PAUL J. ACKEL, APPELLANT,
v.
MID-VALLEY, INC. AND UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY CO., APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1981-12-18
No. AB-194
MILLS and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.
407 So. 2d 379 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1981)

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Synopsis

Ackel appealed a workers' compensation deputy commissioner's order denying his petition to modify a 1978 compensation award based on alleged worsening psychiatric condition. The appellate court affirmed the denial, holding that the deputy properly rejected evidence of new psychiatric disability as cumulative of prior evidence and reasonably found insufficient nexus between the compensable injury and Ackel's current emotional condition.


Holding

The deputy commissioner properly denied the modification petition. The court held that the new psychiatric testimony could reasonably be regarded as cumulative of evidence that was or should have been adduced at the earlier hearing, and the deputy was not required to find a discrete relationship between the compensable injury and Ackel's present psychiatric difficulties given his noncompensable heart and neck disabilities. No countervailing psychiatric testimony was required to support the denial.


Headnotes

[1] A petition to modify a prior compensation order based on a change in condition requires a showing that the claimant is entitled to modification as a matter of law.

[2] A deputy commissioner is not bound to find a discrete relationship between a compensable injury and a claimant's present emotional condition when the claimant also has no…

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Key Quotes

“Ackel's present psychiatric disability, attested by a psychiatrist who examined Ack-el but once before the modification hearing, and at the instance of Ackel's attorney rather than for an attending physician, is shown by this record as a deepening exacerbation of emotional problems which attended Ackel's physical disabilities at the time of the original May 1978 compensation order.”

Establishes the nature of the new psychiatric evidence—a worsening of pre-existing emotional problems rather than new condition.

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Facts & Procedural History

Ackel had received a 70 percent permanent partial disability rating in May 1978 for lost wage earning capacity. Subsequently, Ackel sought modificatio…

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Opinion of the Court
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., Chief Judge.

ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., Chief Judge.

We have considered at some length Ack-el’s appeal from the deputy commissioner’s 1981 order denying Ackel’s petition to modify the May 1978 compensation order based on an asserted detrimental change in Ack-el’s condition. Section 440.28, Florida Statutes (1979). By the order now appealed the deputy declined to increase Ackel’s earlier 70 percent permanent partial disability rating, due to lost wage earning capacity, declined to reclassify Ackel as temporarily and totally disabled, and declined to order remedial psychiatric treatment.

Ackel’s present psychiatric disability, attested by a psychiatrist who examined Ack-el but once before the modification hearing, and at the instance of Ackel’s attorney rather than for an attending physician, is shown by this record as a deepening exacerbation of emotional problems which attended Ackel’s physical disabilities at the time of the original May 1978 compensation order. Whether the deputy properly regarded the new psychiatric testimony as cumulative of evidence that was or should have been adduced at the earlier compensation hearing, thus as not requiring modification, is somewhat problematic. See Sonny Boy’s Fruit Co. v. Compton, 46 So. 2d 17 (Fla.1950); Sauder v. Coast Cities Coaches, Inc., 156 So. 2d 162 (Fla.1963). Yet given Ackel’s noncompensable heart and neck disabilities, which in light of the whole record must be regarded as inextricably related to his present psychiatric difficulties, the deputy was not bound in all events to find a discrete relationship between the compensable injury and Ackel’s present emotional condition. Nor is new countervailing psychiatric testimony required to support the denial of the modification petition. No sufficient showing having been made that Ackel is entitled to modification as a matter of law, the deputy’s order is

AFFIRMED.

MILLS and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.


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