STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
MICHAEL A. MILLIGAN, APPELLEE
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The State appeals a trial court's order suppressing evidence and statements in a cocaine possession case. The appellate court reverses, holding that poor police procedures in preparing the probable cause affidavit do not warrant suppression when the evidence was lawfully seized and the defendant's statement was given voluntarily after Miranda warnings.
The court held that while the police procedures were inappropriate and should not be condoned, they do not justify suppression of evidence or statements. The evidence was lawfully seized as abandoned property, the statement was voluntarily given after proper Miranda warnings, and no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.
[1] A motion to suppress evidence and statements should not be granted solely to sanction police department procedural irregularities when the evidence was not seized in viol…
[2] Evidence voluntarily abandoned by a suspect in an area where the suspect has no reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to Fourth Amendment protections against u…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It has nothing whatsoever to do about whether Michael Milligan did or did not have or possess cocaine and did or did not confess or anything. It has nothing to do with that except that it goes as to the credibility of your police department.”
The trial judge's acknowledgment that the suppression order was based on police credibility concerns rather than legal violations affecting the seizure or statement.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMilligan was charged with cocaine possession. At the suppression hearing, it was discovered that the probable cause affidavit was prepared by one offi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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DELL, Judge.
The State appeals from the trial court’s order granting appellee’s motion to suppress evidence and statements. We reverse.
Appellee was charged by information with violating Sections 893.03(2)(a)4 and 893.13(l)(a)3, Florida Statutes, by actual or constructive possession of cocaine. Appel-lee filed motions to suppress the physical evidence of a tin foil packet and the self incriminating statement he made to police about dropping the packet in a parking lot.
It was determined at a hearing on the motion to suppress that the probable cause affidavit had been prepared by one police officer but signed by another. Both officers took part in the events leading up to and including the arrest of the appellee. There was no showing by the appellee that there had been any irregularity in the manner in which the statement was obtained or in the manner in which the evidence was seized. The trial judge commented that he had no problem with the credibility of the witnesses but that he was concerned with the credibility of the police department in permitting the probable cause affidavit to be executed in the manner in which it was.
While we agree with the trial judge that the actions of the Plantation Police Department in the preparation and execution of the probable cause affidavit should not be condoned, we cannot agree with his order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence and the statements. As the trial court noted,
It has nothing whatsoever to do about whether Michael Milligan did or did not have or possess cocaine and did or did not confess or anything. It has nothing to do with that except that it goes as to the credibility of your police department.
Although the trial judge was correct in his observations as far as the poor police procedures, it did not affect the propriety of the seizure of the cocaine and the statements which were obtained. It was inappropriate for the trial judge to sanction the Plantation Police Department by granting the motion to suppress. The appellee’s statement was made after he had been fully informed and understood his Miranda rights and there was no showing that the cocaine was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure. No search occurs when police retrieve property voluntarily abandoned by a suspect in an area where the latter has no reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Oliver, 368 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Patmore v. State, 383 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Riley v. State, 266 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972).
The order of the trial court granting the appellee’s motion to suppress the evidence and statements is reversed.
REVERSED.
ANSTEAD and HURLEY, JJ., concur.
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Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d 177 (Fla. 2010)…2d 967, 969 (Fla.1983); Riley v. State, 266 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). “No search occurs when police retrieve property voluntarily abandoned by a suspect in an area where the latter has no reasonable expectation of privacy.” State v. Milligan, 411 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). State v. Lampley, 817 So. 2d 989, 990-91 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (emphasis added). Applying the above law to the present case, we conclude that Twilegar has failed to show that the trial court erred in denying his motion to s…
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State v. Lampley, 817 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…2d 967, 969 (Fla.1983); Riley v. State, 266 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). “No search occurs when police retrieve property voluntarily abandoned by a suspect in an area where the latter has no reasonable expectation of privacy.” State v. Milligan, 411 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). This case is similar to State v. Kennon, 652 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). In Kennon, during a surveillance of two bars, the police saw a patron kneel beside a vehicle, place an item behind the right rear tire, and walk a…
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State v. K.C., 207 So. 3d 951 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…rds, “‘[n]o search occurs when police retrieve property voluntarily abandoned by a suspect in an area where the latter has no reasonable expectation of privacy.’ ” State v. Lampley, 817 So. 2d 989, 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (quoting State v. Milligan, 411 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)). While we acknowledge that the physical cell phone in this case was left in the stolen vehicle by the individual, and it was not claimed by anyone at the police station, its contents were still protected by a password, cle…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Oliver, 368 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Patmore v. State, 383 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Riley v. State, 266 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)