CAROL JEAN NIEMANN, PETITIONER,
v.
GARY E. NIEMANN, RESPONDENT
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The award of the husband's corporate stock to the wife as lump sum alimony, and the award of other marital assets to the husband, constituted an abuse of discretion because it improperly imposed a property settlement and lacked justification under lump sum alimony or special equity principles.
In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the trial court awarded the wife the husband's interest in a family corporation as lump sum alimony and award…
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HARDING, Circuit Judge:
By petition for writ of certiorari, we have for review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (Niemann v. Niemann, Fla.App., 294 So. 2d 415), which allegedly conflicts with a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District (Walton v. Walton, Fla.App., 290 So. 2d 110), on the same point of law. In the instant case the court below held:
“The court’s authority to effect a change in the title to the property of the parties in a dissolution of marriage is restricted to an award of lump sum alimony, a determination of a special equity, a partition of the property, or a division based upon an agreement of the parties.”
In Walton v. Walton, supra, the District Court of Appeal in its opinion said:
“ . . .it appears that today a trial judge is authorized to make a division of real property even if held in an estate by the entireties, if such a division is sought by one of the parties and tried without objection.” 290 So. 2d at 112.
The court went on to say:
“In reality, what the appellant is complaining about in the instant appeal is not that the trial court attempted to divide the jointly held property but that he abused his discretion in the manner of the division.”
Therefore, it appears that the statement made by the District Court in Walton regarding the authority of a court to effect a division of real property does not constitute the decision of the court.
We have to look at the decision, rather than a conflict in the opinion, to find that we have jurisdiction. Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823 (Fla.1970).
After having considered this matter and having heard oral argument, we find no conflict of decisions and, therefore, the writ is discharged and the petition is dismissed.
ADKTNS, C. J., concurs specially with opinion.
McCAIN, J., McCORD, District Judge, and RUDD, Circuit Judge, concur.
ADKINS, Chief Judge
(concurring specially) :
I concur with the majority that the decision sub judice does not conflict with Walton v. Walton, 290 So. 2d 110 (Fla.App.3d 1974).
In the decision sub judice, Judge Dow-ney stated:
“The court’s authority to effect a change in the title to the property of the parties in a dissolution of marriage is restricted to an award of lump sum alimony, a determination of a special equity, a partition of the property, or a division based upon an agreement of the parties.
“To justify partition one of the parties must plead a right thereto in accordance with Chapter 64, F.S.1971, F.S.A. A prayer for a division of the property of the parties is insufficient." (294 So. 2d at p. 416) (Emphasis supplied.)
In Walton v. Walton, supra, the Third District Court of Appeal held that a party, who requests the trial court to make an equitable division of jointly held property and fails to object at the trial to the court’s making an equitable division of the property, should not be held to complain that the trial court committed error in undertaking to do what the party requested. Therein, the court said :
“[T]he appellant, having first requested the trial court to make such a decision in his counterclaim, should not now be heard to complain that the trial court committed error in undertaking to do what the appellant requested. [Cited authorities omitted.]” (290 So. 2d at p. 112)
Even though the trial court has no authority to divide currently held property other than under the circumstances specified by Judge Downey in Niemann v. Nie-mann, a party who requests the trial court to divide jointly held property in situations other than that enumerated in the decision sub judice and fails to object at trial to the trial court’s making an equitable division of the property is estopped to raise such as error on appeal.
Viewing the cases in such a light, I concur with the majority that this Court does not have jurisdiction based on a conflict of decisions.
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Blum v. Blum, 382 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…, however, that such a result is authorized, and, in a situation like this, required by Canakaris. That decision seems sub silentio to have departed from the decisions, e. g., Niemann v. Niemann, 294 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974), cert, discharged, 312 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1975), which had held that the courts were not permitted simply to divide fairly the parties’ assets and thus, in effect, to “make a property settlement agreement” on their behalf. Finally, there is no basis whatever for requiring Dr. Blum to…
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Gorman v. Gorman, 400 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…9). . A lump sum alimony award cannot, of course, be used merely to divide jointly owned property because that must be done in accordance with statutory partition proceedings. Niemann v. Niemann, 294 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974), cert. dismissed, 312 So. 2d 733 (Fla.1975); Baker v. Baker, 271 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 278 So. 2d 285 (Fla.1973). Nor can an award of lump sum alimony be used as a division tool where one party has established a special equity because, if the special equity is for…
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Dorothie C. Goss v. Goss, 400 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…peal and remand the cause with instructions to enter an award of permanent alimony based upon the needs of appellant and upon the ability of appellee to provide for those needs. Niemann v. Niemann, 294 So. 2d 415 (Fla.4th DCA 1974). cert. dismissed, 312 So. 2d 733 (Fla.1975). With respect to the authority of the trial court on remand, we adopt the following principle announced by our sister court in Eagan v. Eagan, 392 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla.5th DCA 1981): In Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (F…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1970)
- Niemann v. Niemann, 294 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
- Norwood K. Walton v. Walton, 290 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)