BOBBY LEE KINSON, PETITIONER,
v.
DALE CARSON, SHERIFF OF DUVAL COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENT; EDWIN JOHNSON, PETITIONER, V. DALE CARSON, SHERIFF OF DUVAL COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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In this habeas corpus petition, petitioners challenged the denial of bail in an armed robbery case, arguing that affidavits alone were insufficient to establish that proof of guilt was evident or the presumption great. The court held that the state may satisfy its burden through affidavits or transcripts, provided the evidence would be legally sufficient to sustain a jury verdict.
The state may carry its burden of establishing proof evident or presumption great through affidavits or transcripts of evidence that would be legally sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of guilty. Hearsay evidence presented through affidavits is admissible at bond hearings, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying bail.
[1] A trial court may deny bail when the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great that the defendant committed an offense punishable by life imprisonment.
[2] Affidavits may be considered as evidence by the state to establish that the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great for the purpose of denying bail.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The state's burden, in order to foreclose bail as a matter of right, is to present some further evidence which, viewed in the light most favorable to the state, would be legally sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of guilty.”
Establishes the standard for the state's burden in denying bail: evidence must be sufficient to sustain a jury verdict.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePetitioners Kinson and Johnson were charged with armed robbery. At their bond hearing, the trial court denied their motion for bond based solely on af…
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioners’ Motion for Bond was denied by the trial court upon its finding the proof evident or the presumption great that petitioners had committed the offense charged, armed robbery.
Article I, Section 14 .of the Florida Constitution provides that every person charged with a crime shall be entitled to release on reasonable bail unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great. The question presented to this Court is whether the state can rely solely on affidavits to show that the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great.
The only evidence relating to the crime produced at petitioners’ bond hearing was an affidavit of the victim and an affidavit of the arresting officer. Petitioners objected to the affidavits on the grounds that they were hearsay and petitioners were denied their right to cross examination. The Court overruled the objection, citing to State v. Arthur, 390 So. 2d 717 (Fla.1980), and pointed out that defendants were aware of the identity of the complaining party and the arresting officer and could have compelled their attendance at the hearing.
Petitioners argue that the right of cross examination is fundamental at a bond hearing, see Medina v. Sandstrom, 384 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 3 DCA 1980), and that the court erred in admitting into evidence and considering the affidavits since they are inadmissible under the Florida Evidence Code. Petitioners also argue that even if hearsay is admissible at a bond hearing, it should be treated in the same manner as provided in probation revocation hearings where hearsay must be corroborated by competent evidence which is not hearsay.
Although we recognize that earlier decisions have indicated that hearsay evidence is not sufficient to show proof of guilt evident or the presumption great, see, e.g., Medina v. Sandstrom, supra; Primm v. State, 293 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2 DCA 1974); State ex rel. Loper v. Stack, 291 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 4 DCA 1974), we think the Supreme Court resolved the issue before us in State v. Arthur, supra. In Arthur, the Supreme Court held, (1) that the trial court had discretion to admit a defendant to bail even though proof of his guilt was evident or the presumption great; and (2) that the state has the burden of establishing that proof of guilt is evident or the presumption great. However, in determining that the state had the burden of proof, the Supreme Court also specified the type of evidence the state could use to carry its burden.
Simply to present the indictment or information is not sufficient. The state’s burden, in order to foreclose bail as a matter of right, is to present some further evidence which, viewed in the light most favorable to the state, would be legally sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of guilty. This is the predominant view among jurisdictions with similar constitutional provisions. Fountaine v. Mullen, 117 R.I. 262, 366 A. 2d 1138 (1976). The state can probably carry this burden by presenting the evidence relied upon by the grand jury or the state attorney in charging the crime. This evidence may be presented in the form of transcripts or affidavits.
We find that the state carried its burden through the presentation of the affidavits and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying bail. Therefore, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is
DENIED.
BOOTH, SHIVERS and JOANOS, JJ., concur.
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Preston v. Sheriff David GEE, 133 So. 3d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…th the live testimony of the investigating officer, were sufficient to establish that the proof of guilt was evident or the presumption great that Castro committed the offense of burglary of a structure with an assault or battery); Kinson v. Carson, 409 So. 2d 1212, 1212-13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding that State carried its burden of showing that the proof of guilt was evident or the presumption great when it presented the affidavits of the victim and the arresting officer). That said, the CRA in this case f…
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Castro v. State, 914 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…t release on bail is appropriate. It is with regard to this question that consideration of the likelihood that the accused will flee, regardless of the sureties required, becomes appropriate. Id. at. 720 (emphasis added). See also Kinson v. Carson, 409 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), holding that the affidavit of the victim and the affidavit of the arresting officer were sufficient to demonstrate that the proof of guilt was evident and the presumption strong. The trial court was, therefore, authorized to rel…
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Mininni v. Gillum, 477 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…t in State v. Arthur, 390 So. 2d 717, 720 (Fla.1980), which included affidavits within the types of evidence that the state may use to carry its burden. We note that other district courts have drawn this same conclusion. See, e.g., Kinson v. Carson, 409 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). [*1015] Nevertheless, having examined the affidavits relied upon by the trial court, we conclude that proof of Mininni’s guilt of first degree murder is neither “evident” nor “great” as those terms are employed in the context of…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Arthur, 390 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1980)
- Columbus Fletcher Primm v. State, 293 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- State ex rel. Edward E. Loper v. Stack, 291 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
- Medina v. Sandstrom, 384 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)