M. M., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A juvenile appealed his delinquency adjudication, claiming violation of his speedy trial rights under Florida juvenile procedure rules. The court reversed and remanded for discharge, finding that the trial court failed to properly extend the speedy trial period by the required deadline, and the juvenile never acquiesced to any extension.
The court held that there can be no extension of the speedy trial period without an order of extension entered during the speedy trial period itself. An oral continuance does not extend speedy trial time absent a finding that the interests of justice will be served, the defendant's acquiescence, and a proper written order. A written order entered eight days after expiration of the speedy trial period cannot retroactively cure the defect.
[1] A speedy trial period cannot be extended without the entry of an order of extension.
[2] An oral continuance does not extend speedy trial time absent a finding that the interests of justice will be served by such an extension.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There can be no extension of the speedy trial period without the entry of an order of extension.”
Establishes the fundamental requirement that speedy trial periods can only be extended by proper court order.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceM.M. was charged with a delinquency offense subject to a 90-day speedy trial period. Two days before the 90-day period expired on August 6, 1981, a co…
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JORGENSON, Judge.
M. M. appeals his adjudication of delinquency and alleges, as grounds therefor, violation of his speedy trial rights under Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.180(c). We find merit in his contention and reverse.
On August 6, 1981, two days prior to the running of the 90-day speedy trial period, a continuance was granted until August 27, 1980. The trial court entered its order reflecting the continuance on August 18,1980 (eight days after the expiration of the 90-day speedy trial period). That order did not extend the speedy trial period pursuant to the same Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.180(e), but merely reflected the continuance.
There can be no extension of the speedy trial period without the entry of an order of extension. J. R. S. v. Hastings, 374 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). An oral continuance does not extend the speedy trial time absent a finding that the interests of justice will be served by such an extension. C. S. v. State, 390 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). The state’s reliance on State v. Kelley, 322 So. 2d 581 (1st DCA 1975), is misplaced. In that case the defendant acquiesced in the continuance which was charged to both defendants. In the case sub judice, M. M. never acquiesced to an extension of his speedy trial rights. The court did not take the necessary action required by Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.180(c), specifically extending the speedy trial time, or make the necessary findings which are also required.
The state’s alternative argument, that the defect was cured by the entry of a written order1 eight days after the expiration of the speedy trial period, is equally without merit. In Muller v. State, 387 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), this court held that:
In the absence of an order of extension entered by the trial court during the speedy trial period, we will not find that the time was extended, no matter how compelling or exceptional the circumstances may appear. Since the first issue presented is disposi-tive, we do not reach the other issues contained in M. M.’s appeal.
Absent a showing that the appellant was in any way at fault in delaying the adjudicatory hearing, we reverse and remand with directions to the trial court to discharge the appellant.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
. The written order, even if timely, makes no findings, nor does it extend speedy trial time.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Donnell Rogers v. The Honorable Richard B. Keating, 411 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…ons, M. B. v. Lee, 388 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), does not support Rogers’ position: “[T]he judge did not comply with rule 8.180(c) as he failed to enter an order reciting the reasons for the extension.” 388 So. 2d at 1365. In M. M. v. State, 407 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 3d DCA Dec. 8,1981), also cited by Rogers, the trial court orally granted a continuance, but did not specifically extend the speedy trial period. A written order reflecting the continuance was entered eight days after the speedy trial period h…
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In the Interest of H.B. v. State, 455 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…s regards the reason given for the extension. Accordingly, we find and hold that the trial judge erred in not dismissing the dependency petition. See generally, T.L. v. Byrd, supra; J.J.S. v. State, 440 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); M.M. v. State, 407 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); M.B. v. Lee, 388 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); R.L.P. v. Korda, 380 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); compare St. Dept. of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Lancione, 430 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).1 Notwithstanding the above, appel…
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L.J. v. State, 423 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…se no motion for an extension of time was made by the state or granted by the trial court. In the case sub judice a motion for continuance was timely made, granted by the trial court and the requisite findings were made of record. See M.M. v. State, 407 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Affirmed.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Kelley, 322 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
- Muller v. State, 387 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- The LAW Firm OF Patterson v. Gertrude Kahn Koebrich, 374 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)
- C. S. v. State, 390 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)