MARIANNE DEDMON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1982-01-19
No. 81-450
Before BASKIN, DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
408 So. 2d 822 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1982) Positive Treatment
Cited by 1 case

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Marianne Dedmon's insurance policy with State Farm was not validly cancelled when she signed a change request form on January 2, 1979, under a mistaken understanding of its effect. The court reversed the trial court's judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict and directed entry of judgment for Dedmon, finding sufficient evidence that State Farm's agent caused her to sign the document under a misapprehension about its immediate cancellation effect.


Holding

The policy was not validly cancelled. Dedmon's testimony, viewed favorably to her as required when reviewing a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, was sufficient to raise a jury question whether she signed the form under a mistake of fact caused by or known to State Farm's agent. The jury properly found the policy had not been cancelled and remained in full force and effect on the accident date.


Headnotes

[1] A jury question is raised as to whether a "change request" form creates a valid unilateral contract cancelling an insurance policy when the insured testifies they did not…

[2] A contract is voidable if the signer was misled as to the import of the document or induced not to read it.

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Key Quotes

“the permissible inference which could be drawn from this testimony, if believed, is that Dedmon signed the document which purported to immediately cancel her policy under a mistake of fact caused by, or known to, State Farm's agent and that, therefore, no binding cancellation occurred.”

Establishes the legal standard for voidability of a contract when the signer is misled about its effect

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Facts & Procedural History

On January 2, 1979, Dedmon met with State Farm's agent and signed a 'change request' form. Dedmon testified that she understood from the agent that th…

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Opinion of the Court
DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.

DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.

We reverse the final judgment for the defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, notwithstanding a jury verdict for the plaintiff,1 Marianne Ded-mon, finding that as of January 6,1979, the date of the accident causing damage to Dedmon’s vehicle, State Farm’s policy insuring Dedmon against damage to her vehicle was in full force and effect.

Dedmon’s testimony that at her meeting with State Farm’s agent on January 2, 1979, she never discussed immediate cancellation of the policy, that the “information she was given” by the agent was that the form Dedmon was signing was to confirm the understanding that the policy would be cancelled as of January 30, 1979, to which date premiums had been paid, unless extended by the payment of an additional premium before then, viewed most favorably to her, see, e.g., Pedrajo v. Sloane, 405 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Medina v. 187th Street Apartments, Ltd., 405 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Hernandez v. Motrico, Inc., 370 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Tiny’s Liquors, Inc. v. Davis, 353 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), was sufficient to raise a jury question whether Ded-mon’s signing of this “change request” form created a valid unilateral contract cancelling her policy of insurance. The permissible inference which could be drawn from this testimony, if believed, is that Dedmon signed the document which purported to immediately cancel her policy under a mistake of fact caused by, or known to, State Farm’s agent and that, therefore, no binding cancellation occurred. See Allied Van Lines, Inc. v. Bratton, 351 So. 2d 344 (Fla.1977)2; Coleman v. Holecek, 542 F. 2d 532 (10th Cir. 1976); Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Company, 374 F. 2d 129 (4th Cir. 1967).

Since the jury, as was its right, found that Dedmon’s policy of insurance had not been cancelled by her signing of the “change request” form and was in full force and effect on the date of the accident, we reverse the judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the ensuing cost judgment with directions that judgment be entered for Dedmon on the jury’s verdict in the amount previously agreed upon by the parties, with appropriate interest, and, further, that costs and attorneys’ fees be assessed against State Farm.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

. The parties agree that although the trial court directed a verdict in favor of State Farm before submitting the case to the jury, the effect of thereafter submitting the case to the jury for verdict and entering judgment for State Farm on the “directed verdict” was to enter a judgment n.o.v. . The Florida Supreme Court consolidated for review Allied Van Lines, Inc. v. McKnab, 331 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), and Allied Van Lines, Inc. v. Bratton, 330 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). The Court, holding that a party to a written contract cannot defend against its enforcement on the sole ground that he signed it without reading it, quashed the District Court’s opinion in Bratton, but holding that such a contract is voidable where other facts and circumstances reveal, for example, that the signer was misled as to the import of the document, or induced not to read it, affirmed McKnab.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Am. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 683 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
    …] ing that, based on competent substantial evidence, the jury was entitled to determine that the Martinezes’ unilateral actions were insufficient to effectuate a cancellation of the American Reliance policy, Dedmon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 408 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 3d DCA1982), and to determine further that American Reliance breached the insurance contract. Cf. Jones v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 463 So. 2d 1153 (Fla.l985)(jury can determine whether facts of ease fall within scope of coverage). The record demo…

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