STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
DALE SUTTON, APPELLEE
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PER CURIAM.
The state appeals from the grant of a motion to reduce appellee’s sentence.
Appellee was sentenced on June 23, 1978, to eleven and one-half months in county jail, beginning September 15, 1978. No appeal was filed. On November 3, 1978, the court granted a motion to reduce appellee’s sentence to two years probation because appellee needed treatment not available in the county jail. Appellee made no allega tion that the sentence was illegal, to justify relief under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800 or 3.850.
After the passage of 60 days from imposition of the sentence, the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify the sentence. Petters v. State, 350 So. 2d 558 (Fla.2d DCA 1977); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800(b).
Reversed, and remanded with instruction to reinstate the eleven and one-half month sentence with credit for all time served under this charge.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and SCHEB and RYDER, JJ., concur.
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Smith v. State, 471 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…358 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). We can and do, however, treat this appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari. Generally, a court has no jurisdiction to modify a legal sentence after the passage of sixty days from sentencing. State v. Sutton, 371 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800(b). In the unusual circumstances presented by this case, however, the trial judge effectively enlarged the time during which he could reconsider Smith’s sentence by having commenced the hearing on Smith’s time…
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White v. State, 404 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…was a legal sentence, the trial court was without jurisdiction to reduce the sentence at the time the second motion was filed. The sixty-day period following the original sentence had expired on August 3, 1979. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800; State v. Sutton, 371 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); State v. Mancil, 354 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). At the revocation hearing, the state contended that appellant consented to the trial court’s maintaining jurisdiction in this matter and that therefore he is now es-topped fro…
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Kinney v. State, 458 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…tencing because this court vacated only those two sentences. We did not vacate the robbery sentence. Thus, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to sentence defendant as an habitual felony offender on the robbery conviction. See State v. Sutton, 371 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Therefore, we vacate the portion of defendant’s robbery sentence which finds him to be an habitual felony offender. The habitualization on the attempted murder and grand theft charges was proper because the procedural requisites…
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- Petters v. State, 350 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)