SONNY BOY'S FRUIT CO.
v.
COMPTON
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Supreme Court of Florida addressed whether a circuit court, on appeal from the Industrial Commission, could review a Deputy Commissioner's order directly. The court held that the circuit court must review the Industrial Commission's order, not the Deputy Commissioner's, and should only reverse if the Commission's findings are clearly erroneous.
The Circuit Court is required to review the order of the Industrial Commission, not the order of the Deputy Commissioner. The Industrial Commission's findings should not be reversed unless clearly erroneous.
“It is accordingly our view that the Circuit Court is required to review the order of the Industrial Commission rather than the order of the Deputy Commissioner.”
Establishes the core legal principle regarding the scope of appellate review in this case.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA claimant sustained a toe injury and was awarded compensation. After a denial of additional compensation, the claimant sought modification based on a…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Workers' Compensation Appeal cases and more on FLexlaw
TERRELL, Justice.
On November 22, 1946, the claimant sustained an injury to the great toe of his right foot. His claim for compensation was contested on the ground that the injury was not sustained in the course of his employment. The controversy was heard by the Deputy Commissioner and compensation was awarded and paid up to and including August 16, 1947. The claimant then filed his claim for additional compensation which was denied after considerable medical testimony was taken. The time for taking an appeal to the Industrial Commission expired and no appeal was taken. In 1949 claimant applied to the Deputy Commissioner for modification of the order denying his claim for additional compensation based on misinterpretation of the facts adduced. Additional evidence was taken and the carrier was ordered to bear the expense of an operation recommended by the doctors' report and to pay compensation pending recovery from the operation. On appeal to the full Commission this order was reversed and the claim was dismissed. On appeal the Circuit Court found that there was substantial evidence to sustain the finding of the Deputy Commissioner, on the strength of which he reversed the order of the full Commission and reinstated the order of the Deputy Commissioner. The carrier and the Florida Industrial Commission have appealed from the latter order. The point for determination is whether or not on appeal from an order of the Industrial Commission to the Circuit Court, the court is limited to review of the order of the Industrial Commission or may it review the order of the Deputy Commissioner and reverse the order of the Industrial Commission on the basis of his finding as to the order of the Deputy Commissioner. It is clear from the Circuit Court's order of reversal that he reviewed the order of the Deputy Commissioner and reversed the order of the full Commission because he found "substantial competent evidence to sustain the determination of the Deputy Commissioner." In McCall et al. v. Motor Fuel Carriers et al., 155 Fla. 854, 22 So. 2d 153, and Crawford v. Benrus Market et al., Fla., 40 So. 2d 889, this Court committed itself to the doctrine that in a case like this the probity of the evidence is for the Industrial Commission to determine and their finding should not be reversed unless shown to be clearly erroneous.
It is accordingly our view that the Circuit Court is required to review the order of the Industrial Commission rather than the order of the Deputy Commissioner. The Industrial Commission is required to resolve conflicts in the evidence and unless its order is shown to be clearly erroneous it should be affirmed. After all, the evidence on which the Deputy Commissioner relied was cumulative and represented a difference of opinion from that of the witnesses who testified at the first hearing. It developed nothing new nor did it show that something material had been overlooked by which the rights of the claimant were prejudiced. These were facts that the Commission could take into consideration and on which we must assume that they concluded themselves.
Evidence that does nothing more than add to or controvert that already taken is not sufficient to reopen a case for the purpose of securing additional compensation. It must reveal new or changed developments in the claimant's condition that have a causal relationship to his injury to warrant a reopening of the case. The evidence in question shows no such developments *19 so the order appealed from is reversed.
Reversed.
ADAMS, C.J., and THOMAS and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (20 total)
-
US Cas. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 55 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1951)…ere to our pronouncement that "the probity of the evidence is for the Industrial Commission to determine and their findings should not be reversed unless shown to be clearly erroneous." (Italics supplied.) See Sonny Boy's Fruit Co. v. Compton, Fla., 46 So. 2d 17, 18, and cases cited therein. We believe the confusions wrought by our opinions developed by virtue of the fact that after the 1941 amendments to Sections 440.25 and 440.27, Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A., we inadvertently continued to follow our ea…1 / 2
-
Flesche v. Interstate Warehouse & U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 411 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…ly where the petition is based upon a change in condition. Thus, the deputy commissioner’s and the E/C’s reliance on the Sauder case appears to have been inappropriate. Furthermore, the E/C’s reliance here upon Sonny Boy’s Fruit Company v. Compton, 46 So. 2d 17 (Fla.1950), is inapposite, for the same reasons given by the Dixon court for disregarding it in that case, namely, that the attempted modification in Sonny Boy’s was based on alleged mistake of fact. Sonny Boy’s upheld the Industrial Commission’s re…
-
Fla. Indus. Comm'n v. Nordin, 101 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958)…hich would lead to a different conclusion is of no import. Sections 443.15 [*892] and 443.07(4) (e) (2), Florida Statutes, 1955, F.S.A. See United States Casualty Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., Fla., 55 So. 2d 741; Sonny Boy’s Fruit Co. v. Compton, Fla., 46 So. 2d 17; Florida Industrial Commission v. Ciarlante, Fla., 84 So. 2d 1; and De Groot v. Sheffield, Fla., 95 So. 2d 912. Even a jury verdict that is contrary to the manifest weight and probative force of the evidence and the justice of the cause may be set…
Previewing 3 of 20 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Crawford v. Benrus Mkt., 40 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1949)
- Sonny Boy's Fruit Co. v. Compton, 46 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1950)
- MR. and MRS. L. H. McCall v. Motor Fuel Carriers, Inc., 155 Fla. 854 (Fla. 1945)
- Howell v. State, 155 Fla. 854 (Fla. 1945)