GERALD LAMAR WHITE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Gerald Lamar White appeals the revocation of his probation following a trial court's modification of his original sentence outside the permitted jurisdictional period. The court reverses, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reduce White's sentence more than sixty days after the original sentence was imposed, and therefore the probation order, its revocation, and the new sentence are all void.
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to reduce the sentence because the sixty-day jurisdictional period under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 had expired on August 3, 1979, before the second motion was filed on February 26, 1980. A defendant cannot confer jurisdiction on the trial court through waiver, acquiescence, estoppel, or consent, as jurisdiction is established solely by general law. Therefore, the probation order, revocation order, and new sentence are all void.
[1] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to reduce a sentence after the time period for modification has expired.
[2] A defendant cannot confer jurisdiction upon a trial court by waiver, acquiescence, estoppel, or consent.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Since the original sentence imposed was a legal sentence, the trial court was without jurisdiction to reduce the sentence at the time the second motion was filed. The sixty-day period following the original sentence had expired on August 3, 1979.”
Establishes the core holding: the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence outside the sixty-day window under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWhite was originally sentenced on June 4, 1979, to consecutive six-month sentences for three counts of trafficking in stolen property. On July 24, 197…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Jurisdiction To Modify Sentence cases and more on FLexlaw
BOARDMAN, Judge.
Gerald Lamar White appeals the revocation of his probation. We reverse.
Appellant was originally charged by information with three counts of trafficking in stolen property. He pled guilty and was given consecutive sentences of six months on each count on June 4, 1979. On July 24, 1979, he filed a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800, which was denied.
On February 26, 1980, appellant filed a motion to reconsider the prior motion for reduction of sentence. This motion was granted on March 10, 1980; the balance of appellant’s jail sentence was suspended, and he was given concurrent five-year probationary terms.
On March 13, 1981, an affidavit of probation violation and warrant were filed charging appellant with having committed several felonies. After hearing, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation and gave him concurrent sentences of fifteen years on each count, despite appellant’s counsel’s contention at the revocation hearing that the trial court had no jurisdiction because it had not had jurisdiction to modify appellant’s sentence when it did so. This appeal followed timely.
Since the original sentence imposed was a legal sentence, the trial court was without jurisdiction to reduce the sentence at the time the second motion was filed. The sixty-day period following the original sentence had expired on August 3, 1979. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800; State v. Sutton, 371 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); State v. Mancil, 354 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
At the revocation hearing, the state contended that appellant consented to the trial court’s maintaining jurisdiction in this matter and that therefore he is now es-topped from raising that issue. However, it is well settled that a defendant cannot confer jurisdiction on the trial court by waiver, acquiescence, estoppel, or consent since jurisdiction is established solely by general law. Art: V, § 6(b), Fla.Const.; Worley v. State, 396 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 2d DGA 1981); Sclafani v. County of Dade, 323 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); State v. Evans, 225 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1053, 90 S.Ct. 1394, 25 L.Ed.2d 668 (1970).
Accordingly, the order purporting to place appellant on probation, the order revoking that probation, and the new judgment and sentence are REVERSED and the cause REMANDED with directions to reinstate appellant’s original judgment and sentence.1
SCHEB, C. J., and OTT, J., concur. . Of course, for administrative purposes, appellant’s record should be credited with all the time he has served under either sentence for the felonies involved here.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
-
Wolfson v. State, 437 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…So. 2d 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). There is another reason why appellant’s probation order was invalid. Ordinarily, a trial judge loses jurisdiction to change a sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) after sixty days. White v. State, 404 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Solomon v. State, 341 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). If an appeal is taken, the rule extends the time until sixty days after receipt of the appellate mandate. However, the appeal itself removes jurisdiction from the trial judge,…
-
State v. Rhodes, 554 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…he sentence more than sixty days after the sentencing hearing. We agree. Where the original sentence imposed by the trial court is legal, the court lacks jurisdiction to reduce the sentence [*1230] after the expiration of sixty days. White v. State, 404 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Because the proper vehicle to request review on such grounds is a common-law writ of certiorari, Hudson v. Hofmann, 471 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), we treat this appeal as a petition for certiorari. See Fla.R.App.P. 9.040(c)…
-
State v. Schafer, 583 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…tionary period, but does not authorize extension of the period. Patrick v. State, 336 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). 5. That the Defendant cannot confer jurisdiction on the trial court by waiver, acquiescence, estoppel or consent. White v. State, 404 So. 2d 804 (Fla. [2d DCA] 1981). 6. That the contraband seized pursuant to this unlawful arrest should be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree”. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 407 [471], 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417-18, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). GLICKSTEIN,…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Evans, 225 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- Sclafani v. Cnty. OF Dade, 323 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Ponce v. California, 397 U.S. 1053 (U.S. 1970)
- Primous v. United States, 397 U.S. 1053 (U.S. 1970)
- Worley v. State, 396 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- State v. Carlie Nolan Mancil, Jr., 354 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- State v. Sutton, 371 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)