STEVEN MICHAEL REID, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A defendant appealed his conviction for threatening to throw a destructive device, arguing the statute required proof that he actually intended to carry out the threat. The court held that the statute requires only that the threat itself convey intent to cause bodily harm or damage, not that the defendant subjectively intended to follow through.
The statute requires only that the threat convey an intent to do bodily harm or damage to property; whether the defendant subjectively intended to follow through with the threat is irrelevant. The defendant's note satisfied this requirement because the threat obviously conveyed the requisite intent.
[1] A statute should not be interpreted in a manner that leads to an absurd result.
[2] A threat to throw a destructive device requires that the threat itself convey an intent to do bodily harm or damage to property.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“courts will not ascribe to the legislature an intent to create an absurd result”
The court's rationale for rejecting the defendant's literal interpretation of the statute, relying on the principle that statutes must be construed reasonably.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant entered a bank and handed a customer service employee a note threatening to toss a grenade in the employee's lap if police arrived, dema…
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GRIMES, Judge.
This case involves the construction of section 790.162, Florida Statutes (1979).
Appellant entered a bank and handed a customer service employee a note which said, “I have a grenade. Don’t press a button; first cop I see, I will toss it in your lap. I want to see you put $3,000 in one stack on the counter.” The bank employee handed the note to a coworker who alerted a security guard. The security guard called the police, and they arrested appellant before he left the bank. Throughout this event, no one ever saw a bomb or grenade, and appellant had none in his possession when the police frisked him.
The state charged appellant with threatening to throw, place or discharge a destructive device and with attempted robbery. At the trial, the state attorney conceded that appellant had not possessed a destructive device. The jury found appellant guilty of both charges, and he received consecutive sentences for the crimes. He appeals only his conviction for threatening to throw a destructive device.
Section 790.162 reads:
790.162 Threat to throw, place or discharge any destructive device, felony; penalty. It is unlawful for any person to threaten to throw, place, or discharge any destructive device with intent to do bodily harm to any person or with intent to do damage to any property of any person, and any person convicted thereof shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
Appellant contends that since there was no evidence that he had any intent to do bodily harm or damage to property, the court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal. A literal reading of the statute lends some credence to appellant’s position, but as so interpreted, it would not make much sense. Accordingly, we reject this interpretation since courts will not ascribe to the legislature an intent to create an absurd result. Thomas v. State, 317 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 333 So. 2d 465 (Fla.1976).
Section 790.161 provides that it is unlawful for any person to throw, place or discharge a destructive device with intent to do bodily harm or damage to property. Section 790.162, which essentially tracks the same language, was obviously intended to cover a threat to carry out the conduct proscribed by section 790.161. Viewed in this context, we think that section 790.162 requires only that the threat must convey an intent to do bodily harm or damage to property. Here, appellant’s threat obviously conveyed this intent. Therefore, under our construction of the statute, whether appellant intended to follow through with his threat was irrelevant.
AFFIRMED.
HOBSON, A. C. J., and DANAHY, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Smith v. State, 532 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)…volving or resembling extortion, and Smith’s actions may be so characterized, neither the actual intent to do harm nor the ability to carry out the threats is an essential element. Alonso v. State, 447 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Reid v. State, 405 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). For example, in United States v. Callahan, 702 F. 2d 964 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840, 104 S.Ct. 133, 78 L.Ed.2d 128 (1983), the accused wrote the director of the Secret Service, announcing the necessity of assassinati…
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Valdes v. State, 443 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…lly impossible for the State to obtain a conviction where no actual destructive device was involved. We do not believe that the legislature intended such an absurd result. Moreover, this issue has been resolved adversely to Valdes in Reid v. State, 405 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). We agree with the Second District and hold that in order to obtain a conviction under Section 790.162, Florida Statutes (1981), the State need not prove the existence of an actual destructive device. It is sufficient that the Sta…
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Spellman v. State, 529 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…eat on the victim and thus do not require proof that the defendant actually possessed a bomb or destructive device at the time. See, e.g., Valdes v. State, 443 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA), pet. for rev. den., 450 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1984); Reid v. State, 405 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- A. J. House & Sons, Inc. v. Smith, 317 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Thomas v. State, 317 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)