LENWOOD PATTMON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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OTT, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of a charge of escape and sentenced to 15 years in prison. He was at that time on parole from a sentence on another crime. The new 15-year sentence specified that it was “to commence after any parole violation sentence that might be imposed.”
The quoted language was surplus-age. Unless the court specifically directed otherwise, the new sentence would as a matter of law be consecutive to any other sentence for an offense that was the subject of a separate indictment, information, or affidavit. § 921.16, Fla.Stat. As constituted, the new sentence is impermissibly uncertain as to commencement. Keel v. State, 321 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). We therefore cure the deficiency by striking the surplusage. Teffeteller v. State, 396 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
The judgment of conviction and the sentence, as amended, are AFFIRMED.
GRIMES, Acting C. J., and RYDER, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Tremaine v. State, 698 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…of the sentence and conditions of probation. Tremaine correctly argues that the trial court erred when it ordered his sentence for aggravated battery to run consecutive to any sentence to be imposed in a case pending in Ohio. See Pattmon v. State, 404 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Keel v. State, 321 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Hummell v. State, 693 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). We, therefore, strike that portion of his sentence. We also strike probation condition 14 which states, “[t]his sentence conse…
Authorities Cited
- Teffeteller v. State, 396 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Kubalski v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 321 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Keel v. State, 321 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)