G. E. J., J. B., D. J., M. M., G. J., I. A. D., W. D., T. E. C., W. P. W., J. R. H., CHILDREN, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Twenty-seven juvenile appellants were convicted of escape from the Jacksonville Youth Development Center under Florida statute 39.112. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and rejected constitutional challenges to the escape statute, holding that the Center qualified as a 'training center' and that administrative rules cannot limit statutory application.
The Court affirmed that the Jacksonville Youth Development Center was a 'training center' from which escape was prohibited under section 39.112, and reaffirmed that the statute does not violate the Florida Constitution. Administrative rules and usage cannot improperly restrict a Florida statute, and the 1980 legislative amendment defining 'training school' does not apply retroactively.
[1] A juvenile's escape from a "training center" is prohibited by statute.
[2] Administrative rules and usage are not determinative in construing a statute.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To hold otherwise would allow a state agency rule to improperly restrict a Florida statute. While administrative rules and usage may be considered in construing a statute, they are not conclusive or determinative.”
Establishes that administrative rules cannot override statutory language and their role in statutory construction is limited to consideration only.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTwenty-seven juveniles were convicted of escape under section 39.112, Florida Statutes (1979), from the Jacksonville Youth Development Center. The app…
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[*1326] OVERTON, Justice.
Twenty-seven juvenile appellants appealed their respective convictions for escape under section 39.112, Florida Statutes (1979), to the First District Court of Appeal. The district court, in its opinion reported as R. P. v. State, 389 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), consolidated the appeals and held: (1) as to all twenty-seven appellants, that the Jacksonville Youth Development Center was a “training center” from which escape by a juvenile was prohibited under section 39.112, and (2) as to seventeen of the appellants, that section 39.112 was not violative of article III, section 6, Florida Constitution. With respect to the second issue, because the trial courts' in the remaining ten cases passed upon the constitutional validity of section 39.112 prior to April 1, 1980, the district court found appellate jurisdiction for those causes was properly in this Court under article V, section (3)(b)(l), Florida Constitution (1972), and transferred these causes to this Court pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.040(b). These are the cases we now have before us for review.
Subsequent to the instant district court decision, this Court rendered its decision in State v. J. R. M., 388 So. 2d 1227 (Fla.1980), which upheld section 39.112 from the identical constitutional attack as asserted in the instant case. We reaffirm that decision and affirm the instant trial court decisions.
As to the training center question, we are in full agreement with the district court’s holding that the Jacksonville Youth Development Center was a training center from which a juvenile could escape within the meaning of section 39.112. To hold otherwise would allow a state agency rule to improperly restrict a Florida statute. While administrative rules and usage may be considered in construing a statute, they are not conclusive or determinative.
We are aware that the 1980 legislature amended section 39.01, Florida Statutes, to include a definition of “training school” and that the Jacksonville center was not among those schools expressly named. See ch. 80-290, § 1, Laws of Fla. The district court held, and we agree, that the 1980 amendment does not apply retroactively.
The decisions below are affirmed in all respects.
It is so ordered.
SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, ENGLAND, ALDERMAN and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
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Authorities Cited
- THE Fla. BAR. Re Petition TO Amend Fla. BAR Integration Rule, 388 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 1980)
- R.P. v. State, 389 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)