FRANKLIN DELANO PRINCE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that retroactive application of a statute retaining jurisdiction for parole review is impermissible if it substantively alters the appellant's situation to his disadvantage, as it would have an ex post facto effect.
Appellant was convicted of offenses committed before the enactment of Section 947.16(3) Florida Statutes. The trial judge retained jurisdiction for re…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant seeks review of multiple convictions and sentences which we affirm except as to the trial judge’s retention of jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 947.16(3) Florida Statutes, for review of any parole release order. This statute was enacted subsequent to the commission of the offenses in the present case and, since it substantively alters appellant’s situation to his disadvantage, retroactive application of the provision would be ex post facto in effect and is thus impermissible. State v. Williams, 397 So. 2d 663 (Fla.1981), 6 FLW 263; Rodriquez v. State, 380 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1980); cf., Weaver v. Graham, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1980).
Accordingly, we reverse insofar as the trial judge retained jurisdiction to review parole release orders, and remand the cause for deletion of that portion of the orders of commitment. The judgments of conviction and sentences are otherwise affirmed.
SHIVERS and WENTWORTH, JJ., and WILLIAM C. OWEN, Jr. (Ret.), Associate Judge, concur.
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Williams v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 625 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…st DCA 1982), aff'd, 435 So. 2d 834 (Fla.1983). In other circumstances it has been held to violate the ex post facto clause under the principles discussed in Weaver v. Graham. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 414 So. 2d 509 (Fla.1982); Prince v. State, 398 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 411 So. 2d 384 (Fla.1981); see also Rodriguez v. United States Parole Comm’n, 594 F. 2d 170. Retrospective application of the statutory authorization for a judge to retain jurisdiction over an offender under section 947.…1 / 2
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Hubbard v. State, 411 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…cedure was an impermissible ex post facto application of law.1 Under the circumstances of this case we disagree because application of the direct file statute did not substantively alter Hubbard’s situation to his disadvantage. See Prince v. State, 398 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Robbery with a deadly weapon is a crime punishable by life imprisonment, Section 812.13(2)(a), so the state attorney at the time of the commission of the crime could have initiated indictment proceedings to have the defendant tr…
Authorities Cited
- Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (U.S. 1981)
- State v. Williams, 397 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1981)
- Vicente Rodriguez v. State, 380 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)