an unlawful arrest by another officer. The function of a “(c)(4)” motion to dismiss is to ascertain whether or not the facts which the State relies upon to constitute the crime charged, and on which it will offer evidence to prove it, do, as a matter of law, establish a prima facie case of guilt of the accused. State v. Davis, 243 So. 2d 587 (Fla.1971). In considering such a motion, the trial court should not determine fact issues or consider the weight of conflicting evidence or the credibility of witnesses. State v. Fort, 380 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
Unlike the standard employed at trial when the jury considers the evidence, in determining whether the State has shown a prima facie case so as to successfully resist a “(c)(4)” Motion, all inferences are resolved against the defendant. State v. Upton, 392 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); State v. Fort, supra. If the undisputed facts permit the conclusion that the defendant could be found guilty, the motion must be denied. State v. De Jerinett, 283 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973); cert. denied, 287 So. 2d 689 (Fla.1973). Where material allegations of the motion are denied or disputed in the traverse, the denial of the motion is mandatory. Fort, supra.
Appellee says that the motion to dismiss was granted because the trial court was convinced that the deputy who was allegedly struck was not engaged in the “lawful performance of his duties”. Even if that was the trial court’s reason for dismissal — a conclusion which we cannot reach because the order states no reasons — the motion fails to allege facts to show that Officer Mallard was not so engaged. The failure of the State to traverse any such conclusion has no effect on the result here where there was nothing to traverse.
The order dismissing the information is reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent herewith.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
DAUKSCH, C. J., and FRANK D. UP-CHURCH, Jr., J., concur. . 9.140(c)(1)(A), Fla.R.App.P.
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State v. Fuller, 463 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)…DCA 1984); State v. Raulerson, 403 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Upton. In considering such a motion the trial court should not determine fact issues or consider the weight of conflicting evidence or the credibility of witnesses. State v. Pettis, 397 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); State v. Fort, 380 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). To counter a (c)(4) motion, the state need not produce evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction. It need only show sufficient reasonable inferences to make a prima fa-cie cas…
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State v. Barnard, 405 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…come to arrest him, Payton, does not control the result here. Although ap-pellee also asserted in his motion that there was no violence, these facts were traversed by the State, so the court cold not grant the motion on that ground. State v. Pettis, 397 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The order granting the motion and discharging defendant is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. REVERSED and REMANDED. DAUKSCH, C. J., and SHARP, J., concur. . Appellee asserts, in…
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State v. Fordham, 465 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)…hould not decide or reconcile disputed issues of fact raised by the state’s traverse or inherent in the defendant’s motion. State v. Fuller, 463 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); State v. Sheppard, 401 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); State v. Pettis, 397 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); State v. Upton; State v. Featherolf, 388 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); State v. Fort, 380 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). All questions and inferences from the facts are resolved in favor of the state, like the non-moving party…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Upton, 392 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- State v. Davis, 243 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1971)
- State v. Fort, 380 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- State v. de Jerinett, 283 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- DeJERINETT v. State, 287 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1973)