M. DOUGLAS DAVIS, APPELLANT,
v.
BUREAU OF CRIMES COMPENSATION, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, APPELLEE
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Davis sought compensation under Florida's Crime Victim Compensation Act for injuries sustained in a hit-and-run accident. The court affirmed the denial of his claim, holding that a hit-and-run incident alone, without proof that the driver intentionally inflicted injury through use of the vehicle, does not constitute a crime qualifying for compensation under the statute.
A hit-and-run incident alone does not constitute a crime for purposes of the Crime Victim Compensation Act unless the injury was intentionally inflicted through use of the vehicle or the vehicle was an implement of a crime to which the chapter applies. The driver's intentional act of fleeing the scene does not satisfy the statutory requirement that the injury be intentionally inflicted.
[1] A "hit and run" incident alone, without proof of intent to inflict injury, is insufficient to constitute a "crime" for the purposes of Chapter 960.03(3), Florida Statutes…
[2] Chapter 960.03(3), Florida Statutes (1979), applies only to overt acts of a driver while using their automobile, not to subsequent intentional omissions to render aid.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[N]o act involving the operation of a motor vehicle, boat or aircraft which results in injury or death shall constitute a crime for the purpose of this chapter unless the injury or death was intentionally inflicted through the use of such vehicle, boat, or aircraft, or unless such vehicle, boat, or aircraft is an implement of a crime to which this act applies”
This statutory provision establishes the core requirement that injury must be intentionally inflicted through use of the vehicle itself to qualify as a compensable crime.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDavis was struck by an automobile driven by a hit-and-run motorist while acting as a pedestrian. The driver fled the accident scene. Davis filed a cla…
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PER CURIAM.
Davis, the appellant, filed a claim under Chapter 960, Florida Statutes (1979), seeking compensation for injuries he received in his capacity as a pedestrian when struck by an automobile driven by a “hit and run” motorist. The deputy commissioner denied the appellant’s claim, finding that the “hit and run” incident alone without proof of intent to inflict injury is insufficient to constitute a “crime” for the purposes of Chapter 960.03(3); Florida Statutes (1979). We approve the deputy’s interpretation of the statute and accordingly affirm his order. Davis concedes that there was no evidence that the hit and run driver intentionally struck him with his automobile; however he maintains that the driver’s act was a “crime” within the meaning of Section 960.03(3), inasmuch as the record establishes that the driver intentionally fled from the accident and by doing so presumably intended to inflict greater injury on the claimant. This argument is without merit. Section 960.03(3) provides in material part:
[N]o act involving the operation of a motor vehicle, boat or aircraft which results in injury or death shall constitute a crime for the purpose of this chapter unless the injury or death was intentionally inflicted through the use of such vehicle, boat, or aircraft, or unless such vehicle, boat, or aircraft is an implement of a crime to which this act applies, (e.s.)
Therefore, we agree that the above-quoted statute applies only to overt acts of a driver while using his automobile, and not to any subsequent intentional omission of the driver to render aid to another. We agree also with the deputy’s finding that the automobile of the hit and run driver is not an “implement of a crime” because a “hit and run” violation is not “a crime to which [Chapter 960] applies.” Finally, inasmuch as the deputy has construed a statute in an area within his special expertise, his interpretation' will be accepted as correct by this court as the appellant has not shown it to be clearly erroneous. See Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Yarborough, 275 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
AFFIRMED.
ERVIN, WENTWORTH and JOANOS, JJ., concur.
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Raik v. Dep't of Legal Affairs, 344 So. 3d 540 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)…Crimes Compensation, which held that one of section 960.03(3)’s earlier definitions of crime only applied to “overt acts of a driver while using [an] automobile, and not to any subsequent intentional omission of the driver to render aid to another.” 406 So. 2d 1189, 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). And in its latest revision, the Legislature enlarged the definition of crime to include felonies or misdemeanors that result in the death of an emergency responder. Ch. 2017-155, § 13, Laws of Fla. And even where the Legi…
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Medlin v. Bureau of Crimes Comp. Div. of Workers' Comp., 477 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…er unless the injury or death was intentionally inflicted through the use of such vehicle, boat, or aircraft, or unless such vehicle, boat, or aircraft is an implement of a crime to which this act applies. In Davis v. Bureau of Crimes Compensation, 406 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), our sister court held that a hit and run accident alone, without proof of intent to inflict injury, is insufficient to constitute a crime under section 960.03(3). The court held that the statute applies only to overt acts of a d…
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- Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Jess Yarborough, 275 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973)