STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
GARY LOUIS FREEMAN, J. C. CONYERS, APPELLEES
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The State appealed orders discharging defendants Conyers and Freeman for failure to bring them to trial within 180 days of arrest. The Florida appellate court reversed, holding that defendants who sought continuances to prepare their defense waived the initial 180-day speedy trial deadline under Rule 3.191.
The court held that defendants who file motions seeking postponement of trial dates under pre-1981 Rule 3.191 waive the initial 180-day speedy trial deadline. After waiver, defendants must file a demand for trial or motion to discharge to commence running of other time periods under the Rule. Therefore, the speedy trial time had not run when Conyers and Freeman filed their discharge motions.
[1] A defendant who seeks a postponement of their trial date waives the initial speedy trial time limit.
[2] After waiving the initial speedy trial time limit, a defendant must file a demand for trial or motion to discharge to recommence the running of speedy trial periods.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a defendant who seeks a postponement under the pre-1981 Amendment to Rule 3.191, 'waives' the initial one hundred eighty (180) day time limit, and thereafter, it is necessary for a defendant to file a demand for trial or motion to discharge in order to commence the running of the other time periods under the Rule”
Establishes the core legal principle that seeking a continuance waives the initial 180-day speedy trial deadline
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceConyers and Freeman were arrested in 1980. On March 11, 1981, both defendants filed motions seeking extensions of their trial dates because their atto…
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SHARP, Judge.
The State brings a consolidated appeal from orders discharging defendants Con-yers and Freeman because of failure of the State to bring them to trial within one hundred eighty (180) days of their arrests.1 We reverse.
Conyers and Freeman were both arrested in 1980. On March 11, 1981, both filed motions seeking extensions of their trial dates because their attorneys were unable to depose all of the material witnesses in preparation for trial. The motions sought to .“preserve” the defendants’ “right to a speedy trial.” On March 11, 1981, the court entered orders granting a continuance and resetting the trial for Conyers on June 10, 1981 and for Freeman on June 9, 1981. On March 23, 1981, the trial judge entered an additional order “extending” the speedy trial time, in Freeman’s case (but not Con-yers’) until June 9, 1981. Freeman’s trial date was continued again by the State and reset by the court for June 30, 1981. Con-yers filed a motion for discharge on June 30, 1981, and Freeman filed his on June 25, 1981.
We think the speedy trial time, in both cases, had not run at the time the defendants filed their respective motions for discharge because both filed motions which sought a postponement of the original trial dates, which were timely under the Rule. The case law is well-established that a defendant who seeks a postponement under the pre-1981 Amendment2 to Rule 3.191, “waives” the initial one hundred eighty (180) day time limit,3 and thereafter, it is necessary for a defendant to file a demand for trial or motion to discharge in order to commence the running of the other time periods under the Rule. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla.1980); State v. Moss, 395 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). We do not deem material in Freeman’s case, whether or not the second order called the judge’s action an “extension” rather than a “continuance,” because the subsequent order did not vacate the first, and substantive rights should not turn on semantics. State ex rel. Lee v. Harper, 372 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Neither Conyers nor Freeman asserted or attempted to establish violation of their constitutional right to speedy trial.4
For the reasons stated herein, this case is
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
COBB and FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur. . Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191.
. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191 (1981) does not apply to Conyers and Freeman because they were arrested in 1980. See Holmes v. Leffler, 411 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla.1980); State v. Moss, 395 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); State v. Register, 380 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); State v. Kurtz, 354 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. McCRERY, 429 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…” waiver of their right to speedy trial, neither extended nor tolled the running of the period for speedy trial as contemplated by subsection (d)(2) of the Rule. The order simply continued the trial as the defendants requested. In State v. Freeman, 412 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), Freeman and his co-defendant both filed motions seeking “extensions of their trial dates” because defense counsel stated that they were unable to complete their pre-trial discovery. Their motions sought to “preserve” their “righ…
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Garcia v. State, 474 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)…te met its burden. The extension was only for approximately one month. The reason Garcia was not then brought to trial on that date was the granting of his own motion to stay. Cf. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla.1980); State v. Freeman, 412 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). Thereafter, he was brought to trial well within ninety days after the disposition of the co-defendants’ petition for writ of prohibition as Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(g) requires. Accordingly, he is not entitled to…
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JAY v. State, 443 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…’s motion pursuant to Rule 3.191(d)(3). Id. at 970 (e.s.). See also State v. Lazarus, 433 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); State v. McCrery, 429 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Brownlee v. State, 427 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); State v. Freeman, 412 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Rogers v. Keating, 411 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 419 So. 2d 1200 (Fla.1982). The record is clear that appellant was ready to go to trial on these charges on February 8, 1982 and that appellant made no requests for…
Authorities Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972)
- Honorable Robert A. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1980)
- State v. Kurtz, 354 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Holmes v. The Honorable Kenneth M. Leffler, 411 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Keenan v. State, 372 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- State v. Harmon Eugene Register, 380 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- State v. Moss, 395 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)