IN THE INTEREST OF G. J. N., A CHILD
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the admission of a police officer's testimony regarding a victim's out-of-court statement about the date of an offense was improper hearsay and constituted reversible error.
[1] A police officer's testimony regarding a victim's oral statement about the date of an offense is inadmissible hearsay, even if the statement was recorded in a report, if…
[2] Admitting a police officer's testimony of a victim's out-of-court statement regarding the date of an offense, when that statement is offered to prove the truth of the mat…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA juvenile was found guilty of battery. The victim testified the battery occurred on September 1, 1979, but the State's petition and a police officer'…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Business Records Exception cases and more on FLexlaw
BERANEK, Judge.
Appellant, a juvenile, was found guilty of battery and placed on probation. He appeals, urging error in the admission of certain testimony given by an investigating police officer. The delinquency petition alleged a battery occurring on September 21, 1979. Although not specifically provided for under the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, the State answered a defense request for statement of particulars. This answer also stated September 21, 1979, as the date of the offense. At trial, however, the victim testified the battery occurred on September 1, 1979. This testimony was given by the victim on two occasions in answer to direct questions from the State. Despite the variance, no clarification was sought from the witness.
The State’s only other witness was a police officer who discussed the case with the victim approximately three months after the occurrence. Over defense objection, the police officer was allowed to testify that the victim told him that the battery had occurred on September 21, 1979. The trial court overruled the defendant’s hearsay objection and admitted the testimony as a business record pursuant to Section 90.-803(6), Florida Statutes (1979). This ruling was error. The report itself was never introduced into evidence and the officer was simply allowed to testify to the oral statements of the victim. The business record exemption permits introduction of a document rather than oral hearsay statements.
We conclude that the testimony was hearsay and was improperly admitted. See Cox v. State, 394 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Both the petition and the volunteered statement of particulars established September 21, 1979, as the date of the offense. Under these circumstances, the court erred in finding the juvenile guilty of the offense as charged on September 21, 1979, since absent the officer’s testimony, there was no evidence as to this date. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to enter judgment in favor of appellant.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HERSEY, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., Retired, Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
J.H. v. State, 458 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…committed a battery and a trespass is insufficient as a matter of law, we reverse the adjudication of delinquency and remand with directions to discharge the appellant. See Owen v. State, 432 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); In the Interest of G.J.N., 405 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); G.A.D. v. State, 340 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). Reversed and remanded with directions.…
Authorities Cited
- COX v. State, 394 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)