TERRY LEE KNIGHT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that an order retaining jurisdiction over a defendant must be entered at the time of sentencing, not two weeks later. The court also remanded for correction of the split sentence.
Knight was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to a split sentence. Two weeks after sentencing, the state requested the court retain jurisdiction…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Modification Of Sentence cases and more on FLexlaw
SHARP, Judge.
Knight was convicted of armed robbery and was sentenced immediately after his jury trial to a thirty (30) year “split” sentence consisting of fifteen (15) years in prison and fifteen (15) years thereafter on probation. Two weeks after the trial, the State requested that the court retain jurisdiction over the first one-third of the sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). The court entered an order retaining jurisdiction, and Knight appeals the order and judgment.
Section 947.16(3) provides that where a defendant is convicted of certain specified crimes, a trial judge may “at the time of sentencing” enter an order retaining jurisdiction over the defendant for the first one-third of the maximum sentence imposed for the highest felony charged and proven. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 provides that a court may reduce a legal sentence imposed by it within sixty (60) days. Retention of jurisdiction over an offender under section 947.16(3) is not a “reduction” of sentence, but rather it constitutes a modification which enhances the severity of the sentence.
We therefore conclude that the order seeking to retain jurisdiction over Knight was entered without jurisdiction. If such an order is going to be entered, it must be done at the time of sentencing. The order retaining jurisdiction is reversed. Gonzalez v. State, 384 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Petters v. State, 350 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
Further, in view of Villery v. The Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1981), we remand this cause to the trial court for correction of the “split sentence” consistent with the dictates of the Florida Supreme Court. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
REVERSED in part and REMANDED.
COBB and COWART, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Neal v. State, 414 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…with the statute. The court’s announcement two weeks after imposition of sentence that it intended to retain jurisdiction at a later date did not fulfill statutory requirements. See Hayes v. State, 400 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Knight v. State, 398 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Affirmed as modified.…
-
Griffin v. State, 414 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…efendant for Review of Future Parole Commission Release Order Pursuant to Florida Statute 947.16.” The trial court lost the chance to properly enter this order when it was not done at the time of sentencing, as the statute requires. Knight v. State, 398 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The judgment and sentence are affirmed but the order retaining jurisdiction is quashed. JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED; ORDER QUASHED. COBB and SHARP, JJ., concur.…
-
Lang v. State, 616 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…a trial court may not modify a sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 1, so as to retain jurisdiction when such had not been done at the time of sentencing, see Hayes v. State, 400 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), and Knight v. State, 398 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), we see no reason why the trial court may not legally modify a sentence which retained jurisdiction at the time of sentencing, but which simply failed to state the justification therefor. In so saying, we note that if appellant h…
Authorities Cited
- Villery v. The Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1980)
- Fuse v. State, 384 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Petters v. State, 350 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)