RAYMOND STEWART, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that when a defendant requests a continuance before the speedy trial period expires, he waives speedy trial rights as to all charges arising from the same criminal episode, even if the state later downgrades the charges. The Court rejected the argument that a 90-day speedy trial period applied after the defendant's continuance request.
No. The defendant is not entitled to discharge because by requesting a continuance before the applicable speedy trial period expires, the defendant waives speedy trial rights as to all charges emanating from the same criminal episode, regardless of whether the state later refiles with a different or lesser charge.
[1] A defendant's request for a continuance before the expiration of the speedy trial period waives speedy trial rights for all charges arising from the same criminal episode…
[2] A defendant who waives speedy trial rights by requesting a continuance cannot later claim a violation of the speedy trial rule when the state nol prosses and refiles char…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when a defendant requests a continuance prior to the expiration of the applicable speedy trial time period for the crime with which he is charged, the defendant waives his speedy trial right as to all charges which emanate from the same criminal episode”
Establishes the core principle that a timely continuance request waives speedy trial protections for all related charges
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStewart was arraigned on June 18, 1983 on a grand theft charge. Approximately 157 days later, on December 2, 1983, Stewart requested a continuance, th…
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McDONALD, Chief Justice.
The First District Court of Appeal has certified the following question as being one of great public importance:
IF THE STATE FILES A FELONY CHARGE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT AND THE DEFENDANT MOVES FOR A CONTINUANCE MORE THAN 90 DAYS BUT LESS THAN 180 DAYS AFTER HIS ARREST, AND THE STATE THEN NOL PROSSES THE FELONY CHARGE AND REFILES THE INFORMATION CHARGING A MISDEMEANOR, IS THE DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO AN IMMEDIATE DISCHARGE UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL RULE?
Stewart v. State, 470 So. 2d 101, 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution. We answer in the negative and approve the opinion of the district court.
Stewart was arraigned on June 18, 1983 on the charge of grand theft. On December 2, 1983, approximately 157 days later, Stewart requested a continuance, thereby waiving his rights under the speedy trial rule. Ziegler v. State, 402 So. 2d 365 (Fla.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035, 102 S.Ct. 1739, 72 L.Ed.2d 153 (1982); Mohler v. State, 466 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191. On January 17, 1984 the state nol prossed the felony information charging grand theft and on January 21, 1984 filed a new misdemeanor information charging petit theft. Stewart then moved for a discharge on speedy trial grounds and the county court granted the motion. The state appealed and the circuit court reversed. On petition for writ of certiorari the district court approved the decision of the circuit court, but certified the instant question.
As the district court correctly stated, when a defendant requests a continuance prior to the expiration of the applicable speedy trial time period for the crime with which he is charged, the defendant waives his speedy trial right as to all charges which emanate from the same criminal episode. E.g., State v. Albanez, 448 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Goldstein v. State, 447 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); State v. Cocalis, 443 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); State v. Jones, 404 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Conner v. State, 398 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Moreover, the district court correctly concluded that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(h)(2) is inapplicable under the facts of this case. The purpose of rule 3.191(h)(2) is to prevent the state from circumventing the speedy trial rule and extending the applicable time period by nol prossing a charge and refiling a new information when the time limit approaches. See Fyman v. State, 450 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Wright v. State, 387 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). The state could not have violated rule 3.191(h)(2) by nol pross-ing the information when the defendant had already waived his rights under the rule. State v. Condon, 444 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); State v. Kerper, 393 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
Further, we reject Stewart’s argument that the speedy trial period in the instant case expired on day ninety. At the time Stewart requested the continuance, he stood charged with grand theft, for which the applicable speedy trial period was 180 days. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1). Because Stewart requested the continuance within that period, the request constituted a timely waiver. Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the negative and approve the opinion of the district court.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW and BARKETT, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (21 total)
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State v. Nelson, 26 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 2010)…. 2d 128 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)). Thus, the Fourth District maintained its conclusion that the post-expiration continuance did not waive Nelson’s speedy trial rights. See id. The district court then attempted to harmonize Naveira with Stewart v. State, 491 So. 2d 271 (Fla.1986), which held that “when a defendant requests a continuance prior to the expiration of the applicable speedy trial time period for the crime with which he is charged, the defendant waives his speedy trial right as to all charges which emana…1 / 2
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State v. Dorian, 619 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…a.1987). . Fyman v. State, 450 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (opinion by Grimes, J.); Richardson v. State, 340 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); State ex rel. Green v. Patterson, 279 So. 2d 362, 363-64 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). . Stewart v. State, 491 So. 2d 271, 272 (Fla.1986). . State v. McDonald, 538 So. 2d 1352, 1353 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). . State v. Agee, 588 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). . State v. Agee, 588 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (defendant arrested for felony files a demand for speedy tria…
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Thompson v. State, 615 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…tinuance prior to the expiration of the applicable speedy trial time period for the crime with which he is charged, the defendant waives his speedy trial right as to all charges which emanate [*741] from the same criminal episode.” Stewart v. State, 491 So. 2d 271, 272 (Fla.1986). Accord Beverly v. State, 516 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Birken v. Scheer, 543 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 553 So. 2d 1166 (Fla.1989). The speedy trial requirement is reinstated upon the filing of a motion for disc…
Previewing 3 of 21 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- Zeigler v. State, 402 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1981)
- Greene v. Grievance Comm. for the Ninth Jud. Dist., 455 U.S. 1035 (U.S. 1982)
- Padilla v. State, 447 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Wright v. State, 387 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Fyman v. State, 450 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Monahan v. State, 398 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- State v. Condon, 444 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- State v. Kerper, 393 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- State v. Jones, 404 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- State v. Cocalis, 443 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)