JAMES D. CARROLL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1982-04-21
No. ZZ-223
MILLS, WENTWORTH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
412 So. 2d 972 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1982) Negative Treatment
Cited by 16 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Carroll sought rehearing on his 20-year sentence for second-degree murder and denial of youthful offender status. The court granted rehearing on the sentencing issue, finding the trial court properly imposed a 20-year sentence because enhancement under Florida Statutes § 775.087(1) applies only to the crime charged (first-degree murder, a capital felony), not the crime of conviction (second-degree murder). The court affirmed the denial of youthful offender status because Carroll had a prior felony conviction and was not entitled to mandatory classification.


Holding

Enhancement under § 775.087(1) applies only to the crime charged, not the crime of conviction. Because Carroll was charged with a capital felony (first-degree murder) which cannot be enhanced, the 20-year sentence for second-degree murder was proper. Carroll is excluded from mandatory youthful offender classification due to his prior felony conviction, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying such status.


Headnotes

[1] A felony sentence enhancement under Section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1979), is proper only against the crime charged, not the crime for which a defendant is ultimate…

[2] A defendant previously convicted of a felony is not automatically precluded from youthful offender status.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“enhancement and reclassification of felonies pursuant to Section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1979), is proper only against the crime charged, rather than the crime for which he was ultimately convicted”

Establishes the central holding that enhancement applies to the charged offense, not the convicted offense

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Carroll was charged with first-degree murder. At his plea hearing on May 15, 1980, he pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in one case and nolo cont…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Carroll seeks rehearing and contends this Court erred in improperly enhancing his sentence of twenty years for second degree murder and in affirming the trial court’s denial of youthful offender status. His motion is well taken regarding the enhancement of his sentence and rehearing is granted as to that issue. We deny, however, the motion regarding the trial court’s denial of youthful offender status.

Carroll correctly asserts that enhancement and reclassification of felonies pursuant to Section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1979), is proper only against the crime charged, rather than the crime for which he was ultimately convicted. In this case, he was charged with first degree murder, a capital felony. He ultimately pleaded guilty to and was adjudged guilty of second degree murder, a first degree felony. Under the statute, it is not possible to enhance the crime charged, a capital felony. Therefore, the trial court’s sentence of twenty years was a proper sentence in this case.

Carroll incorrectly argues, however, that he is entitled to youthful offender classification. At the plea hearing of May 15, 1980, he pleaded guilty to second degree murder in this case and pleaded nolo con-tendere to attempted second degree murder, a second degree felony, in another case. The trial judge adjudicated him guilty of both offenses and postponed sentencing until a later date. Therefore, at the time of sentencing, he had previously been convicted of a felony (attempted second degree murder) other than the one for which he sought sentencing as a youthful offender (second degree murder).

While not being precluded from youthful offender status by the contemporaneous conviction of two felonies, Carroll is excluded from mandatory classification as a youthful offender. State v. Goodson, 403 So. 2d 1337 (Fla.1981). Therefore, whether to grant youthful offender status to him was discretionary with the trial court. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s denial since no abuse of discretion has been shown.

This Court’s opinion filed on February 9, 1982, is vacated and set aside. Rehearing is granted in part and denied in part, and the judgment and sentence is affirmed.

MILLS, WENTWORTH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Overfelt v. State, 434 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
    …ent of waiver to the effect that the defendant had the burden of securing such findings from the jury. . This case is presently pending on rehearing before the Supreme Court of Florida. . We also note with interest the holding in Carroll v. State, 412 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Carroll looks at Section 775.087 and makes the distinction between the reclassification section which uses the words, “whenever a person is charged," and the mandatory minimum section which uses the words, “any person who is con…
  • Miller v. State, 460 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1984)
    …ALDERMAN, Justice. We review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Miller v. State, 438 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), which directly expressly conflicts with Carroll v. State, 412 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Since our acceptance of jurisdiction in the present case on the basis of conflict, the First District, in an en banc opinion, has expressly receded from its holding in Carroll. Cooper v. State, 455 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…
  • Cooper v. State, 455 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
    …degree murder, a first degree felony by reclassification under section 775.087(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1983). We affirm the trial court’s holding that the offenses are first degree felonies and recede from this court’s holdings in Carroll v. State, 412 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) and Smith v. State, 445 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). All necessarily included offenses and lesser included offenses are “charged” within the meaning of section 775.087. This is a concept of fundamental fairness in the crimin…

Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw