SETH HAMILTON GIDDENS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Seth Giddens was convicted of statutory rape, incest, and sexual battery. The Florida Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial court erred in admitting a statement where Giddens said he would not confess this time after having confessed to similar charges previously, as it violated the Williams Rule by improperly placing his character in issue.
The court held that the statement was improperly admitted because it violated the Williams Rule by placing Giddens's character in issue through reference to a prior arrest, was not proper impeachment testimony as it was introduced during the state's case-in-chief rather than on rebuttal, and had no relevance to the essential issues of the case.
[1] A statement made by a defendant after receiving Miranda warnings, which can be interpreted as an admission of guilt in a prior instance and a refusal to speak in the curr…
[2] Evidence of prior arrests, absent specific exceptions, is inadmissible when it serves only to demonstrate a defendant's criminal propensity and places character in issue.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Last time you arrested me for this I fell for it and I told you the truth that I did it. Look where it got me then. I'm not falling for it this time.”
The statement made by Giddens to the officer after Miranda warnings, which the state sought to introduce as impeachment evidence.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGiddens was arrested and after being read Miranda warnings, made a statement to an officer: 'Last time you arrested me for this I fell for it and I to…
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GRIMES, Judge.
Appellant challenges his conviction for statutory rape, incest and three counts of sexual battery. Among other things, he contends that the court erred in admitting certain testimony in violation of the “Williams Rule.”
The state proffered a statement which appellant made after an officer read him the Miranda warnings in the booking room at the police station. According to the officer, appellant said, “Last time you arrested me for this I fell for it and I told you the truth that I did it. Look where it got me then. I’m not falling for it this time.” Defense counsel objected to the statement on the ground that it would improperly place appellant’s character in issue.1 The court permitted the introduction of the statement with the elimination of the words “for this,” thereby deleting any reference to appellant having been previously arrested for the same offense.
Appellant ultimately took the stand and denied all of the charges against him. By interpreting the statement to mean that appellant was saying that he intended to lie about the charges this time, the state contends that it was admissible as impeachment. If that was what appellant meant, the court largely negated the statement’s value for impeachment purposes by deleting the words “for this,” thereby eliminating the relationship between the previous charges and those for which he was on trial. In any event, the statement was not proper as impeachment because it was introduced during the state’s case-in-chief before appellant testified. The state’s argument that this is irrelevant because the statement could have been introduced in rebuttal is unpersuasive. There is no way to know whether appellant would have testified if the statement had not been previously introduced.2
Another reason exists for rejecting the state’s argument. A more likely interpretation of appellant’s statement is that when he was last arrested he had admitted his guilt to his detriment so he was not going to say anything this time. The statement is thus essentially the equivalent of a refusal to talk, and so it has no value for impeachment purposes.
We are also unable to see how the edited statement was relevant to any of the other essential issues. Therefore, it tended only to place appellant’s character (criminal propensity) in issue by demonstrating that he had been previously arrested. This is precisely what Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1959), as codified in section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1979), tries to avoid. See, also, Curry v. State, 355 So. 2d 462 (Fla.2d DCA 1978).
We find no merit in the other points which appellant raises. We reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.
SCHEB, C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur. . Counsel also argued that the statement was an improper comment on appellant’s right to remain silent, but he did not make a motion for mistrial. Therefore, to the extent that the recitation of the statement may have violated appellant’s fifth amendment rights, the error was waived. Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331 (Fla.1978).
. We are unwilling to extend the principle of Duncan v. State, 291 So. 2d 241 (Fla.2d DCA 1974), beyond the particular facts of that case.
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Moore v. State, 530 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…(Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Such statements cannot be offered against an accused during the state’s case-in-chief, because “[a] witness may not be impeached before he has testified.” Erp v. Carroll, 438 So. 2d 31, 35 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Gid-dens v. State, 404 So. 2d 163, 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 608.1 (2d ed. 1984). Although self-serving hearsay statements are inadmissible, an out-of-court admission by the accused is admissible under section 90.803(18), Florida Statutes, when offered b…
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State v. Elkin, 595 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…r, appellee’s statements are inadmissible during the State’s case-in-chief as impeachment because “a witness may not be impeached before he has testified.” Moore, 530 So. 2d at 61; Erp v. Carroll, 438 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Giddens v. State, 404 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). The State attempted to show that appel-lee’s statement was false, in order to show that it was inculpatory. The State asserted that appellee’s statement was false because it was inconsistent with appellee’s previous statements.…
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Pier 66 Co. v. Poulos, 542 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…re was no objection made to this testimony, which is only considered by us on appellants’ allegations of fundamental error. The admission of the indemnity agreement was error. Cf. Erp v. Carroll, 438 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Giddens v. State, 404 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). We recognize that this error would have been considered harmless error were it not for its role in the cumulative impact. Admitting the evidence of the criminal contempt conviction was also error. E.g. Boshnack v. World Wide Rent…
Authorities Cited
- Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959)
- Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1978)
- Ira G. Duncan v. State, 291 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Beasley v. Cleghorn, 355 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)