DAISY R. MAYCOCK, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Daisy Maycock appealed the trial court's denial of her motion to sever charges of unlawful possession of a concealed weapon by a convicted felon from second-degree murder. The court affirmed, holding that while better practice would sever such charges to protect the presumption of innocence, the defendant forfeited her argument by stipulating to being a convicted felon and failing to preserve the objection regarding disclosure of the prior conviction's nature.
The court affirmed the denial of severance. While better practice would sever charges requiring proof of prior conviction to protect the presumption of innocence, the defendant forfeited her argument by stipulating to being a convicted felon. The defendant could not complain on appeal because the charges arose from the same criminal episode and the evidence was clear.
[1] A defendant may not complain on appeal about the joinder of charges if they stipulated to a fact necessary to prove one of the charges, thereby enabling the court to avoi…
[2] While severance of a charge requiring proof of a prior conviction is better practice to preserve the presumption of innocence, a defendant may waive this objection by sti…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Better practice would permit the court to sever a charge which requires proof of a prior conviction in order to avoid depriving defendant of the presumption of innocence to which she is entitled.”
Establishes the court's acknowledgment that severance is preferable practice when prior conviction must be proven
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDaisy Maycock was charged with both second-degree murder and unlawful possession of a concealed weapon by a convicted felon. The concealed weapon char…
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[*496] BASKIN, Judge.
We affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to sever the charge of unlawful possession of a concealed weapon by a convicted felon from the charge of second degree murder. Better practice would permit the court to sever a charge which requires proof of a prior conviction in order to avoid depriving defendant of the presumption of innocence to which she is entitled. Since defendant argued only that the jury not be informed as to the nature of the prior conviction and even stipulated1 to the fact that she was a convicted felon, thereby enabling the court to refrain from informing the jury that the prior conviction was for another second degree murder, she may not be heard to complain on appeal. The joined offenses pertained to the same criminal episode, see Shargaa v. State, 102 So. 2d 814 (Fla.1958), and the evidence against defendant was clear. Clark v. State, 378 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
The remaining point is without merit.
Affirmed.
. At the hearing defense counsel stated:
Without giving up our right to file an appeal on the motion to sever, you can consider a motion for rehearing. The basis is new case law and, without giving up that right, I would be willing to stipulate to the fact that she is a convicted felon.
I can’t spite my client’s face by cutting off her nose.
The defense thereby attempted simultaneously to waive and preserve the objection. The argument in the motion to sever was directed to the fact that informing the jury of the nature of defendant’s prior conviction would be prejudicial. The stipulation waived objection to the jury’s learning of the fact of the prior conviction, and that issue is not preserved for appellate review.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Vazquez, 419 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1982)…a lack of relevancy to those charges. As the third district has stated, the better practice would be to sever a count which requires proof of a prior conviction in order not to deprive a defendant of the presumption of innocence. Maycock v. State, 398 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). We agree that introducing this evidence unfairly prejudiced Vazquez. The documentation regarding the prior conviction does not meet the test set out in Williams [*1091] and would not have been admissible in a trial of the first a…1 / 2
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Sosa v. State, 639 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…was permitted, the defense’s motion to sever should have been granted. The offenses in the instant case should have been separated for trial where one charge required proof of a previous felony conviction and one did not. See id.; Maycock v. State, 398 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Orr v. State, 380 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Even if consolidation of charges is the most practical and efficient method of processing a case, practicality and efficiency should not outweigh a defendant’s right to a fair tr…
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Vazquez v. State, 405 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…in evidence at trial proof of his prior felony conviction and thus waived whatever pretrial right to a severance he may have had on the count charging unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. We have similarly held in Maycock v. State, 398 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), that a defendant also waives his right to the above-stated severance where he stipulates at trial that he has a prior felony conviction. Indeed, we specifically limited our holding in Panzavecchia to the precise facts of the case…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ojeda v. Louie Wainwright, 378 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Shargaa v. State, 102 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1958)