TRI STAR INVESTMENTS, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
VICTORIA E. MIELE AND REGENCY PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 1981-12-11
No. 81-631
GRIMES, A. C. J., and DANAHY, J., concur.
407 So. 2d 292 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1981) Positive Treatment
Cited by 46 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.


Holding

The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the action with prejudice based on unproven allegations of fraud on the court.


Facts & Procedural History

Plaintiff's counsel informed the court that corporate officers could not appear due to an airline strike, but the judge's own investigation contradict…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
OTT, Judge.

OTT, Judge.

The court below entered a final order dismissing with prejudice this action for breach of fiduciary duty. The dismissal was based on a determination that the plaintiff, through its counsel, had falsely and fraudulently represented to the court that its corporate officers would be unable to appear at trial because of an airline strike. However, counsel stated that he was ready for trial and, in fact, was not going to ask for a continuance.

The record reveals that the trial judge then had his secretary call the airline in question. From information thus obtained, the court concluded that the statement made to the court concerning the availability of plaintiff’s officers was false. No attempt was made to have an evidentiary hearing on the alleged “false representation,” and thus provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to rebut the judge’s hearsay information.

The law is clear that a trial court has the inherent authority to dismiss an action when fraud has been perpetrated on the court. Such power is indispensable to the proper administration of justice, because no litigant has a right to trifle with the courts. It is a power, however, which should be exercised cautiously and sparingly, and only upon a clear showing of fraud, pretense, collusion, or similar wrongdoing. Young v. Curgil, 358 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). The court, however, should carefully adhere to established due process, adversarial practice, and evidentiary rules in conducting an inquiry into such charges.

Here, we believe the facts presented do not clearly imply or establish fraud and constitute an abuse of discretion. Indeed, this may be a case of poor communication between plaintiff’s counsel and the trial judge, hardly warranting the harsh sanction of dismissal with prejudice.

The order of dismissal is REVERSED and the case REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

GRIMES, A. C. J., and DANAHY, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (23 total)

  • Morgan v. Campbell, 816 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
    …t abused its discretion by imposing an unreasonable sanction. This court has held that a trial court has the inherent authority to dismiss an action as a sanction when the plaintiff has perpetrated a fraud on the court. See Tri Star Invs. v. Miele, 407 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). This power exists because “no litigant has a right to trifle with the courts.” Id. However, because of the consequences of such a dismissal, this sanction should be imposed only on a “clear showing of fraud, pretense, collus…
  • Jacob v. Cal Henderson, 840 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
    …stating that trial court’s power to dismiss a case based on fraud “should be cautiously and sparingly exercised and only on the most blatant showing of fraud, pretense, collusion or other similar wrongdoing”); see also Tri Star Invs., Inc. v. Miele, 407 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (same). A more stringent abuse of discretion standard is appropriate because dismissal is an extreme remedy. The test we are to apply is set out most succinctly by Chief Judge Griffin in Cox v. Burke, 706 So. 2d 43, 46 (Fla.…
  • Ilene Sales Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
    …consisted of a separate count on behalf of appellant's husband, seeking damages for his alleged permanent injuries, which the court knew to be contrary to the husband’s prior sworn testimony before the court. . Tri Star Investments, Inc. v. Miele, 407 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). . Ferrante v. Waters, 383 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). . Johnson v. Landmark First Natl Bank, 415 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). . Hart v. Weaver, 364 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). . See, e.g., Johnson v. Landmark First…

Previewing 3 of 23 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw