ILENE SALES KORNBLUM, APPELLANT,
v.
IRVING S. SCHNEIDER AND RONALD B. MAGED, APPELLEES
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Appellant's personal injury complaint was dismissed by the trial court as a sanction for alleged fraud on the court. The appellate court reversed, holding that dismissal of the plaintiff's legitimate claim was an abuse of discretion where the plaintiff did not authorize or have knowledge of her counsel's fraudulent allegations.
The trial court abused its discretion in dismissing appellant's claim for her own personal injuries. While courts have inherent authority to dismiss cases as a sanction for fraud on the court, dismissal is the most severe sanction and should be employed only in extreme circumstances. Where fraud pertains only to part of a claim and the plaintiff did not authorize the fraudulent conduct, dismissal of the legitimate parts of the claim is too severe.
[1] A trial court possesses inherent authority to dismiss an action for fraud on the court or persistent non-compliance with court orders.
[2] Dismissal of an action is the most severe sanction and should be reserved for extreme circumstances.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because dismissal is the most severe of all possible sanctions, it should be employed only in extreme circumstances.”
Establishes the legal standard for when dismissal as a sanction is appropriate
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Kornblum filed a personal injury complaint that included a separate count on behalf of her husband seeking damages for permanent injuries. T…
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OWEN, WILLIAM C., JR., Senior Judge.
We grant the motion for rehearing and substitute the following opinion for the opinion filed October 14, 1992.
As a sanction for conduct which the trial judge perceived to be a fraud on the court by appellant,1 her personal injury complaint was dismissed and judgment was entered for the defendant. We reverse.
The trial court has the inherent authority, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, to dismiss an action when the plaintiff has perpetrated a fraud on the court,2 or where a party,3 or the party’s counsel,4 persistently fails or refuses to comply with court orders. Because dismissal is the most severe of all possible sanctions, it should be employed only in extreme circumstances.5 In some cases, where the misconduct of a party or the party’s counsel has permeated the entire proceeding, dismissal of the entire case has been upheld,6 but in others where the fraud or other misconduct pertained to only a part of the claim, dismissal of the unaffected legitimate part of the claim has been held to be too severe.7
In this case the record does not establish that appellant either authorized or had any prior knowledge of her counsel’s inclusion in the Gomplaint of the offending allegations and claim.8 Furthermore, the separate count on behalf of appellant’s husband had been voluntarily dismissed, and attorney’s fees had been awarded to appellees’ trial counsel. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing appellant’s claim for her own personal injuries.
The judgment and the order dismissing appellant's complaint are severally reversed.
GLICKSTEIN, C.J., and DELL, J., concur. . The fraud consisted of a separate count on behalf of appellant's husband, seeking damages for his alleged permanent injuries, which the court knew to be contrary to the husband’s prior sworn testimony before the court.
. Tri Star Investments, Inc. v. Miele, 407 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
. Ferrante v. Waters, 383 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
. Johnson v. Landmark First Natl Bank, 415 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
. Hart v. Weaver, 364 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
. See, e.g., Johnson v. Landmark First Nat'l Bank, supra; Ferrante v. Waters, supra.
. See, e.g., Kirby v. Adkins, 582 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Parham v. Kohler, 134 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961).
. Appellant’s counsel on this appeal did not represent appellant in the trial court.
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Citator
Cited By (31 total)
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COX v. Burke, 706 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…8. The trial court has the inherent authority, within the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to dismiss an action when a plaintiff has perpetrated a fraud on the court, or where a party refuses to comply with court orders. Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Because dismissal is the most severe of all possible sanctions, however, it should be em- • ployed only in extreme circumstances. Id.; Bird v. Hardrives of Delray, Inc., 644 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Defendants re…
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Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Martinsen, 736 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), review dismissed, 703 So. 2d 476 (Fla.1997); Mendez v. Blanco, 665 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); O'Vahey v. Miller, 644 So. 2d 550, 550 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), review denied, 654 So. 2d 919 (Fla.1995); Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Horjales v. Loeb, 291 So. 2d 92, 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Fair v. Tampa Elec. Co., 158 Fla. 15, 27 So. 2d 514 (1946); Fagan v. Powell, 237 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)). Because the record clearly establishes that plaintiff engag…
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Jacob v. Cal Henderson, 840 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…8. The trial court has the inherent authority, within the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to dismiss an action when a plaintiff has perpetrated a fraud on the court, or where a party refuses to comply with court orders. Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Because dismissal is the most severe of all possible sanctions, however, it should be employed only in extreme circumstances. Id.; Bird v. Hardrives of Delray, Inc., 644 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Viewing the facts…
Previewing 3 of 31 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ferrante v. Waters, 383 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- TRI Star Invs., Inc. v. Miele, 407 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- Glenna Parham and Richard Parham v. Kohler, 134 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)
- Dean v. State, 364 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Hart v. Weaver, 364 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Webber v. State, 415 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Kirby v. Adkins, 582 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)