DOROTHIE C. GOSS, APPELLANT,
v.
FRANK L. GOSS, APPELLEE
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In this divorce appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's award of rehabilitative alimony to a long-term homemaker and remanded for an award of permanent alimony. The court held that a fifty-two-year-old woman married for thirty years with minimal work experience and poor health could not reasonably be rehabilitated into self-sufficiency.
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to award permanent alimony. Given Mrs. Goss's age, length of marriage, lack of work experience, failed job search efforts, minimal earning capacity, and poor health, permanent alimony based on her needs and the husband's ability to pay was the appropriate award.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by failing to award permanent alimony to a long-term homemaker with limited work history, poor health, and difficulty finding gainful…
[2] When an appellate court finds error in a trial court's disposition of a dissolution case, the cause should be remanded with sufficient authority for the trial court to mo…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Given these facts, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award permanent alimony.”
The court's holding that rehabilitative alimony was inappropriate given Mrs. Goss's circumstances
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMr. and Mrs. Goss were divorced in 1979 after thirty years of marriage. At dissolution, Mrs. Goss was fifty-two years old, had been a homemaker for tw…
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HURLEY, Judge.
On this appeal, appellant/wife argues that she should have been awarded permanent rather than rehabilitative alimony. We agree and therefore reverse. Mr. and Mrs. Goss were divorced in 1979 after thirty years of marriage. At the time of the dissolution, Mrs. Goss was fifty-two years old, had been a homemaker for twenty-nine years, had raised three children, and had an eleventh grade education. As for work experience, Mrs. Goss testified that she had last worked twenty-nine years ago and then had held only menial jobs such as working at “a soda fountain, ... a garment factory, and ... a battery factory.” Since filing for dissolution, she had unsuccessfully sought employment with nine different employers, but had to settle for babysitting or sewing positions which produced meager income. She described her health as poor, saying that she had “a bad back, high blood pressure and nervous conditions.”
Given these facts, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award permanent alimony. See Colucci v. Colucci, 392 So. 2d 577 (Fla.3d DCA 1980). Thus, we reverse the order on appeal and remand the cause with instructions to enter an award of permanent alimony based upon the needs of appellant and upon the ability of appellee to provide for those needs. Niemann v. Niemann, 294 So. 2d 415 (Fla.4th DCA 1974). cert. dismissed, 312 So. 2d 733 (Fla.1975).
With respect to the authority of the trial court on remand, we adopt the following principle announced by our sister court in Eagan v. Eagan, 392 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla.5th DCA 1981):
In Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla.1980), our Supreme Court observed that in a dissolution cases apportioning assets and providing necessary support are difficult problems and that the various procedural remedies which the trial court can use to solve these problems are interrelated and, from the trial judge’s viewpoint, are generally all part of one overall scheme. It follows, therefore, that when a trial judge is found to be in error as to some aspect of his disposition the cause should be remanded with sufficient authority that he may again exercise broad discretion to modify the related matters within his original plan for division and support as may be necessary in order to do equity and justice between the parties in view of the changes required by the appellate opinion.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
LETTS, C.J., and MOORE, J., concur.
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Robbie v. Dwyn Daniels Robbie, 726 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…cise broad discretion to modify the related matters imth-in his original plan for division and suppori as may be necessary in order to do equity and justice between the parties in view of the changes required by the appellate opinion. Goss v. Goss, 400 So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)(emphasis supplied). On remand, the trial court was to determine the value of the husband’s interest in the Miami Sports Corporation and what share of that interest the wife may be entitled to under equitable distribution pr…
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Weider v. Weider, 402 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…elationship of the financial aspects, the trial court, on remand, should reconsider all the provisions of the final judgment relating to support and division of the parties’ assets in order to do equity and justice between the parties. Goss v. Goss, 400 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). In reconsidering the final judgment the trial court may receive new evidence. Except for the granting of a dissolution of the marriage between the parties, the final judgment is reversed and this cause is remanded for further p…
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Noah v. Noah, 467 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)…ecifically adjusting the award by distributing the condominium to the husband. Assuming the trial court has abused its discretion, the appropriate remedy in my opinion is to remand, allowing the trial court to reconsider the matter. In Goss v. Goss, 400 So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), this court specifically adopted the principle enunciated in Eagan v. Eagan, 392 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981): With respect to the authority of the trial court on remand, we adopt the following principle announced by…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Colucci v. Colucci, 392 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Niemann v. Niemann, 294 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
- McQUIGGAN v. State, 392 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Eagan v. Eagan, 392 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Niemann v. Niemann, 312 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1975)