STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
EUGENE JONES, APPELLEE
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Florida appealed the discharge of Eugene Jones under the speedy trial rule. The trial court had granted Jones a directed verdict of acquittal on the original burglary charge due to a material variance between the information and proof, then dismissed the second burglary information as violating speedy trial rights. The appellate court reversed, holding that either the charges arose from the same conduct (making the speedy trial waiver applicable to both) or they did not (in which case the speedy trial period had not expired for the second charge).
The court reversed the discharge order, holding that if the two charges arose from the same criminal conduct or episode, Jones's speedy trial waiver for the first charge also waived it for the second charge. Alternatively, if the charges did not arise from the same conduct, the speedy trial period for the second charge began upon arrest on March 28, 1980, and had not expired when the discharge order was entered on June 10, 1980. Additionally, Jones was estopped from claiming the charges were the same offense for double jeopardy purposes when he had benefited from the material variance between them to obtain acquittal.
[1] A defendant who obtains a judgment of acquittal due to a material variance between the information and the proof is estopped from later arguing that the variance was imma…
[2] If new charges arise from the same criminal conduct or episode as a prior charge for which speedy trial was waived, the waiver extends to the new charges.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Here either the two charges arose from the same criminal conduct or episode or else they did not. If they did, then appellee's waiver of speedy trial for the first charge was also a waiver for the second charge. State v. Brown; State v. Stevens. If they did not, then appellee's arrest pursuant to the second information began the running of speedy trial as to that charge and this time had not expired when the trial court's order discharging appellee was entered.”
The court's core legal test for determining whether the speedy trial discharge was proper, framing the two alternative scenarios.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJones was charged by information filed November 1, 1979, with burglary of apartment 12. He requested a continuance, taking the case out of speedy tria…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Judge.
The state appeals an order granting appellee’s motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191.
An information was filed on November 1, 1979, charging appellee with burglary of apartment 12 at an Orlando apartment complex. Appellee requested a continuance and thus took the matter out of the operation of the speedy trial rule. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla.1980); State v. Brown, 394 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)1 .
The case proceeded to trial and on March 4, 1980, the trial court granted a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground that the evidence indicated that apartment 125, not apartment 12, had been burglarized.
On March 10, 1980, a new information was filed charging appellee with burglary of apartment 125. Appellee was arrested on this charge on March 28, 1980, and trial was set for June 19, 1980. On June 10, 1980, however, appellee moved for discharge and the trial court subsequently granted the motion, relying on Haddock v. State, 379 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
We REVERSE under the rationale of Stevens v. State, 383 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Here either the two charges arose from the same criminal conduct or episode or else they did not. If they did, then appellee’s waiver of speedy trial for the first charge was also a waiver for the second charge. State v. Brown; State v. Stevens. If they did not, then appellee’s arrest pursuant to the second information began the running of speedy trial as to that charge and this time had not expired when the trial court’s order discharging appellee was entered.
Appellee claims that a double jeopardy violation exists because the second charge was really for the same offense as the first charge. However, a defendant who obtains a judgment of acquittal on the grounds that a material variance existed between the allegations in the information and the proof adduced at trial is estopped to suggest that the variance which was mate rial enough for acquittal is nonetheless immaterial for a new charge. State v. Katz, 402 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1981).
The order discharging appellee is QUASHED and this cause REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent herewith.
DAUKSCH, C. J., and ORFINGER, J., concur. . There are exceptions to the general rule that when a defendant requests and is granted a continuance, the matter is taken out of the operation of the speedy trial rule, but they are not applicable here. See Butterworth at 970; Brown at 219.
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Citator
Cited By
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Stewart v. State, 491 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1986)…t as to all charges which emanate from the same criminal episode. E.g., State v. Albanez, 448 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Goldstein v. State, 447 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); State v. Cocalis, 443 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); State v. Jones, 404 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Conner v. State, 398 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Moreover, the district court correctly concluded that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(h)(2) is inapplicable under the facts of this case. The purpose of rule 3.191(h)…
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State v. Brandt, 460 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…Without distinguishing between a single episode versus multiple episodes we agree appellee was not under restraint, in custody, for the second count until the state charged him with that crime. This case is materially different from State v. Jones, 404 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) where Jones was always charged with only one burglary. There, the first information inaccurately stated the apartment number which was burglarized. Double jeopardy did not bar a new charge and this court ruled a waiver of the spe…
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Irby v. State, 450 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…tate v. Beamon, 298 So. 2d 376 (Fla.1974); State v. Bentley, 81 So. 2d 750 (Fla.1955); State v. Cootner, 60 So. 2d 734 (Fla.1952); State v. Shaw, 415 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); State v. Gragg, 409 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); State v. Jones, 404 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Stevens v. State, 383 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Obviously, the first and second batteries of Officer Ball were either a single continuous episode giving rise to a single offense or two unrelated episodes giving rise to t…
Authorities Cited
- Honorable Robert A. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1980)
- State v. Katz, 402 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1981)
- Udell Shirley Stevens v. State, 383 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- State v. Brown, 394 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Sonney Heath v. State, 379 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Haddock v. State, 379 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)