JAMES VINCENT ACQUAFREDDA, A/K/A VINCENT ACQUAFREDDA AND JOAN ACQUAFREDDA, APPELLANTS,
v.
JOSEPH MESSINA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1982-01-20
No. 81-105
DAUKSCH, C. J., and COBB, J„ concur.
408 So. 2d 828 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1982) Positive Treatment
Cited by 24 cases

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Synopsis

Appellants challenge a temporary restraining order that prevented them from disposing of business assets during a lawsuit on a promissory note. The court reversed, holding that an injunction cannot issue in an action at law for debt when adequate legal remedies such as attachment are available.


Holding

The court held that no temporary injunction may issue where the complaint sets forth no ground for equitable relief, and that an action for damages on a promissory note does not become an equitable action merely because an injunction is requested. Since adequate legal remedies by attachment were available, the restraining order was improper.


Headnotes

[1] An appellate court may review the legal sufficiency of a complaint and supporting affidavits forming the basis for a temporary injunction, even in the absence of a motion…

[2] A temporary injunction may not be issued if the complaint upon which it is based fails to state a ground for equitable relief.

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Key Quotes

“No temporary injunction may be issued where the complaint upon which it is based sets out no ground for equitable relief.”

Establishes the fundamental principle that injunctive relief requires an equitable cause of action

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellees brought an action on a promissory note allegedly issued by defendants to plaintiff's assignor and assigned to plaintiff. On the trial date, …

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Opinion of the Court
ORFINGER, Judge.

ORFINGER, Judge.

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in entering a temporary restraining order1 enjoining them from conveying certain of their assets during the pendency of this suit, an action brought on a promissory note. We reverse.

Appellee, as plaintiff, filed an action at law for damages, seeking recovery under a promissory note which was alleged to have been issued by defendants to plaintiff’s assignor, and assigned to plaintiff. In another count, plaintiff sought attachment of defendant’s assets, but the complaint was not verified and the request for attachment was apparently never acted upon by the court.

On the day set for trial, a continuance was granted at defendant’s request because plaintiff allegedly had not responded to a notice to produce. Later that day, based on a verified petition filed by plaintiff, requesting a prejudgment writ of attachment, or alternatively, a temporary restraining order without notice, the trial court entered a temporary restraining order, enjoining defendants from disposing of certain business assets pending the outcome of the action for damages.2 The essence of the motion on which the order was based was that the promissory note represented a debt due on certain business assets purchased by defendant from plaintiff’s assignor; that defendants were attempting to sell those assets and that if the defendants were not restrained from disposing of the assets or an attachment not be issued, plaintiff would be left with an uncollectible note and thus without remedy. Defendants did not move to dissolve the injunction, but filed their notice of appeal instead.

In the absence of a motion to dissolve, an appellate court may not review the factual matters upon which the temporary injunction was issued, but it will, nevertheless, review the legal sufficiency of the complaint and supporting affidavits which form the basis for its entry. Hotel-Motel Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union, Local 339 of Broward County v. Black Angus of Lauderhill, Inc., 290 So. 2d 479 (Fla.1974). See also, Northwestern National Insurance Co. v. Greenspun, 330 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).

No temporary injunction may be issued where the complaint upon which it is based sets out no ground for equitable relief. Blume v. Giles, 143 Fla. 615, 197 So. 344 (1940). No action for equitable relief can be maintained unless it falls within some acknowledged head of equity jurisprudence.' Thus where a complaint seeks an injunction to prevent a defendant from disposing of assets until an action at law on a debt can be concluded, no equitable cause of action is stated and no injunction should issue. B.L.E. Realty Corporation v. Mary Williams Co., 101 Fla. 254, 134 So. 47 (1931). An action for damages does not become an equitable action merely because a request for injunction is also made. Ramsey v. Lovett, 89 So. 2d 669 (Fla.1956).

No equitable cause of action was asserted here upon which an injunction could issue. This was a traditional action at law; a suit on a promissory note. Additionally, there was an adequate remedy at law by attachment, which provides a prejudgment legal remedy to creditors who can attest to any of the statutory grounds for such relief. The fact that the plaintiff here asserted that he was unable to post the required attachment bond does not make such remedy unavailable or inadequate.

The temporary restraining order is vacated and set aside, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

Order VACATED, cause REMANDED.

DAUKSCH, C. J., and COBB, J„ concur. . We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(B).

. Appellant also complains of the procedure followed below because on the morning when the continuance was granted, plaintiffs’ counsel advised defendants and the court that a verified petition for the restraining order would be filed and requested that it be heard later that day. The court announced that it would entertain the motion later that day. Defendants were not present or represented at the later hearing. The order granting the temporary restraining order recites that it is issued without notice. In the light of our decision, we need not address this issue.


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Citator

Cited By (12 total)

  • Weinstein v. Yoram Aisenberg, 758 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
    …quitable relief, such as an injunction, cannot be maintained unless it falls “ ‘within some acknowledged head of equity jurisprudence.’ ” Action Elec. & Repair, Inc. v. Batelli 416 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (quoting Acquafredda v. Messina, 408 So. 2d 828, 829 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (quoting B.L.E. Realty Corp. v. Mary Williams Co., 101 Fla. 254, 134 So. 47, 50 (1931))). Many cases explain this rule by focusing on the absence of two of the elements that a plaintiff must establish in order to obtain inj…
  • Finkelstein v. Se. Bank, N.A., 490 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
    …awrence Co. v. Alkow Realty, Inc., 453 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) that injunctive relief will not lie where its purpose is to restrain a seller from disbursing sale proceeds when an adequate remedy at law exists. See also Acquafredda v. Messina, 408 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) which held that a complaint on a promissory note does not state a claim in equity for an injunction to prevent a debtor from disposing of assets prior to judgment. Section 895.05(6), Florida Statutes (1985), provides: Any aggri…
  • Mary Dee's, Inc. v. Tartamella, 492 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
    …will be collectible. See St. Lawrence Company v. Alkow Realty, 453 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). See generally Finkelstein v. Southeast Bank, 490 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). We agree with the reasoning of the court in Acquafredda v. Messina, 408 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), where it stated: This was a traditional action at law; a suit on a promissory note. Additionally, there was an adequate remedy at law by attachment, which provides a prejudgment legal remedy to creditors who can attest to any o…

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