DEAN HARPER AND JAMES P. JENKINS, APPELLANTS,
v.
CONTINENTAL CAN COMPANY, INC., APPELLEE
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Former Continental Can employees appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action to set aside an arbitration award that upheld their discharge. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the suit was time-barred under the 90-day limitations period for vacating arbitration awards and that appellants failed to allege the union breached its duty to protect their interests.
Employees as third-party beneficiaries have the same rights and limitations as the union under the collective bargaining agreement, including the right to challenge arbitration awards. However, appellants' action was properly dismissed because: (1) it was not filed within the 90-day statute of limitations applicable to petitions to vacate arbitration awards under Florida Statutes § 682.13; and (2) the complaint failed to allege that the union breached its duty to protect employees' interests, which is required to set aside a binding arbitration award.
[1] An employee, as a third-party beneficiary of a collective bargaining agreement, has the same rights and limitations as the union in pursuing claims arising from the agree…
[2] An action to set aside an arbitration award under a collective bargaining agreement is governed by the statute of limitations for petitions to vacate arbitration awards,…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“As third party beneficiaries of the agreement, appellants have the same rights with the same limitations as the promisee-union and, since the union could proceed in arbitration, including moving to set aside an arbitration decision, appellants, as employees and beneficiaries, could do likewise.”
Establishes that employees as third-party beneficiaries can challenge arbitration awards with the same rights as the union.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHarper and Jenkins were discharged from Continental Can and pursued grievance proceedings under a collective bargaining agreement. After the union-ini…
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COWART, Judge.
Appellants, former employees of appellee, when discharged, instituted grievance proceedings against appellee under a collective bargaining agreement and, suffering an adverse result, appealed to arbitration as provided in the agreement. When the arbitrator upheld their discharge, appellants filed an action in the circuit court as third party beneficiaries of the master collective bargaining agreement between appellee and appellants’ union. They appeal from a summary judgment entered against them.
Section 13.10 of the master collective bargaining agreement, under which appellants sought review of the prior dispute settlement procedure, provides that the arbitrator’s decision will be binding on the parties. As third party beneficiaries of the agreement, appellants have the same rights with the same limitations as the promisee-union and, since the union could proceed in arbitration, including moving to set aside an arbitration decision, appellants, as employees and beneficiaries, could do likewise. Therefore, appellants’ action in the trial court was essentially a suit to set aside the arbitration award and not an action for damages for wrongful termination of employment.
The trial judge was correct in ruling that this action was time-barred, since it was not filed within the 90 day limitations period provided by section 682.13, Florida Statutes (1981), a provision of the Florida Arbitration Code relating to petitions to vacate arbitration awards, which statute more specifically applies to this action than the 5 year statute of limitation provided by section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), relating to “a legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument.” Section 95.11(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1981), which imposes a 2 year limitation on “an action to recover wages or overtime or damages or penalties concerning payment of wages and overtime” does not apply, regardless of whether appellants were hourly employees paid with wages or salaried employees. This is not a suit for wages due, but an action to set aside an arbitration award, notwithstanding that, if the arbitration award was set aside and it was determined that appellants’ discharge was wrongful, appellants’ damages might be partially measured in terms of lost wages.
An employee’s complaint to set aside a binding arbitration award made pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement must allege that the employee was deprived of procedural due process in the arbitration proceeding through the union’s failure to fulfill its duty to safeguard the employee’s interest. Air Line Pilots Association International v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 632 F. 2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1980); New Orleans Steamship Association v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F. 2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Daws, 614 F. 2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1980); International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Papermill Workers v. St. Regis Paper Co., 362 F. 2d 711 (5th Cir. 1966); National Airlines, Inc. v. Metcalf, 114 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959).
Appellants’ complaint was fatally deficient in failing to allege that their union failed to perform its duty to protect the employees’ interest and the summary judgment was correctly entered because of this insufficiency of the pleading, as well as because the action alleged was time-barred. See Gordon v. City of Belle Glade, 132 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961). Appellants made no motion for leave to amend the defective pleading. See Heinlein v. Metropolitan Dade County, 216 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968).
The summary judgment is
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH, C.J., and FRANK D. UP-CHURCH, Jr., J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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ZAC Smith & Co., Inc. v. Moonspinner Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 472 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…it is granted, the order denying the motion for stay and to compel arbitration is quashed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent herewith. BOOTH, C.J., and WIGGINTON and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. . In Harper v. Continental Can Company, 411 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), the court held: Section 13.10 of the master collective bargaining Agreement, under which appellants sought review of the prior dispute settlement procedure, provides that the arbitrator’s decision will be binding on the parties…
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McGHEE v. Ogburn, 707 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1983)…or legal basis for the cause of action, the two-year statute applies. The only Florida case we are aware of to apply a different limitation period to an employment termination case which could result in back wages is Harper v. Continental Can Co., 411 So. 2d 1002 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982). There the plaintiffs sought to set aside an arbitration award denying a grievance filed by the employees following their terminations. The court applied the shorter 90-day limitation period provided by the Florida Arbitration…
Authorities Cited
- NEW Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980)
- Gordon v. City OF Belle Glade, 132 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)
- Int'l Bhd. OF Pulp v. ST. Regis Paper Co., 362 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1966)
- Nat'l Airlines v. Metcalf, 114 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- AIR Line Pilots Ass'n v. E. AIR Lines, Inc., 632 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1980)
- Edsel Heinlein and Clara Heinlein v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 216 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Smith v. Daws, 614 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1980)