WILLIAM JOEL KEEL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court affirmed a guilty plea to robbery but remanded for resentencing because the consecutive sentence was vague as to its commencement date.
A sentence that runs consecutive to an unspecified Georgia sentence is vague and improper because the commencement date is indefinite.
[1] A sentence imposed to run consecutive to an unspecified sentence from another jurisdiction is vague and improper when the commencement date is indefinite.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKeel pleaded guilty to robbery pursuant to plea negotiations providing for a ten-year sentence to run consecutive to any Georgia sentence he was then …
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BOARDMAN, Judge.
William Keel entered a plea of guilty to the charge of robbery pursuant to plea negotiations. The negotiations provided that he would receive a ten year sentence which would run consecutive to any sentence which’ he was then serving in Georgia. After determining that the plea was voluntarily entered the court accepted the plea and sentenced appellant to “ten (10) years to run consecutively with any sentence from the State of Georgia.”
Appellant contends that the sentence was vague as to date of commencement. We find this claim is meritorious. While the intent of the trial court may have been to have appellant’s sentence commence at the expiration of a specific Georgia sentence, as imposed the sentence is vague and uncertain. For example, if appellant were subsequently tried and convicted of another crime in Georgia, the commencement of the robbery sentence would be delayed. This indefinite commencement of the sentence is improper. Wallace v. State, Fla. 1899, 41 Fla. 547, 26 So. 713; Bush v. State, Fla.App.2d 1975, 319 So. 2d 126; Dyer v. State, Fla.App.3d 1974, 296 So. 2d 524.
We have considered appellant’s other point on appeal and find it to be without merit.
The judgment is affirmed and the case remanded to the trial court for entry of a corrective sentence.
HOBSON, A. C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Ellis Richardson v. State, 432 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…The statutory language infers that there must be an existing ' sentence in that jurisdiction. Cf., Newman v. State, 409 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). Additionally, the date of commencement of a sentence cannot be vague or uncertain. Keel v. State, 321 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Although appellant had been placed on parole, the New Jersey authorities chose not to prosecute him for his subsequent violation. Thus, no sentence existed for that violation in New Jersey when he was sentenced by the trial court…
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Percival v. State, 506 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…hat the trial court erred in requiring his sentences to be served consecutively to a sentence which had not yet been imposed on other charges pending against him. The sentence imposed by a trial court must commence on a definite date, Keel v. State, 321 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), and may only be required to be served consecutively to an existing sentence. See Richardson v. State, 432 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Teffeteller v. State, 396 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). In this case, the trial court di…
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McCALL v. State, 475 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…because it was vague and uncertain as to when it commenced relative to “any additional sentence” in North Carolina. See Richardson v. State, 432 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Teffeteller v. State, 396 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Keel v. State, 321 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). However, the record reflects that defendant began serving his Florida sentence after he served all of his sentences in North Carolina. Thus, the issue has become moot, and no purpose would be served by remanding for entry of a co…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wallace v. State, 26 So. 713 (Fla. 1899)
- Dyer v. State, 296 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Bush v. State, 319 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)