LIONEL DON COX, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Lionel Cox was convicted as a principal in the first degree for armed robbery committed by his brother. The Florida appellate court reversed the conviction, finding the evidence legally insufficient and that the state failed to prove Cox's intent to participate in the crime.
The conviction must be reversed because (1) the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction, consisting only of proof that Cox's brother and another male fled the scene and that Cox was found with his brother thirty minutes later two miles away; and (2) the record contained no evidence of Cox's intent to participate in the crime, which is a required element for aiding and abetting liability.
[1] Evidence of guilt must be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence to sustain a conviction.
[2] Testimony regarding out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted constitutes hearsay.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This circumstantial evidence, while consistent with guilt, is not wholly inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence and, therefore, cannot sustain a conviction.”
Establishes the legal standard for sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in Florida; evidence must be wholly inconsistent with innocence.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJames Earl Cox robbed a convenience store clerk shortly after midnight. Two white males were seen fleeing the scene by a motorist, George Mullins. Thi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Intent To Participate In Crime cases and more on FLexlaw
OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr. (Retired), Associate Judge.
Appellant was convicted as a principal in the first degree to an armed robbery committed by his brother, James Earl Cox. We find that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the conviction and, therefore, vacate the sentence and reverse the judgment.
Shortly after midnight, a white male later identified as appellant’s brother, James Earl Cox, robbed the clerk of a convenience store. Immediately thereafter, a passing motorist, George Mullins, saw two white males running from the vicinity of the store. Mullins stopped and went into the store. When the police arrived a few moments later, he was able to give the police a description of the clothing worn by one of the men fleeing the scene but not the other. This description matched the clerk’s description of the robber. Thirty minutes later appellant and his brother were arrested in their car in front of a club two miles from the scene of the crime. The clothing worn by appellant’s brother matched the description given the police by both Mullins and the clerk. Both appellant and his brother were taken into custody and the clerk immediately identified James as the robber. At trial, Mullins testified that he could not describe the other man fleeing the scene and that he did not give any description of such person to the police. However, over appellant’s objection, the investigating officer testified that he had taken notes indicating that Mullins described the second man as a white male wearing a red shirt and blue jeans. When arrested, appellant was wearing blue jeans and a white shirt with a red logo. Appellant testified he and his brother had been together most of the evening, but denied they had been together for approximately thirty minutes prior to the arrest. Appellant gave a logical explanation for his whereabouts during that period of separation.
The investigating officer’s testimony concerning Mullins’ description of the second person was clearly hearsay, and the objection should have been sustained. Since the officer’s notes were not admitted into evidence, we need not and do not determine whether such notes would have qualified as a hearsay exception under Section 90.803(6), Florida Statutes (1979).1
Therefore, the evidence against appellant consists only of proof that his brother and another white male were seen running from the convenience store after the robbery and that thirty minutes later appellant was found seated in a car with his brother two miles from the scene of the crime. This circumstantial evidence, while consistent with guilt, is not wholly inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence and, therefore, cannot sustain a conviction. Tillman v. State, 353 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Ferguson v. State, 321 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
This cause must be reversed for an additional reason. Appellant was charged and convicted as a principal in the first degree for aiding and abetting under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1979). Before an accused may be convicted as an aider and abettor, his intent to participate in the crime must be proven. Fisher v. State, 365 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Shockley v. State, 338 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976). The record does not contain any evidence of the appellant’s intent to participate in the crime.
The judgment is reversed.
MILLS, C. J., and ROBERT P. SMITH, J., concur. . See also, State v. Inman, 347 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977) predating the effective date of the evidence code.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Jones v. State, 466 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…le theory of innocence; delinquency adjudication based on a theft finding reversed); Owen v. State, 432 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (state’s evidence deemed insufficient to link defendant to a burglary; burglary conviction reversed); Cox v. State, 394 So. 2d 237 [*321] (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (state’s evidence deemed insufficient to link the defendant to store holdup; robbery conviction reversed); J.C. v. State, 377 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (state’s, evidence including fingerprints deemed insufficient to l…
-
Donnie Bullard v. State, 436 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…d object to the admission of hearsay in the form of statements of an absent witness presented to the jury through the testimony of a police officer. That testimony was inadmissible. Driessen v. State, 431 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Cox v. State, 394 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Although the trial court erred in admitting the testimony, the error must be deemed harmless in light of the three eyewitness identifications presented to the jury. For these reasons we hold that the record supports- reversal b…
-
In the Interest of G. J. N., 405 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…llowed to testify to the oral statements of the victim. The business record exemption permits introduction of a document rather than oral hearsay statements. We conclude that the testimony was hearsay and was improperly admitted. See Cox v. State, 394 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Both the petition and the volunteered statement of particulars established September 21, 1979, as the date of the offense. Under these circumstances, the court erred in finding the juvenile guilty of the offense as charged on Se…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Tillman v. State, 353 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Shockey v. State, 338 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- State v. Inman, 347 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Ferguson v. State, 321 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Allstate Ins. Co. v. Czarnecki, 365 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Fisher v. State, 365 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)