RICARDO REDONDO, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1981-07-23
No. 59032
ADKINS, OVERTON and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur., SUNDBERG, C. J., and ENGLAND and McDONALD, JJ., dissent.
403 So. 2d 954 Florida Supreme Court (1981) Negative Treatment
Cited by 133 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot be convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony when the jury has acquitted him of the underlying felony by convicting him only of a lesser included misdemeanor offense. The court reversed the district court's decision reinstating the firearm conviction and quashed that portion of the appellate decision.


Holding

A defendant cannot be convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony when the jury's verdict of guilty on a lesser included misdemeanor constitutes an acquittal of the underlying felony. The conviction for firearm possession must stand or fall with the underlying felony charge, as the existence of a felony is an essential element of the firearm crime.


Headnotes

[1] A conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony cannot stand if the jury acquits the defendant of the underlying felony.

[2] A jury's verdict of guilty on a lesser included misdemeanor offense operates as an acquittal of the greater felony charge.

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Key Quotes

“In the present case the jury in effect acquitted petitioner of the felonies of aggravated battery and attempted aggravated battery when it found him guilty of the lesser included offense of simple battery, a misdemeanor. The existence of a felony or an attempted felony is an essential element of the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.”

Establishes that a guilty verdict on a lesser included misdemeanor constitutes an acquittal of the underlying felony, preventing conviction on a charge requiring the felony as an essential element.

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Facts & Procedural History

Redondo was charged with aggravated battery and unlawful possession of a firearm while committing a felony. At trial, the jury found him guilty of sim…

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Opinion of the Court
BOYD, Justice.

BOYD, Justice.

This cause is before the Court on petition for certiorari to review the decision in Redondo v. State, 380 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.3d DCA 1980). We find express and direct conflict with Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158 (Fla.1979), and therefore have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const. Petitioner was charged by a two-count information with aggravated battery and the unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in the commission of a felony. The case was tried before a jury. On the aggravated battery charge, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of the lesser included offense of simple battery. On the firearm charge, the jury found petitioner guilty as charged of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.

The trial court initially entered judgment on both convictions, but later granted a motion for arrest of judgment on the firearm charge on the ground that it was inconsistent with the jury’s acquittal of petitioner on the underlying felony charge.

On appeal, the district court reversed the judgment of conviction of simple battery due to an error the trial court made in instructing the jury. The case was ordered remanded for a new trial on a charge of simple battery, since a re-trial of the aggravated battery accusation was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The state cross-appealed the trial court’s order in arrest of judgment on the firearm charge. The district court reversed the order, reasoning that although technically inconsistent with the jury’s verdict on the underlying felony charge, the guilty verdict for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony was within the power of the jury to return. Although holding that the trial court erred, the appellate court declined to simply reinstate the judgment, since the same error in jury instructions that called for a new trial on the battery accusation also required one on the firearm possession charge. The court remanded for a new trial for the misdemeanor of simple battery and the crime of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.

In Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158 (Fla.1979), the appellants were charged with third-degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse. Patricia Mahaun was found guilty by the jury of third-degree felony murder and child abuse by culpable negligence, a lesser included misdemeanor of the felony of aggravated child abuse. We concluded that by returning the verdict of guilty of the misdemeanor the jury had acquitted her of the felony of aggravated child abuse. We held that since the felony of aggravated child abuse was an essential element of the felony murder, Mrs. Mahaun could not be convicted on the latter charge.

In the present case the jury in effect acquitted petitioner of the felonies of aggravated battery and attempted aggravated battery when it found him guilty of the lesser included offense of simple battery, a misdemeanor. The existence of a felony or an attempted felony is an essential element of the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. § 790.07(2), Fla.Stat. (1977).1 Therefore, petitioner may not be convicted of that crime. A conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony must stand or fall in conjunction with the underlying felony. Ferrell v. State, 358 So. 2d 843 (Fla.3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 885 (Fla.1979).

That portion of the district court decision that reversed the trial court’s order in arrest of judgment is quashed. We remand the case to the district court with directions to reinstate the trial court’s order and to remand for a new trial on the charge of simple battery.

It is so ordered.

ADKINS, OVERTON and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. SUNDBERG, C. J., and ENGLAND and McDONALD, JJ., dissent.

. Whoever, while committing or attempting to commit any felony or while under indictment, displays, uses, threatens, or attempts to use any firearm or carries a concealed firearm is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, and s. 775.084.


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Citator

Cited By (67 total)

  • State v. Barton, 523 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1988)
    …cts. Where one is convicted of two separate crimes arising out of the same incident, the greater crime will be vacated in those instances in which the conviction of the lesser crime has the effect of exonerating him of the greater. Redondo v. State, 403 So. 2d 954 (Fla.1981). However, a jury verdict of guilt will be set aside only when it is legally inconsistent with another. Pitts. Here, the verdict finding Barton guilty of attempted murder did not disprove his guilt of aggravated battery.2 In Carawan, the…
  • Smiley v. State, 966 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 2007)
    …had established the right to use deadly force in self-defense in a motor vehicle. Compare Redondo v. State, 380 So. 2d 1107, 1110 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (holding that the castle doctrine extends to a place of business), quashed in part on other grounds, 403 So. 2d 954 (Fla.1981) with Baker v. State, 506 So. 2d 1056, 1059 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (holding that the castle doctrine does not extend to automobiles). Moreover, this Court previously held that a new jury instruction on self-defense, which was not related to se…
  • Murrell Streeter v. State, 416 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
    …degree, punishable by fifteen instead of five years, see § 775.082(3)(c), Fla.Stat. (1979). . The only exception to the proposition that separate counts must be viewed independently is now found in the line of cases represented by Redondo v. State, 403 So. 2d 954 (Fla.1981); Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158 (Fla.1979); and Wooten v. State, 404 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). The exception is, as is apparent from these cases, limited to instances where what the jury fails to find in one count vitiates a guilt…

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