ZAC SMITH & COMPANY, INC. AND LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, PETITIONERS,
v.
MOONSPINNER CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that a third-party beneficiary to a construction contract is bound by an arbitration clause contained in that contract, reversing the trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration. The decision establishes that third-party beneficiaries' rights are measured by the contract terms, including any arbitration provisions.
An arbitration clause in a contract is binding on a third-party beneficiary. A third-party beneficiary's rights depend upon and are measured by the terms of the contract between the promisor and promisee, including any arbitration provisions. Section 682.03, Florida Statutes applies to third-party beneficiaries and subjects them to the arbitration agreement.
[1] A third-party beneficiary to a contract containing an arbitration clause is bound by that clause.
[2] A third-party beneficiary's rights under a contract are measured by the terms of the contract between the promisor and the promisee.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A third-party beneficiary's rights depend upon, and are measured by, the terms of the contract between the promisor and the promisee.”
Establishes the foundational principle that third-party beneficiaries are bound by all contract terms, including arbitration clauses
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMoonspinner Condominium Association filed suit against Zac Smith & Company, Inc. and others for negligence and breach of contract, alleging constructi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Construction Contract Interpretation cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking review of the trial court’s denial of petitioners’, Zac Smith & Company, Inc., and Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company’s, motion to stay and compel arbitration, pursuant to Section 682.03, Florida Statutes (1983), of the matters contained in the complaint of respondent, Moonspinner Condominium Association, Inc. Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners and others in negligence and breach of contract, alleging defects in the design and construction of a condominium. In that suit, respondent condominium association claims it is a third-party beneficiary of the construction contract between Zac Smith & Company, Inc. and Gulf Moon Corporation. Petitioners moved in the trial court for a stay and to compel arbitration, alleging that respondent was bound by an arbitration provision in the construction contract between petitioner and Gulf Moon Corporation, the contract to which respondent alleges it is a third-party beneficiary. The trial court denied petitioners’ motion on the ground that the third-party beneficiary was not required to abide by the arbitration clause contained in the contract.
On appeal, the issue presented is whether an arbitration clause in a contract is binding on a third-party beneficiary. We hold that it is. A third-party beneficiary’s rights depend upon, and are measured by, the terms of the contract between the promisor and the promisee. 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 315 (1964).
“Where the contract contains an arbitration clause which is legally enforceable, the general view is that the beneficiary is bound thereby to the same extent that the promisee is bound.” 2 Williston on Contracts (3d ed.) § 364A (1959).1
We hold that Section 682.03, Florida Statutes (1983),2 applies to third-party beneficiaries to a contract containing an arbitration clause, such as in the instant case, and subjects the third-party beneficiary to the arbitration agreement.
Accordingly, the writ is granted, the order denying the motion for stay and to compel arbitration is quashed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.
BOOTH, C.J., and WIGGINTON and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. . In Harper v. Continental Can Company, 411 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), the court held:
Section 13.10 of the master collective bargaining Agreement, under which appellants sought review of the prior dispute settlement procedure, provides that the arbitrator’s decision will be binding on the parties. As third-party beneficiaries of the agreement, appellants have the same rights with the same limitations as promisee — union, and, since the union could proceed in arbitration, including moving to set aside an arbitration decision, appellants, as employees and beneficiaries, could do likewise.
. Section 682.03, Florida Statutes, in pertinent part:
(1) A party to an agreement or provision for arbitration subject to this law claiming the neglect or refusal of another party thereto to comply therewith may make application to the court for an order directing the parties to proceed with arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (20 total)
-
Terminix Int'l Co., LP v. Ponzio, 693 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…1985). As third party beneficiaries, these additional plaintiffs are bound by the arbitration provision. See Raffa Assoc. v. Boca Raton Resort & Club, 616 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Zac Smith & Co., Inc. v. Moonspinner Condominium Assoc., Inc. 472 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). We reverse the order denying Terminix’s motion to dismiss and remand with instructions that the claims be referred to arbitration. REVERSED AND REMANDED. GRIFFIN and ANTOON, JJ., concur. . Jurisdiction is predicated on Flori…
-
Breckenridge v. Farber, 640 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…ither by virtue of his third party beneficiary status or his then-existing employee-employer relationship with Thomson McKinnon. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Goldstein, 615 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Zac Smith & Co. v. Moonspinner Condo. Ass’n, 472 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Melamed, 453 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Thus, as the broker may enforce the rights of the signature card, so may the obligations attached to these rights be enforced against hi…
-
Mendez v. Hampton Court Nursing Ctr., LLC, 203 So. 3d 146 (Fla. 2016)…iting Terminix Int’l Co., LP v. Ponzio, 693 So. 2d 104, 109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (“As third party beneficiaries, these additional plaintiffs are bound by the arbitration provision.”)); see also Zac Smith & Co., Inc. v. Moonspinner Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 472 So. 2d 1324, 1324 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (holding that “an arbitration clause in a contract is binding on a third-party beneficiary”). This is true even if the third-party beneficiary-did not sign the contract containing the arbitration agreement: “[A] nonsignator…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 20 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Harper v. Cont'l CAN Co., Inc., 411 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)