CALVIN MILLS, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, AND DADE COUNTY CAA, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1981-05-26
No. 80-1560
Before HENDRY, SCHWARTZ and BASKIN, JJ.
398 So. 2d 500 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1981) Positive Treatment
Cited by 13 cases


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant seeks review of an order of the Unemployment Appeals Commission which affirmed a decision of an appeals referee denying him unemployment compensation benefits. He contends that this determination was erroneous because he left his employment for “good cause attributable to his employer” under Section 443.-06(1), Florida Statutes (1979). There is, however competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the finding that Mills quit his CETA job with Dade County, not in reaction to a supposedly unreasonable requirement imposed by his supervisor, but rather simply because he thought he had secured another position. Since this is true, this court may not set aside the referee’s resolution of the issue in question. Perez v. State, Department of Labor and Employment Security, 377 So. 2d 806 (Fla.3d DCA 1979), and cases cited.

Affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (13 total)

  • State v. Duran, 550 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
    …there was also a passenger in the truck, presenting a joint occupancy issue which is not present in this case. In light of the traverse on the ultimate fact question of knowledge, the motion to dismiss should have been denied. See State v. Johnson, 398 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(d) (a motion to dismiss shall be denied if the State files a traverse which with specificity denies under oath the facts alleged). Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. . The first district’s opinio…
  • State v. Snyder, 635 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
    …ing dominion and control. When material facts are specifically denied by the state’s sworn traverse, as in this case, the trial court has no discretion and must deny the motion. State v. Radandt, 410 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); State v. Johnson, 398 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Last, even if the state had not filed a sworn traverse, on the facts presented to us by the appellee himself, the court should have denied his motion. A proceeding under rule 3.190(e)(4) is the equivalent of a civil summary judg…
  • State v. Williams, 400 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
    …o the case at bar, it is obvious that the facts denied by the state constitute the heart of Ms. Williams’ justification for self-defense. Once placed in dispute, the court had no choice but to allow a jury to resolve thé issue. See State v. Johnson, 398 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Wale v. State, 397 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. Wright, 386 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); State v. Fort, 380 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); State v. Cook, 354 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. dismissed, 359 So. 2d 1…

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