STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
BRENDA ANN WILLIAMS, APPELLEE
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The State appeals a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss a manslaughter charge against Brenda Ann Williams, who claimed self-defense. The court held that the trial judge erred by granting the motion despite the State filing a sworn traverse that specifically denied material facts central to Williams' self-defense claim, requiring reversal and remand for jury trial.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 3.190(c)(4) shall be denied if the State files a traverse which with specificity denies under oath the material fact or facts alleged in the motion. Because the State's traverse specifically denied the material facts constituting Williams' self-defense justification, the trial court was obligated to deny the motion and allow the jury to resolve the factual dispute.
[1] A motion to dismiss under Rule 3.190(c)(4), Fla.R.Crim.P., must be denied if the State files a sworn traverse that specifically denies a material fact alleged in the moti…
[2] A sworn traverse denying the material facts supporting a claim of self-defense obligates the trial court to deny a motion to dismiss.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A motion to dismiss under (c)(4) of this rule shall be denied if the State files a traverse which with specificity denies under oath the material fact or facts alleged in the motion to dismiss.”
Establishes the mandatory rule that controls the case—when State files a specific sworn traverse denying material facts, the motion to dismiss must be denied
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrenda Ann Williams was charged with manslaughter in the death of Otis Nelson. Williams admitted stabbing Nelson but claimed self-defense, alleging Ne…
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HURLEY, Judge.
This appeal illustrates the interrelationship of two subsections of Rule 3.190, Fla.R. Crim.P. — subsection (c)(4) which allows a motion to dismiss and subsection (d) which authorizes a traverse or demurrer. Since the sworn traverse in the case at bar specifically denied a material fact in the defendant’s motion, the trial court was obligated by the plain meaning of the rule to deny the motion. Its failure to do so requires us to reverse.
Brenda Ann Williams, charged with manslaughter in the death of Otis Nelson, filed a detailed motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 3.190(c)(4), Fla.R.Crim.P. Ms. Williams admitted stabbing Mr. Nelson, but claimed the action was done in self-defense. She alleged that Nelson had consumed quantities of gin and beer, that he hit her in the head and knocked her to the floor, and that only after Nelson approached her with his arms and hands reaching toward the area of her neck so as to cause her to believe that he was going to choke or strangle her, did she resort to the knife. The State responded to these allegations with a sworn traverse as permitted by Rule 3.190(d), Fla.R.Crim.P. The State denied that “the Defendant picked up and used the knife for her own protection and that her actions were necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to herself.” The trial court granted defendant’s motion, holding that the undisputed facts “do not constitute the crime charged and/or do affirmatively establish a valid defense.” We respectfully disagree.
Rule 3.190(d), Fla.R.Crim.P., provides in pertinent part:
A motion to dismiss under (c)(4) of this rule shall be denied if the State files a traverse which with specificity denies under oath the material fact or facts alleged in the motion to dismiss. (Emphasis supplied.)
Furthermore, section 2.11(d) of the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (2d ed.), provides that:
[A person] is justified in the use of deadly force only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another, or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony, or when resisting any attempt to commit any felony upon or in any dwelling house in which he shall be.
See also O’Steen v. State, 92 Fla. 1062, 111 So. 725 (1927); McKnight v. State, 341 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 953 (Fla.1977); Bates v. State, 325 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 1180 (Fla.1976); Gil v. State, 266 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 271 So. 2d 139 (Fla.1972); but see Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self Defense, 15 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev. 623 (1980).
Applying this long-established principle of law to the case at bar, it is obvious that the facts denied by the state constitute the heart of Ms. Williams’ justification for self-defense. Once placed in dispute, the court had no choice but to allow a jury to resolve thé issue. See State v. Johnson, 398 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Wale v. State, 397 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. Wright, 386 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); State v. Fort, 380 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); State v. Cook, 354 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. dismissed, 359 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1978); Ellis v. State, 346 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 175 (Fla.1977).
Accordingly, the order on appeal is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BERANEK and HERSEY, JJ., concur.
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Romulus Brinkley, Jr. v. State, 874 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…State v. Cole, 710 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); State v. Bailey, 508 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); State v. Atkinson, 490 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); State v. Milton, 488 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); State v. Lukas; State v. Williams, 400 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss. AFFIRMED. PLEUS, J., concurs. GRIFFIN, J., dissents, without opinion. . The defendant pled nolo contendere to the charge following denial of his motion to dismiss. The…
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Maralanda v. State, 432 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See State v. Williams, 400 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Siders v. State, 342 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); and State v. McIntyre, 303 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). ANSTEAD, DELL and WALDEN, JJ., concur.…
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State v. Radandt, 410 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…was insufficient and granted the motion to dismiss. The cases are almost legion which hold that when the State files a sworn traverse denying material facts alleged in the motion to dismiss, the motion must be denied. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 400 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. Fort, 380 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Denial of a motion to dismiss under these circumstances has been characterized as automatic. State v. J. T. S., 373 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Appellee’s motion to dismiss a…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (14 total)
- Wale v. State, 397 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Ellis v. State, 346 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- O'Steen v. State, 111 So. 725 (Fla. 1926)
- State v. Fort, 380 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- McKNIGHT v. State, 341 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- GIL v. State, 266 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- State v. Wright, 386 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- State v. Cook, 354 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- The Sch. Bd. OF Pinellas Cnty. v. State of Fla. Pub. Emps. Relations Comm'n & Pinellas Cnty. Custodial Union No. 1221 of the Int'l Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers, 354 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Mills v. Fla. Dep't OF Labor & Emp. Sec., 398 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)