COLUMBUS FLETCHER PRIMM, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Petitioner was denied bail in two rape cases without hearing, then after hearing. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the bail denial because the state relied solely on hearsay testimony from investigating officers rather than admissible evidence under oath, failing to meet the heightened standard required to deny bail in capital offenses.
The court held that the state must produce evidence indicating great presumption of guilt, and that hearsay testimony from investigating officers regarding out-of-court statements is insufficient. Admissible evidence must be from witnesses who testified under oath at a preliminary hearing and were subject to cross-examination.
[1] Hearsay testimony of investigating officers, without more, is insufficient to establish that guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is great for the purpose of deny…
[2] The degree of proof required to deny bail in a capital case is greater than that required to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the degree of proof sufficient to deny an accused the right to bail in a capital case under our Constitution, to-wit, proof that guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is great, is actually a greater degree of proof than that which is required to establish guilt merely to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt”
Establishes the heightened standard for denying bail in capital offenses under Florida law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceColumbus Fletcher Primm was charged with rape in two separate informations in Hillsborough County. His bail application was denied without hearing by …
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioner, Columbus Fletcher Primm, was charged in two separate informations filed in Hillsborough County with the crime of rape in violation of § 794.01, Fla. Stat., F.S.A. His application to be released on bail pending trial was denied without hearing by the circuit court. A prior petition for writ of habeas corpus filed here was denied without prejudice to seek further relief in the circuit court. After hearing, the trial court again denied bail. Thereupon, the petitioner filed this amended petition for writ of habeas corpus or, in the alternative, motion to seek bail in this court.
The only evidence in the record before this court as to the proof of guilt being evident or the presumption thereof great is the hearsay testimony of the two investigating officers.
The degree of proof necessary to deny bail in capital offenses was set forth by our Supreme Court in State v. Williams, 87 So. 2d 45:
“In Russell v. State, 71 Fla. 236, 71 So. 27, this Court held that the degree of proof sufficient to deny an accused the right to bail in a capital case under our Constitution, to-wit, proof that guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is great, is actually a greater degree of proof than that which is required to establish guilt merely to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. See State ex rel. Freeman v. Kelly, Fla.1956, 86 So. 2d 166; State ex rel. Hernandez v. Culbreath, 152 Fla. 356, 11 So. 2d 569; State ex rel. Connor v. Sullivan, 160 Fla. 844, 36 So. 2d 828.”
In James v. State, Fla. 1970, 241 So. 2d 383, the defendant James was indicted for first degree murder. At a subsequent preliminary hearing an eye-witness testified to the homicide. Thereafter, the eye-witness died and James petitioned for writ of ha-beas corpus questioning whether or not he was entitled to release on bail. At the hearing on James’ right to bail the State admitted that its primary evidence against him was a transcript of testimony of the eye-witness. Bail was denied and appeal taken to the Florida Supreme Court. The court held:
“At a hearing on the question of right to bail, it was necessary that the State produce evidence indicating great presumption of guilt. In this case, the evidence produced was that of an eye-witness who had testified at preliminary hearing and had been subjected to cross and re-cross examination.”
The court held that this testimony was sufficient to raise a great presumption of guilt adequate to resist an attempt to secure release on bail. The court was not confronted with the question of whether or not this testimony would be admissible at trial but held that its weight could be considered at a hearing on bail and given consideration by the court.
The important distinguishing factor in the case sub judice and in James, supra, is that in James the testimony considered was that of an eye-witness given under oath at a preliminary hearing and was subject to cross-examination; whereas, in this case the only testimony adduced to raise a great presumption of guilt was strictly hearsay testimony of two investigating officers who were testifying to statements made to them by the victims and an eye-witness who were not under oath and not subject to cross-examination by the petitioner. In view of the fact that James, supra, held that it was necessary for the State to produce evidence indicating great presumption of guilt, this cause is remanded to the trial court for a rehearing as to petitioner’s right to bail under the guidelines established in James.
Remanded for further hearing.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., BOARDMAN, J., and SCHWARTZ, ALAN R., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Stansel v. State, 297 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)…tive evidence. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed,2d 62 (1967). While a bail reduction hearing does not necessarily have all the formalities of a trial, it is clearly an adversary hearing, cf. Primm v. State, Fla.App.2d, 1974, 293 So. 2d 725. To permit the trier of fact to receive evidence in secret from one side would place the other side in an untenable position. There could be no way in which the evidence could be rebutted because it would not be known what the evidence was. Therefor…
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Kinson v. Carson, 409 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…idence which is not hearsay. Although we recognize that earlier decisions have indicated that hearsay evidence [*1213] is not sufficient to show proof of guilt evident or the presumption great, see, e.g., Medina v. Sandstrom, supra; Primm v. State, 293 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2 DCA 1974); State ex rel. Loper v. Stack, 291 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 4 DCA 1974), we think the Supreme Court resolved the issue before us in State v. Arthur, supra. In Arthur, the Supreme Court held, (1) that the trial court had discretion to admit…
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Preston v. Sheriff David GEE, 133 So. 3d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…evident or the presumption great. This court and others have long recognized that the level of proof necessary to meet this test is greater than that necessary to prove a defendant guilty to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. E.g., Primm v. State, 293 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). Arthur potentially muddied this issue when it observed that the State must undertake its burden by presenting evidence that would be “legally sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of guilty.” 390 So. 2d at 720. But this was not an…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Russell v. State, 71 Fla. 236 (Fla. 1916)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Philip van Eeghen v. Williams, 87 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1956)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Mary Freeman v. Kelly, 86 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1956)
- State of Fla. Ex rel. Cecil H. Connor v. Sullivan, 160 Fla. 844 (Fla. 1948)
- State v. Honorable Arthur Gomez, 152 Fla. 355 (Fla. 1943)
- James v. State, 241 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 1970)
- In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 152 Fla. 356 (Fla. 1943)
- State Upon the Relation of Mario Hernandez v. Culbreath, 152 Fla. 356 (Fla. 1943)