RALPH JAMES HUMPHRY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1981-08-26
No. XX-425
MILLS, ERVIN and LARRY G. SMITH, JJ., concur.
402 So. 2d 1322 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1981) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Humphry appeals his conviction and sentence for robbery with a firearm and two counts of attempted first-degree murder. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of his motion for competency experts but reversed and remanded for resentencing due to errors in sentencing, including failure to articulate reasons for retaining jurisdiction and improper application of the Youthful Offender Act.


Holding

The court affirmed the denial of the competency expert motion but reversed on sentencing grounds. The trial court erred by failing to articulate reasons for retaining jurisdiction and by sentencing Humphry as an adult on all three convictions when he should have been sentenced as a youthful offender on the first conviction and as an adult on the other two.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court has competent substantial evidence to find a defendant is not incompetent within the meaning of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210(b) when the evidenc…

[2] A trial court must articulate reasons when retaining jurisdiction over a portion of a sentence.

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Key Quotes

“Reasons must be articulated by a trial court once it has decided to retain jurisdiction.”

Establishes the legal requirement that trial courts must provide reasons when retaining jurisdiction over a portion of a sentence.

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Facts & Procedural History

Humphry was convicted of three felonies: robbery with a firearm and two counts of attempted first-degree murder. He received a 30-year sentence for th…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Humphry appeals his judgment and sentence assigning four points as error. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

We affirm on the appellant’s first two interrelated points since the trial court had before it competent substantial evidence to find that appellant was not “incompetent” within the meaning of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210(b). See Walker v. State, 384 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Green v. State, 377 So. 2d 193 (Fla.3d DCA 1979). Therefore, the trial court did not err by refusing to grant the appellant’s motion which requested that the trial court appoint at least two experts to determine appellant’s competency to stand trial pursuant to Rule 3.210(b).

However, we agree with appellant’s contentions raised in points III and IV that the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant. The appellant was convicted of three felonies: robbery with a firearm, and two counts of attempted first degree murder. A 30-year sentence for the robbery conviction was imposed upon him, and jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence was retained without the trial court specifying any reasons for so doing. Reasons must be articulated by a trial court once it has decided to retain jurisdiction. Moore v. State, 392 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Arnett v. State, 397 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).1

The trial court also erred by sentencing the appellant as an adult on all three convictions even though the record established that the appellant met all of the requirements of the Youthful Offender Act, Section 958.04(2), Florida Statutes (1979). The record reveals that the appellant was first adjudicated guilty on all three felonies and then sentenced for each felony at the same proceeding. Therefore, the appellant should have been sentenced as a youthful offender on the first sentence imposed and then sentenced as an adult on the other two convictions. Abram v. State, no. TT-193 (Fla. 1st DCA, April 14, 1981) [1981 FLW 879].

However, as in Abram, we certify the following question to the Supreme Court of the State of Florida as one of great public interest:

Is a person excluded from a mandatory classification under Section 958.04(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978), when prior to sentencing the offender has been found guilty of a qualifying felony under the act and has simultaneously been found guilty of other felonies?

This case is reversed and remanded for the trial court to resentence the appellant in a manner consistent with this opinion.

MILLS, ERVIN and LARRY G. SMITH, JJ., concur. . Although this issue was not ruled on by the lower court, and normally the error should be corrected pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, see Sawyer v. State, 401 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), we allow for its correction on direct appeal as the cause must be remanded for resentencing in accordance with the Youthful Offender Act.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Cooper v. State, 465 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
    …eated by chapter 958, Florida Statutes. We have not been directed to a case which clearly responds to our inquiry, but the following appear to make a distinction between sentencing as a youthful offender and sentencing as an adult: Humphry v. State, 402 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 1st DCA); vacated in part, 408 So. 2d 222 (Fla.1981); Kirkwood v. State, 426 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Nairn v. State, 417 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Whitlock v. State, 404 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); State v. Owens, 395 So. 2d 12…
  • McCOY v. State, 429 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
    …raised and ruled upon in the trial court, we would normally require that the defendant raise such issues via a motion in the trial court pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850. See Sawyer v. State, 401 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), and Humphry v. State, 402 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). However, inasmuch as such issues have been fully briefed herein and considered by us and we have found that the trial judge stated his justification with sufficient particularity, we shall, in the interest of finality, entertain…
  • Garvin v. State, 413 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
    …t of Abram at the time of sentencing. We follow Abram despite our concerns over its correctness because that decision is now under review in the Supreme Court. We are also mindful of the recent decision of a panel of this court in Humphry v. State, 402 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), which read Abram as requiring youthful offender treatment for the first felony of all multiple felony sentencing situations, regardless of the sequence of adjudications and sentencing. We find it inappropriate to render a decisi…

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