JAMES ALEXANDER ZIRKLE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Zirkle appeals his conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct with a child, arguing the trial court violated the speedy trial rule by denying his motion for discharge when more than 180 days elapsed from arrest. The court affirmed, holding that the defendant was not continuously available for trial during the period when a court-ordered psychiatric examination was pending.
The trial court did not err in denying the motion for discharge because Zirkle was not continuously available for trial during the period when the court-ordered psychiatric examination was pending. The conditional acceptance of the plea bargain tolled the running of the speedy trial period, and the defendant's status during a mental evaluation is such that he is not continuously available for trial under Rule 3.191(e).
[1] A defendant is unavailable for trial during the period his mental condition and competence to stand trial are being determined.
[2] A trial court's conditional acceptance of a negotiated plea, pending the results of a psychiatric examination, renders the defendant unavailable for trial for speedy tria…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a defendant is unavailable for trial during such period of time as his mental condition and competence to stand trial are being determined”
Establishes the legal principle that time periods during mental evaluations do not count toward speedy trial requirements.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceZirkle was arrested on June 15, 1979. A plea agreement was reached on September 18, 1979, which the trial court conditionally accepted pending a psych…
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NESBITT, Judge.
Zirkle appeals his judgment of conviction for a lewd and lascivious act committed upon a child under the age of fourteen. The only point that we are concerned with in the present appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying his motion for discharge made and presented pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191.
Zirkle was arrested on June 15, 1979. His trial was scheduled for September 4, 1979 and then rescheduled for September 18, 1979. At that time, a plea agreement was reached between the state attorney and defense counsel.
The trial court accepted the negotiated plea on the condition that the defendant submit to a psychiatric examination aimed at determining whether he was a mentally disordered sex offender. Zirkle and his counsel clearly acquiesced in the court’s appointment, sua sponte, of a psychiatrist to conduct the examination and render a report.
On November 7, 1979, following receipt of the psychiatric evaluation, the State filed a motion to withdraw its agreement to the proposed negotiated plea. The motion was granted and the case reset for trial on January 7, 1980.
On December 13, 1979, Zirkle moved for his discharge for noncompliance with the speedy trial rule, Fla.R.Crim.Pro. 3.191, on the ground that more than 180 days had elapsed since his arrest. The motion was heard and denied on December 27, 1979.
The order denying the motion for discharge did not specify the basis for denial. We must affirm the denial of a motion for discharge if the ruling is supported by any basis in the record. Stuart v. State, 360 So. 2d 406, 408 (Fla.1978).
The defendant concedes that had a motion been made to extend the time for placing him on trial, the motion would have been warranted under the exceptional circumstances doctrine set forth in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(f). We must reject defendant’s contention that an order under the cited rule was required, because we otherwise determine that the defendant was not continuously available for trial.
In Isley v. State, 354 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), the rule was expressed that a defendant is unavailable for trial during such period of time as his mental condition and competence to stand trial are being determined. The Isley opinion does not reveal whether the request for the examination was generated by either party or upon the court’s own motion.
However, in Davis v. State, 386 So. 2d 1287 (Fla.3d DCA 1980), we held that the trial judge’s conditional acceptance of a negotiated plea, pending the results of a presentence investigation, rendered the defendant not continuously available for trial as of the date the plea was received. Thus, in the present case, the trial court’s conditional acceptance of the defendant’s plea bargain tolled the running of the speedy trial term. It is of no consequence whether the psychiatric examination was requested by a particular party or sought by the court itself. See Davis v. State, supra. During the period of time required to complete this type of medical evaluation, the defendant’s status is such that he is not continuously available for trial within the purview of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(e).
Affirmed.
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State v. Zipfel, 537 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…that the trial court correctly answered the certified question, although it may have been for the wrong reason. See and compare Combs v. State, [*1100] 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla.1983); Patterson v. State, 462 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Zirkle v. State, 410 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Robinson v. State, 393 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Accordingly, the order of dismissal appealed herein is hereby affirmed. AFFIRMED. BARKDULL, J., and ORFINGER, Associate Judge, concur. . The oath reads as follows: "BEFOR…
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State v. Guyton, 445 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…ere not triggered. Further, during the applicable 180 day “speedy trial” period, the defense never sought a continuance and was never unavailable for trial. The State relies upon Harley v. State, 412 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Zirkle v. State, 410 So. 2d 948 (Fla..3d DCA 1982); and Isley v. State, 354 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). However, these cases are not applicable as they presented delays in proceedings of a type clearly distinct from the facts of this case. AFFIRMED. ANSTEAD, C.J., and BERANE…
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Zarifian v. State, 581 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…(1). On January 15, 1988, the motion was heard and denied. The trial judge did not articulate the reason for the denial. In such cases, an appellate court must affirm the denial if the ruling is supported by any basis in the record. Zirkle v. State, 410 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 418 So. 2d 1281 (1982). We have scrutinized the record and we can find no delay chargeable to the defendant. On December 14, 1987, twenty days remained in the speedy trial period, sufficient time to accommodate the deposi…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Alphonso Stuart v. State, 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978)
- Isley v. State, 354 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- White v. Roundtree Transp., Inc., 386 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Davis v. State, 386 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)